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and
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Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,
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to

exte:n4 and renew the tenn of Pla:intiff$'

("LeSliees") cottage site leases for one year throll,ib Dec=nber 31, 2011 under the existing tenus

in lessees l

CUlTOn!

leases. '!'he Land Board also vot.cll to iIlst::met the Idaho Dq:l8ftnl,ent of Lands

(IIDepartment of Lands") to give notice to Lessees that cottage .ue lea&B$ in 20 U will be offered
at a. tental rate of four p~ of ourren.t value of eb.e lease p3'CJllie.es for a pori04 of ten years in

accordance with applicable law.

The Land Board unanimously decided that its lI":tion $t the

December 211 2010 meetiag suptntedes the lOtion it took at its Marcb 16, 2010 tI1eIlIting.
Because the Land Board's aetion at the l\!arch 16 meeUng WM tbe basis for some of Lessees'
claims in their Amended Cotnplaint, filed. with this Court on Nowm~

la,

2010, the partie~

have agreed that the Court should dismiss those parti.CUlar cWms.
THE :PARTIES TBEREBORE AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

1.

That COUNT ill - Declaratory Judgment (Rega.rdl~ the: I..a-Qd Board's Violation

of the Idaho Constitution) - ofth.e Amended Complaint shall be dismissed without ~1.l.dice.
2.

That COUNT IV - DeDlua.tory Judgxncnt (:Regarding the Land Bc,atd) iii Violation

ofte. § S8-310A) - of the Amended Complaint I!lhAtl be Qiamis£ed without prc:j'Udlee.

3.

TbAt COUNT V - Declaratory Judgrnen1 (R.egardiug tbe Land Board's

Unoon!ltitutional Application ofI.C. § 58-310A) - o(the Am.ended CompWnt shall be dis.tr!.issed

vritbout prejudice.
4.

That COUNT V1 - lnj1ll\Ctive Relief - of the Amcmde4 Complaint ahall bt::

dismissed without p:rejudice.
5.

That no costs or attomey fees

¥1Cci.at.ed

with the above claims in tbii oase shall

be award.cd to either party.
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Merlyn W. Clark, ISB No. 1026
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5210
Email: mclark@hawleytroxell.com
jashby@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendants Idaho Board of Land
Commissioners and George Bacon
IN THE DISTRICT COeRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST, et aI.,

)
)

Case No. CV 201 0-436C

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

vs.

)
)

IDAHO BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS; and GEORGE BACON,
in his official capacity as Director of the Idaho
Department of Lands,

)
)
}
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT
CLAIMS AND IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOnON FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS

)

Defendants.

)
">

The Idaho Board of Land Commissioners and George Bacon (collectively, the "Land
Board" or "Board"), submit this memorandum in support of its

Cross~Motion

for Summary

Judgment Re: Contract Claims and in opposition to Plaintiffs' (the "Payette Lessees") Motion for
Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims.
MEMORANDUM TN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS AND IN
OPPOS]TION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
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I. INTRODUCTION
1n Counts I and 2 of their Amended Complaint, the Payette Lessees contend that they
have a contractual right to renew their cottage site leases for a I O-year tenn at the 2.5% rental
rate provided for in their prior leases (the "200 1 Lease" or "Lease"), which expired on December
31,2010. The cross-motions for summary judgment present two issues. The Lessees carmot
prevail on either issue, and summary judgment accordingly should be granted to the Land Board.
The threshold question is jurisdictional: Whether this action can be maintained at all
outside the context of a petition for judicial review under the Idaho Administrative Procedure
Act ("lAP A"), Idaho Code §§ 67-5201 to -5291. No matter how they characterize these counts,
the Payette Lessees cannot escape the fact that they can suffer a legally cognizable injury only
from an "agency action," as defined in § 67·520 I (3), by the Land Board. When this lawsuit was
filed in October 2010, that action was the Board's March 16,2010 direction to the Department of
Lands to prepare and forward to the Payette Lessees, as well as to the Priest Lake cottage-site
lessees, a lease form for purposes of soliciting applications for the 20 11 ~2021 period and,
conceivably, the Department's March 31,2010 letter from its Bureau Chief of Surface and
Mineral Resources. The Land Board's March 16 action and necessarily the Department's March
31 letter, however, was superseded by its action on December 21, 2010 that directed the
Department to offer to the Payette Lessees and their Priest Lake counterparts one-year leases
containing the same terms as those expiring on December 31, 2010, including a rental rate of
2.5% of current market value. The Department additionally was directed to begin preparation of
a 1O-year lease containing a rental rate of 4% of current value of the lease premises and no
provision for the premium rent. The Board's December action must be challenged under lAPA's
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS AND IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
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judicial review provisions and LR.C.P. 84, and the Lessees have done precisely that in judicial
review petitions filed on January 18,2011, which challenge the Board's December 21,2010
actions. See Babcock v. Stale Board oj Land Commissioners, No. CV 2011 ~20C (4th Jud. Dist.,
Valley County) ("Babcock If') (contract-based challenges), and Babcock v. State Board o/Land

Commissioners, No. CV 2011-16C (4th Jud. Dist., Valley County) ("Babcock IIf')
(constitutional and statutory challenges).l
Even if this Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction, however, the Payette Lessees
could not prevail on the merits. The 2001 Lease provides in Section C.l.l that the Land Board
"may" renew leases "as determined by the [Land Board] at the [Land Board's) discretion
pursuant to I.C. § 58-31 OA." This contract Janguage admits of no ambiguity; i.e., it says exactly
what it means, and means exactly what it says. Nothing in a wholly unrelated provision Section K.l.4.b - that deals with the purchase of improvements by the Land Board in the event
that an existing lessee's lease-renewal application is denied alters the Board's authority under
Section C.l.1 to set the tenns and conditions of new, or renewal, leases. Not only is the Payette
Lessees' position contrary to the cJear terms of the 2001 Lease, but it is contrary to the Idaho
Constitution, which requires the Land Board to secure the maximum long term financial return

from endowment lands. It is also contrary to Idaho Code § 58-31 OA, which requires the Land

Board to lease cottage sites at "market rent." In fact, the Payette Lessees' position that they have
a right to renew leases at the rental rate of prior leases was squarely rejected by the ldaho
Supreme Court in Allen v. Smylie, 92 Idaho 846, 848,452 P.2d 343, 345 (1969).

I The petitions for review in Babcock 11 and 111 are appended as Exhibits A and B to the of
MEMORA~DUM
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
A.

Background Of The "Cottage Site" Endowment Lands
The Idaho Department of Lands is the executive agency established to administer state

endoVl.ment lands. See Idaho Code §§ 58-101 and -119. George Bacon is the Director of the
Idaho Department of Lands. See Amended Complaint, ~ 5. Under Article IX, § 8 oftbe Idaho
Constitution, the Land Board is the trustee of public schools, normal schools and state hospital
endo\J,'lllent lands. The Land Board consists of five members: the Governor, the Secretary of
State, the Attorney General, the Controller and the Superintendent of Public Instruction. See
Idaho Const, Art. IX, § 7; Idaho Code § 58-101.
The Land Board is the trustee for almost 2.5 miJJion acres of endowment lands granted to
1daho at statehood for the purpose of supporting public schools and other public institutions. See
Affidavit of Bob Brammer, filed Kovember 18,2010 ("First Brammer Aff."), Exh. B. Idaho's
endowment trust assets include 35410t5 on Priest Lake and 168 lots on Payette Lake. Id. The
State leases the lots, and lessees are authorized to construct and

OVv11

single-family residences on

the sites. Id. The lots are generally referred to as "cottage sites."

B.

Constitutional And Statutory Background
Article IX, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution provides that the Land Board "shall have

direction, control and disposition of the public lands of the state, under such regulations as may
be prescribed by law." Article IX, Section 8 further states that the Land Board shall provide for
the sale or rental of endowment lands "under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and
in such manner as will secure the maximum long-term financial return." Idaho Code § 58-310A

Merlyn W. Clark ("Clark Aff."), filed concurrently herewith.
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provides that "maximum long-term financial returns to the institutions to which granted are best
obtained through stable teases at market rent."
With regard to leases of endowment land. the Land Board has express statutory authority
to determine lease rental rates. See Idaho Code § 58-304 ("The state board of land
commissioners may Jease any portion of the state land at a rental amount fixed and determined
by the board."). Moreover, the Idaho Administrative Code grants the Land Board discretion to
set the annual lease rate for cottage site leases. See IDAPA 20.03.13.026 ("Annual rental shall
be set by the board from time to time as they deem necessary.") (emphasis added).

C.

Background Of The 2001 Lease
As set forth in the Amended Complaint, the Payette Lessees andlor their predecessors in

interest, entered into the 2001 Lease for certain cottage site lots surrounding Payette Lake.
Amended Complaint,

~

]2; see also First Brammer Aff., Exh. A The 2001 Leases were for a

1O-year terms and expired on December 31, 20] O. ld. (cover page, providing that "This lease
shall commence JANUARY 1,2001. and terminate DECEMBER 31, 2010"). The 2001 Lease
provides for annual rent of2.5% of the fee simple value of the leased premises, adjusted annually
based on assessed values determined by Valley County. !d at ~ 1.1.
The 2001 Lease provides that lease renewals "may be granted by the [Land Board] as
determined by the [Land Board] at the [Land Board's] discretion pursuant to I.e. § 58-310A."

Id. at , C.I.l (emphasis added). Consistent with the lease provision that any renewal will be "as
determined by the [Land Board], ,- the 2001 Lease does not state the rental rate that might apply
to any renewal lease.
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D.

Background Of The Action Taken By The Land Board To Determine The Terms
And Conditions For The 2011 Cottage Site Leases
In recognition of the fact that the 2001 Leases expire on December 31,2010, the Land

Board has been working for several years to determine the appropriate terms for new leases to go
into effect on January 1,2011. The Land Board began this process in 2007 by establishing a
Cottage Site Subcommittee (the "Subcommittee"), which consists of Secretary of State Ben
Ysursa and Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Luna. First Brammer Aff, Exh. B.
The Land Board also considered severa) leasing methodologies and rental structures
presented by various Subcommittee members, individual leaseholders andior representatives of
the respective lessee associations. Representatives of the Payette Lake Cabin Owner's
Association, including its president andlor its former legal counsel, addressed the Subcommittee
in meetings on April 22, 2008, June 16,2009, February 16,2010 and March 16,2010. See
Second Brammer Aff., Exhs. A-C; First Brammer Afr., Exh. C. At no time during those
meetings did the Payette Lessees assert that they had a contractual right to renew their leases at
the older 2.5% rate. Rather, they urged that the new leases be issued at "market rate." Id.
On March 16,2010, in a 3-2 vote, the Land Board voted to implement a 4% lease rate,
effective January 1,201 L See First Brammer Afr., Exh. C, p. 36-37. That 4% rate would have
been phased in over 5 years and would have been based on the average value of the leased land
over the prior lO years. On December 17,2011, Fourth Judicial District Court Judge Deborah
Bail issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Board from implementing the Board's
March 16, 20 I 0 decision pending a hearing on the merits of constitutional challenges brought by
the Attorney General. As currently pled, the Attorney General asserts that Idaho Code § 58310A is unconstitutional by its elimination of the public auction requirement in Article lX,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS AND IN
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Section 8. See Clark Aff., Exh. C. On December 21, 2010, the Land Board reconvened and
voted to offer to renew the existing cottage site leases for a term of one year at the existing rental
rate of 2.5%. In addition, the Board voted to implement a simple 4% rental rate for cottage site
leases issued beginning in 2012. See Second Brammer Aff., Exh. E.
E.

Procedural Posture
The lawsuit filed by the Payette Lessees is one of five recent lawsuits, including the suit

challenging the constitutionality of § 58·31 OA pending before Judge Bail, related to the cottage
site leasing. The first commenced on March 24, 2010, when the Attorney General filed a
Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the Idaho Supreme Court contending that the lease rate
adopted by the Land Board at its March 16, 2010 meeting for the 2011-2021 leases failed to
secure the maximum long term financial return for the endowment lands' beneficiaries as
mandated under Article IX, Section 8. See Affidavit ofD. John Ashby, filed November 18,2010
("Ashby Aff."), Exh. A. The Board sought dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Prohibition. Id.
at Exh. C. The Payette Lake Cabin Owner's Association 2 obtained permission to participate in
the Idaho Supreme Court action as an amicus curiae and to submit a brief in opposition to the
petition. ld. at Exh. D. In their brief, the Association did not argue that they had a contractual
right to renew the 2001 Lease at the old 2.5% lease rate. Instead, they agreed with the Land
Board that its duty was to charge "market rent." Specifically, they argued that the Land Board
"has jurisdiction to charge market rent," but that, "because the [March 16,2010] figure
advocated by the Board is above market rent, the Board has acted in excess of its jurisdiction."
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Id. at pp. 12, 14. The petition was dismissed subsequently on ground that the Attorney General
possessed another adequate remedy in the fonn ofa declaratory judgment action. See Wasden ex
rei. State v. Idaho State Bd. of Land Comm'rs, No.3 7528, 2010 WL 5186728 (Idaho S. Ct. Dec.

23,2010) (substitute opinion for opinion issued on December 1,2010).
Immediately after the original opinion in the ~Tit of prohibition proceeding was issued,
the Attorney General filed a declaratory judgment action against the Land Board in this Court
referred to above and now pending before Judge Bail. See Clark Aff., Exh. C. That action,
again, challenges the constitutionality of § 58-31 OA because of its exempting cottage site leases
from the public auction process) The action alternatively challenged the constitutionality of the
rental rate adopted at the Land Board's March 16, 2010 meeting and the rate's compliance with
"market rent" requirement in § 58-31 OA, but those claims were dismissed by stipulation of the
parties in light of the Land Board's December 21, 20 I 0 action that (1) rescinded the March 16,
2010 action, (2) offered to renew the existing cottage leases for a term of one year at the existing
renta1 rate of2.5% of the leased premises' current fee simple value, and adopted a straight 4%
rate for leases issued in 2012. Id. at' 3. As stated previously, the Payette Lessees recently filed
two petitionS-{lne predicated on alleged violations of the 2001 Lease and a second predicated
on alleged constitutional and statutory violations-challenging the actions approved in the
December 21,2010 motions. Clark Aff., Exhs. A & B.

2

The Plaintiffs in this case apparently consist of some, but not all, of the members of the
Payette Lake Cabin Owner's Association.
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III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P.56(c).
IV. ARGUMENT
This case does not involve factual disputes. Instead, it involves the purely legal questions
of whether this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction and whether the Payette Lessees have
a contractual right to renew the 2001 Leases at the old 2.5% lease rate. The first question is
dispositive and controlled by IAPA. The second question, if reached, is governed by settled
contract-interpretation principles establishing that the interpretation and legal effect of an
unambiguous contract are questions of law. Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434,
437, 18 P.3d 956,959 (2000). In construing a contract, a court should "consider it as a whole
and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible." Id. Like any other
contract, a lease should be construed according to its plain meaning. J.R. Simp/ot Co. v. Rycair,
Inc., 138 Idaho 557, 564, 67 P.3d 36, 43 (2003). "[C]ourts will presume parties to a contract
intended a lawfuJ construction thereof." Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners and Taxpayers. Inc.
V.

3

Kootenai County, ]04 Idaho 590, 595, 661 P.2d 756, 761 (1983).

Under that process, endov,'11lent land leases are auctioned off to the highest bidder in a
"conflict" auction if more than one application is received for the Jease of any particular
parcel of endowment land. See Idaho Code § 58-310.
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A.

Counts 1 And 2 Are Cognizable Only In The Context Of An IAPA Judicial Review
Proceeding
The Amended Complaint alleges that "[b]ased on the last correspondence Plaintiffs

received from the Department of Lands, dated March 31, 20 I 0, which included a draft of the
new lease, Plaintiffs believe the renewal leases wi1l contain new and different terms than those
contained in the current leases, including but not limited to the increased rental rate formula of
4% of land value." Amended Complaint, at ~ 27. As discussed above, the Land Board's March
16, 2010 action has been superseded by the motions approved at its December 21, 20 10 meeting
and therefore renders moot any alleged harm from either the Board's or the Department's actions
in March 2010. See, e.g., Farrellv. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604,610, 200P.3d 1153,1159(2009)
(" A case becomes moot \-vhen the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome."). The Payette Lessees' remedy, to the extent that they are
aggrieved by the Land Board's December action, lies in an IAPA-basedjudicial review
proceeding challenging the December action,

1.

The Exclusive Remedy For Review Of The Land Board's Decisions Related
To The Lease Is Through A Petition For JUdicial Review

While the Payette Lessees label Counts 1 and 2 of their Complaint as "breach of
contract" claims, their exclusive remedy lies in the form of an IAPA-basedjudicial review
proceeding. Idaho Code § 67-5269 provides that a "person aggrieved by final agency action
other than an order in a contested case4 is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the
person complies with the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code." The

Jdaho Code § 58-122 provides that the Land Board's decisions related to the disposition of
public lands "shall not be considered to be contested cases ...."
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Idaho Supreme Court has held that that Land Board "is an 'agency' as defined by I.e. § 67-

5201 (2) and the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the State Board of Land
Commissioners," and that its decisions are subject to judicial review. Idaho Watersheds Project.

Inc. v. Stale Bd. of Land Comm 'rs, 128 Idaho 76 t, 764, 918 P.2d 1206, 1209 (1996).
Idaho Code § 67-5201(3) defines "Agency action" as follows:
(a) The whole or part of a rule or order;
(b) The failure to issue a rule or order; or
(c) An agency's performance of, or failure to perform, any duty
placed on it by law.
The Land Board's December 21, 20] 0 is subject to judicial review because it is an
agency "order" that determines the rights of the Payette Lessees with regard to the lease of
cottage sites. See Idaho Code § 67-5201 (3) (defining "Order" as "an agency action of particu)ar
applicability that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal
interests of one (l) or more specific persons"). Moreover, the December 21, 2010 decision
constitutes the Board's "performance of, or failure to perform, any duty placed on it by law," as
it is the Land Board's attempt to comply with its constitutional and statutory obligations. See
Idaho Cons1., Art. IX, § 8 ("It shall be the duty of the state board ofland commissioners to
provide for the location, protection, sale or rental of [endowment lands J ... in such manner as
will secure the maximum long~term financial return to the institution to which granted .... ");
Idaho Code § 58-310A ("[T]he board shall insure that each leased lot generates market rent
throughout the duration of the lease.").
Given that the Land Board's December 21, 2010 decision is agency action subject to
judicial review, judicial review under lAP A is the exclusive remedy for challenging the Land
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Board's decision. See Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 847-48, 693 P.2d 1046, 1049-50
(1984). In Bone, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that a petition for judicial review under
lAPA is a "complete, detailed, and exhaustive remedy upon which an aggrieved party can
appeal" an adverse agency decision. Jd. Accordingly, the Court held that, where judicial review
is available, judicial review "is the exclusive source of appear' for adverse agency decisions. Jd.
"To hold otherwise would render the mandate of [IAPA] meaningless, for it would allow an
applicant to bypass [lAPA] by seeking different avenues ofappeaJ with different levels of
judicial scrutiny." Jd.; see also Cobbley v. City a/Challis, 143 Idaho

no. 133-34, 139 P.3d 732,

735-36 (2006) ("It therefore goes almost without saying that if the exclusive and otherwise
unavailabje method is set forth in the provided-for judicial review procedures, one cannot
challenge in a separate civil

SUil

the action of a board where that board has acted on matters

within its jurisdiction."); Heath v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 134 Idaho 407,409-410,3 P.3d 532,
534-35 (Cl. App. 2000) (explaining that a party aggrieved by an agency decision cannot bring a
declaratory judgment action as a substitute for a petition for judicial review).

2.

The Payette Lessees Lack Standing To Bring Claims Outside Of A Petition
For Judicial Review OfTbe Land Board's December 21, 2010 Action

The Payette Lessees' claims for relief are predicated exclusively on the Land Board's
taking certain actions that purportedly violate a contractual duty. Absent those actions, the
Payette Lessees suffer no harm and thus possess

no standing to maintain the claims.

Idaho law follows federal precedent as to standing and thus applies a three-part standing

analysis. As the Idaho Supreme Court explained over two decades ago in the seminal Miles v.
Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989), the first prerequisite of standing is
injury-in-fact:
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"The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking 10 invoke the
court's jurisdiction has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the
presentation upon which the court so depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions: As refined by subsequent reformation, this requirement
of 'personal stake' has come to be understood to require not only a 'distinct
palpable injury' to the plaintiff, but also a 'fairly traceable' causal connection
between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct."
116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (citations omitted». Without such injury, there is no harm to be caused
and nothing for the Judicial Branch to redress. There is, instead, only an abstract dispute that
might, or might not, arise in the future - precisely the type of purported controversy repeatedly
deemed non-justiciable by the Supreme Court. E.g., Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513,
516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1993) ('" A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a
difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or
moot. .. , The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests.''') (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41
(1937». As the quoted Aetna Life decision indicates, that a request for declaratory relief is at
stake does not alter these fundamental principles. See Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass 'n v. Slate ex reI.
Andrus, 127 Idaho 239, 245,899 P.2d 949, 955 (1995) ("\Vhile the Declaratory Judgment Act
may potentially expand the scope of remedies available to the environmental groups ifthey are
ultimately successful, it does not relieve them of the obligation to demonstrate that they have
standing to bring the action in the first instance.").
Here. the only source of injury to the Payette Lessees' asserted contractual rights is action
taken by the Land Board at its December 21, 20 10 meeting. Any challenge to that action must
be filed, and resolved, consistently with IAPA'sjudicial review procedures and I.R.C.P. 84. The
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Lessees have so recognized by challenging the Board's December 21,2010 actions in the
recently-filed lAP A judicial-review proceedings and, specifically, Babcock II. This Court
accordingly lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Counts 1 and 2.

B.

The 2001 Lease Does Not Grant The Payette Lessees A Right Of Renewal
The Payette Lessees' breach of contract claim relies on the assumption that they have a

contractual right to renew the 2001 Lease for another 1O-year term at the same 2.5% lease rate.

See Amended Complaint, , 29. The 2001 Lease grants them no such right.
"A tenant who wants a right of renewal must reach an agreement with the landlord and
whatever right the tenant has is governed by the terms of the agreement.'· 49 Am. Jur. 2d. § 134

(2010). "[A]n option or right to renew a Lease is not presumed, and specific language granting
the renewal or extension right is required." Id; see also Milton R. Friedman, Friedman on

Leases § 14:1 (4th ed. 1997) ("A landlord is not bound to renew a lease without an express
covenant to this effect."); Stroh v. Alaska State Hous. Au/h., 459 P.2d 480, 482 (Alaska 1969)
("A tenant's right of renewal of a lease refers to a legal right, and this exists only when the lease
expressly grants to the tenant the option to renew the lease at the end of its tenn.").

Here, the 200 I Lease does not grant the Payette Lessees a right to renew the 2001 Lease
at all, much less a1 the 2.5% lease rate. Rather, the 2001 Lease provides that a renewal "mal: be
granted by the [Land Board]." See First Brammer Aff., Exh. A, ,.. C.I.l (emphasis added).
Moreover, the 200 1 Lease expressly provides that any renewal will be granted "as determined by
the [Land Board] at the [Land Board'] discretion pursuant to I.e. § 58·3 lOA." Id. (emphasis
added). Idaho Code § 5&-31 OA provides that the Land Board "shall insure that each leased lot
generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease." (Emphasis added.) While the
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validity of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA is at issue in the ongoing action filed by the Attorney General,
that challenge is directed to another issue not raised by the parties here: the very constitutionality

of § 58-31 OA. The statute's requirement that the each cottage site generate "market rent" is
merely a restatement ofthe constitutional requirement that the Land Board lease the cottage sites
"in such manner as wiH secure the maximum long-term financial retum." See Idaho Const., Art.
IX, § 8. 5
Thus, the language of the 2001 Lease makes clear that the Payette Lessees have no
contractual right to a renewal. Rather, the Land Board "may" grant a renewal if it chooses to do
so. If the Land Board chooses to offer a renewal of the lease, the renewal will be offered "as
determined by the Land Board," i.e., on terms determined by the Land Board.
C.

The 2001 Lease Must Be Iuterpreted Consistent With Idaho Law

"[C]ourts

~;11

presume parties to a contract intended a lawful construction thereof." See

Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners, 104 Idaho at 595. indeed, the 200 I Lease expressly
incorporates the Idaho statutes regulating cottage sites. See First Brammer Aff., Exh. A, " X.I.6
("This Lease is subject to all current and subsequently enacted statutes, rule, regulations and laws
applicable to state endowment lands or this lease."). The 2001 Lease provides that a lessee may
"apply to renew this lease in the manner provided by law."
The Lease's reference to renewing a lease "in the marmer provide by 1aw" refers to Idaho
Code § 58-307, the statute that sets forth the general procedure for renewing leases. Section 58307 provides that "[a)1I applications to lease or to renew an existing lease which expires

5

The Land Board intends to follow, and is required to follow, Idaho Code § 58-31OA unless
and until changed by the legislature or ruled unconstitutional by a court.
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December 31 of any year, sha1l be tiled in the office of the director of the department of lands by
the thirtieth day of April preceding the date of such expiration." The statute does not provide
that the Land Board must renew the leases, nor does it provide that renewals will be on the same
terms as prior leases. Instead, it simply provides that the renewal applications "will be
considered by the state land board and be disposed of in the manner provided by law." Id As
discussed below, although Section K.lA of the 200 I Lease provides that "(aJ reguest for renewal
by the Lessee shaH not be unreasonably withheld," this provision does not require the Land
Board to renew the leases on the same terms as prior leases or, for that matter, to renew the
leases at all. (Emphasis added.)

D.

The 2001 Lease Interpretation Offered By The Payette Lessees Would Be Contrary
To Idaho Law
The Payette Lessees' contention that they are entitled to renew their leases for another

I O-year term at the 2.5% rental rate is inconsistent with the rule of contract construction that
"courts will presume parties to a contract intended a lawful construction thereof." Coeur d'Alene

Lakeshore Owners, 104 Idaho at 595. The cottage site leases are one-of-a-kind. Unlike
customary leases in which the parties are free to lease land on whatever terms they choose, the
cottage site leases are subject to constitutional and statutory restrictions. The Land Board is
constitutionally bound to lease the cottage sites "in such manner as will secure the maximum
long-tenn financial return." Idaho Canst., Art. IX, § 8. In furtherance of this constitutional
mandate, the Legislature has instructed the Board to charge "market rent," as determined in its
discretion. Idaho Code § 58-31 OA. Thus, the Land Board has no authority to contractually agree
to grant the lessees an automatic right to renew at the existing rental rate - an essential element
of their proffered interpretation of Section K.IA. b.
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has already reached that determination under similar
circumstances. In Allen v. Smylie, 92 Idaho 846, 848,452 P.2d 343, 345 (l969), the Court
considered whether a statutory "preferential right of rcnewa)" of mining leases on endowment
lands required the Land Board to renew leases on the same tenns as prior leases. The Court
explained that the preferential right of renewal must be read together with the Land Board's
constitutional duty to maximize returns on endowment lands. Id., 92 Idaho at 850. Because of
this constitutional duty, the Court explained that the statutory preferential right of renewal "is not
synonymous with an option to renew." ld. at 851. [nstead, a renewal would be "only on such
terms as the Land Board may propose." ld. Thus, "[i]t would be morc accurate to speak of the
right given by the statutes as a right of first refusal." Id Specifically, the Court explained that,
despite the statutory right of renewal, any new lease would be on terms determined by the Land
Board:
At the end of that term of years the provision of any new lease
must be upon such terms as determined by the Land Board. It
must be presumed that the Land Board at that time wiJ] exercise its
constitutional duty to obtain the maximum return for the State of
Idaho.

Jd. at 852 (emphasis added). Simply stated, the Board must exercise its constitutional and
statutory authority with careful attention to the circumstances existing, and the information
before it, when the new lease rates are formulated. The Payette Lessees straight-jacket~like
approach cannot be squared with this duty imposed on the Land Board.
While Allen involved a statutory renewal right rather than an alleged contractual renewal
right, it blazes the correct path for resolving the dispute here. The 2001 Lease contemplates that

it "may" be renewed "as determined by the [Land Board)," and any renewal right must be read
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together with the Land Board's constitutional duty to maximize long-term financial returns and
its statutory obligation to charge "market rent." Requiring the Land Board to renew the 2001
Lease at the old 2.5% lease rate would not only be inconsistent with the terms of the 2001 Lease,
but would violate the Idaho Constitution. Section K.IA.h does not counsel otherwise. It merely
contains a commitment by the Board to process a "request for renewa'" fairly; conversely, it does
not limit the Board's constitutional and statutory discretion to determine the contents of the lease
for which "renewal" is "request [ed]. ,,6

E.

The 2001 Lease Interpretation Offered By The Payette Lessees Is Also Contrary To
The Position They Have Taken Over The Past Several Years
Not only is the lease interpretation offered by the Payette Lessees contrary to the Idaho

constitution and statutes, but it is contrary to the position the Payette Lessees have been taking
over the past several years. The process of determining the rental rate that would be
implemented through 2011 leases began in 2007 with the appointment of the Cottage Site
Subcommittee. The Cottage Site Subcommittee held several public meetings On the subject, and
the Payette Lessees were active participants. See Second Brammer Aff., Exhs. A-C. Despite

6

The Payette Lessees cite out-of-state authorities for the proposition that a contractual right of
renewal entitles them to renew a lease for an additional term at the same lease rate if the right
of renewal does not specify a new lease rate. Those cases are inapplicable for two reasons.
First, the 2001 Lease does not provide for a right of renewal. Any such right is governed by
Idaho Code § 58-31 OA, insofar as it exempts cottage site leases from the conflict auction
process, but nothing in that statute restricts the Land Board's authority to determine the
contents of a lease other than the "market rent" requirement - which is intended to act as a
proxy for the "maximum long term financial return" mandate in Article IX, Section 8.
Second, those cases did not involve leases made pursuant to a statutory or constitutional duty
to maximize returns or to charge market rent. Even if the 2001 Lease contained a right of
renewal, any renewal would have to be at market rent because of the Land Board's statutory
and constitutional duties to maximize returns on endowment lands.
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participating in several meetings, during which various proposals for new 2011 lease tenns were
discussed, the Payette Lessees never asserted a contractual right to renewal at the old 2.5% lease
rate. To the contrary, they expressly took the position that the 2011 leases should cbarge
"market rent."
For example, Jim Young, the President of the Payette Lake Cabin Owners Association,
and Dave Leroy, fonner counsel to the Payette Lake Cabin Owners Association, addressed the
Land Board at an April 22, 2008 Cottage Site Subcommittee Meeting. See Second Brammer
Aff., Exh. A. Mr. Young acknowledged that the Land Board needed to determine the terms of "a
new lease" and that the Land Board's decision "centers around this definition of market rent."

Id. at p. 27. Indeed, the Payette Lessees themselves offered a specific proposal for new leases to
begin in 2011. ld. at pp. 34-36. Another Payette Lake Cabin Owners Association's lawyer,
Terry Copple, thus urged the Land Board in a March 15,2010 letter to "adopt the plan submitted
by the Association" and reiterated their position that the Land Board "can onl): charge market
rent for endowment lands." Jd at Exh. D (emphasis in original).
Now that their proposed tormula for calculating "market rent" has been rejected, the
Payette Lessees have changed their minds about being entitled to a 2011 lease at "market rent."
Now they contend they are entitled to renew their leases at the old 2.5% lease rate, despite the
constitutional and statutory requirements to the contrary. These inconsistent positions reflect
what is otherwise plain from the 2001 Lease's provisions: The Land Board retains the discretion
to set the terms and conditions of Cottage Site leases subject only to constraints imposed by the
fdaho Constitution or otherwise valid statutes. Unsurprisingiy, the Payette Lessees identify no
such constraints
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS AND IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS - 19

414
4509000022201550.3

F.

Summary Judgment On The Payette Lessees' Contract Claims Should Be Granted
In Favor Of The Land Board
The Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the Land Board on Count 1 of the

Payette Lessees' Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the reasons
discussed above. Alternatively, and as also discussed above, the Lessees fare no better on the
merits. Count 1 asserts that the Land Board breached the 2001 Lease by "refusing to recognize

Plaintiffs' right to renew the [2001 Lease] under the same terms, including the same rental rate."

See Amended Complaint, ~ 32. As set forth above, the 2001 Lease grants no such right
Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted in favor of the Land Board, and the Payette
Lessees' motion for partial summary judgment must be denied.
The proper disposition of Count 2 is tied inextricably to Count 1's fate. The second
count asserts that the Land Board "must pay Plaintiffs fair market value for the approved
improvements constructed on their respective lots" because ofthe Board's "refusal to renew the
existing leases under the existing terms, including the existing rental rate." See Amended
Complaint"38. Again, the 2001 Lease does not provide a right to renew at the old 2.5% lease
rate. Section K.IA of the Lease, to which the Payette Lessees anchor both Counts, deals only
with the Land Board's responsibility for purchasing improvements in the event that a lessee's
lease-renewal application is denied and, as discussed above, says nothjng about the Board's
otherwise preserved discretion to formulate the terms of the lease applied for. Equally important
for present purposes is the uncontroverted fact that the Land Board has not declined to process
the Payette Lessees' renewal application. The Board instead has offered to renew the leases at
the rental rate that the Land Board believes will satisfy its constitutional and statutory

responsibilities. Resolution of Count 1, in any event, wi 11 negate the need to reach Count 2
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since, if the Payette Lessees prevail, they will have a renewal lease on the terms that they seek
and, if the Board prevails, the Lessees will be put to the choice of determining whether to accept
the proffered lease. Count 2 thus presents, at most, a hypothetical, and nonjusticiable, dispute
because the claim alleged there neither has arisen nor, at this time, appears likely to arise. See,

e.g., Miles, ] 16 Idaho at 642, 778 P.2d at 764 ("a declaratory judgment action must raise issues
that are definite and concrete, and must involve a real and substantial controversy as opposed to
an advisory opinion based upon hypothetical facts").

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Land Board respectfully requests that summary judgment
be granted in its favor on Counts 1 and 2 of the Payette Lessees' Amended Complaint.

,u.
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GLADYS BACKBOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST, et aI.,

)
}

Case No. CV 2010-436C

)

Plaintiffs,

)

AFfIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK

)
)

vs.

)

IDAHO BOARD OF LAND

COMMfSSIONERS; and GEORGE BACON,

)
)

in his official capacity as Director of the Idaho

)

Department of Lands,
Defendants.
Merlyn W. Clark, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
l.

I am an attorney with the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP,

counsel of record for the above-named Defendants (collectively, the "Land Board") in this

matter. I make this affidavit based on my own personal know'ledge, and I am competent to
testify thereto.
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45090 0002.2201536.1

-

..
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2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of a Petition for Judicial

Review Regarding Breach of Contract, Case No. CV 2011-20C (4th Jud. Dist., Valley County)
("Babcock lJ").

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and accurate copy of a Petition for Judicial

Review Regarding Violation of Statutory and Constitutional Law, Case No. CV 20 Il-J6C (4th
Jud. Dist., Valley County) ("Babcock III").
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and accurate copy of a Complaint for

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief filed by the Idaho Attorney General against the Land Board in
the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Ada, Case No. CV OC 1023751 (the "Ada County Declaratory Judgment Action"),
5.

The parties have stipulated to dismiss the second and third counts in the Ada

County Declaratory Judgment Action.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

/~.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before m~his :2!t-aay of JanUary, 2011.
i

,

~
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~

.

",

t

-

Name:

\

.

Q\'0.QO .. - h~f\

I~\,,:((\.A

mDY).W-::"&

Not~r Public for hTh1."'-'
Resldmg a1 Lr"\Q~ Q....A/\ )
My commission expires :?l

'I \

/'

r\';:) \ ~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thO
day of January, 2011, r caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVII OF ME LYN W. CLARK by the method indicated below,
and addressed to each of the following:
Phillip S. Oberrecht
Colleen D. Zahn
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHI & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Mabo, Suite 700
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Plaintiffs]

;x:

"

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.395.8585
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RECEIVED By 1'>ft.AIL

JAN 20 2011

Phillip S. Oberrecht
ISB #1904. pso@hallfarJey.com

HAlL. FARLEY. OI3&fiRECHT

Colleen D. ZMn

& BLANTON. PA.

(SB #6208, cdz@hallfarJey.com

Mikela A. French
ISB;; 8038; mal@hallfarley.com

HAll, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box ]271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
W:\4\4..oI2.IIPLEADINGSIJlldl.ial Revicw-HFOB-Pelltion

Fe

COIItnoct ttin.I),doe

Attorneys for Petitioners
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the BABCOCK
TRUST; lAURA L. BARCLAY; BARBARA J.
BARSNESS; TIIOMAS W. BARTON; JAMES D.
and SHANON N. BIVENS; FRANK R. and
ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES and JEANNENE
BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJ-LE TATE and
HAROLD A. BRJDGES; JEFFREY RUMPH, as
trustee of the SANDRA BROMAGEN TRUST;
GREGG BURINGTON and H. ANTON lOll;
MARTIN L. and JAN]S G. BURKE, as Co-Trustees
for the BURKE FAMILY (988 TRUST; CHRISTINE
M. CARNE FIX THOMAS, as Trustee of the
WENDELL/BARBARA
CARNEFIX
TRUST;
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the
CHARLOTTE
KINNEY
TRUST;
COLIN
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARD'NER IV
LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE COOKE;
RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA L. CROWLEY;
CTh"THlA L. ANDERSON and MARTIN J.
SAL TZMAN; D. STANTON DALY; FRANCINE
DINGEL. as personal representative of the ESTATE
OF ALLYN DIN GEL; JAMES D.
DOBBS;
BENNETT G. DAY and DONNA DAY JACOBS, as
Co-Trustees of the DONALD & MARJOR1E DAY
TRUST; DAVID THATCHER DUCHARME and
TERESA CHAPMAN DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees

Case No. c.y di)l1

-.;lOc.,....

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW REGARDING
BREACH OF CONTRACT
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of the DUCHARME REVOCABLE UVING TRUST;
and DIXJE DYKMAN; WENDY
ALLEN
EDMUNDS; ROBERT and BARBARA FARBER;
JOSEPH J. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND PATRICIA
FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN W. GENTRY;
GERMAIN R. TARRANT and JANET 1. KELL;
HOWARD C. GOUL; RONALD and STACY 1.
GUILL; STEVEN M. HAGER; SAMES E.
HANCOCK; KEVIN R. HANIGAN, as trustee of the
HANIGAN·ECKES CABIN REVOCABLE UVING
TRUST; liLA HARPER; RODNEY HEATER;
KENT MICHAEL HENRIKSEN and JEANNE C. I
HENRIKSEN. as Co· Trustees of the HENRIKSEN
FAMILY TRUST; CHARLES HERVEY; CRAIG and
LORI HICKMAN; WADE A. & JOAN C. HILLARD;
WILLIAM and BARBARA HlPP; KARL and
MARGARET HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and
JOSEPH J. HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK
JENSEN, as Trustee of the JENSEN FAM1LY I
TRUST; HAL JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J. I
JOSLIN; DANIEL and ANGELINA KAUFMA"J;!
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as [
personaf representative for the ESTATE OF
CHARLES R. KING. JR.; STEVE and JEANE
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA; SHARON
L MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the LEISY FAMIL Y
LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and REBECCA A.
LONG SON; LEE S. and LEEANN LONGSON;
ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN MACK;
RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN MCKN1GHT, as
Trustee of the EDWIN H. & VIV}AN P. MCKNIGHT
FAMILY TRUST; C1NDY KUBENA, as Trustee of
the MILDRED l. FERGUSON TRUST; DONNA
MOORE; WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT;
STEPHEN and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F.
O'GARA. as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA III
FAMIL Y TRUST DATED JULY 8. 1982; THOMAS
& SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and KJMBERL Y A.
OSTROM; W. ANTHONY PARK and GA1L
CHALOUPKA; JOE and KATHY PEARSON;
PETERSON MOTOR CO.; ROBERT J. and JOAN A.
PISTEY, as Co-Trustees of the ROBERT & JOAN
PISTEY TRUST; JEANE E. RETTER; ROBERT D.
and KA TY 1. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE; DAVID
ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE; EDWARD SLOAN,
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as Trustee of the S-5 FAMIL Y TRUST; DEBORAH
T. ROSE, as Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST;
O. LANCE and CYNDY SALLADAY; CHARLES
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T.
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V.
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH and
BARBARA SMITH, as Co-Trustees of the SMITH
FAMILY TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as Trustee of
tbe
STODDARD/CLARK
CABIN
TRUST;
GREGORY and JULIE SURABIAN~ CATHY
PETERSON, as Trustee of THE MCCALL CABIN
TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C. THOMPSON and
JULlE E. THOMPSON; scon THOMPSON;
LINDA S. TURNER; JOHN L. SIMMONS; SALLE

I

C. UBERUAGA; STEVEN C. and MARYANN I

WALKER; J. LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. I
WALKER and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of
i

the WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLlE

HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLlE
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A.
WRENN; JA YSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal
Representative of the EST ATE OF KANDACE
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE,

KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KAY KEMP DlLlON; ,
EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H. ZIMMER, as
Co-Trustees of THE Z]MMER FAMILY TRUST
DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998; SUZANNE
ZIMMERMAN; GLORIA B. SALLADAY; GREGG
and SALLE MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M.

STEVENS.
Petitioners,
vs.
STATE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS and
the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LANDS,

Respondents.
Babcock er al. ("Petitioners") hereby petition this Court for judicial review of ac1ions

taken by the State Board of Land Commissioners ("the Board") and the Idaho Department of

Lands ("Department of Lands") (collectively "Respondents"). Petitioners seek review of the

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW REGARDING BREACH OF CONTRACT· 3
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Respondents' decisions on December 21, 2010. relative to cottage site leases at Payette Lake,

which effectively denied Petitioners' requests to renew their current leases ("January 1, 200]
Jeases") under their existing tenns, thereby breaching Respondents' contracts with Petitioners.
Petitioners also seek review of Respondents' decision to increase Petitioners' rent for their 201 f

Jeases without the 180-day notice, which is required by statute and by the January J, 2001 Jeases.
Specifically, Petitioners seek review as follows:

!.

Review is sought from Respondents' denial of Petitioners' requests to renew their

January I, 200 1 leases and Respondents' decision to increase Petitioners' rental rates without the
required 18{)"day notice.

2.

This Petition is taken to the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho, in

and for the County of Valley. by Petitioners.
3.

Review is sought oflhe folJowing:
a.

Respondents' approval of a motion on December 21,2010, at the regular

meeting of the Land Board, to offer Petitioners a one-year extension of their January t. 2001
leases for 20J I, including the term that the rental rate shall be 2.5% of current market value of
the lease premises;

b.

Respondents' approval of a motion on December 2l, 2010, at the regular

meeting of the Land Board, that cottage site leases will be offered in 2012 for a ten-year tenn, at
a rental rate of 4% of current market value of the leased premises, and that Respondents'
approval of the same supersedes their own earlier decision made on March 16,2010, which prior
decision increased the reotal rate for the leased premises under a different fonnula;
c.

Respondents' denial, through approval of the above-described motions.

of Petitioners' requests to renew their January 1, 2001 leases; and
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d.

Respondents' increase of rent charged to Petitioners for 201 1. pursuant to

the above-described motions, without first providing i80-day notice of a rent increase as
required by statute and by the January 1, 200 I leases.
4.

Petitioners sent a letter to Respondents, dated January 11. 20 I 1, in whjch they

requested, among other things. a contested case hearing, in order to have the opportunity to fully
present documentary and testimonial evidence, examine witnesses. and present argument in
support of their position !.hat Respondents' actions, as described above in paragraph 3, constitute
breaches of Petitioners' Ja.'luary I, 2001 leases. Respondents refused Petitioners' request. This
Court should therefore conduct a hearing de novo in this matter and allow Petitioners to present
evidence, witnesses, and argument related to and concerning the issues for review cited herein.
5.

Petitioners are parties to cottage site leases issued by Respondents, and

Respondents' actions, as described above in paragraph 3, have prejudiced substantial rights of

Petitioners.
6.

The issues for judicial review include the following:

a.

Whether Petitioners have a contractual right to renew their January 1,

200 I leases on the same tenns and conditions contained therein;
b.

Whether Respondents have unreasonably refused to alJow Petitioners to

renew their January 1, 200 I leases on the same tenns and conditions contained therein and thus
breached the same;

c.

Whether Respondents' unilateral imposition of a new lease and new lease

rate for 2012 is a breach of the January 1, 2001 leases;
d.

Whether Petitioners are entitled to specific performance of their January I,

2001 leases to allow renewal under the terms ofthose leases;
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e.

Whether, if Respondents refuse to renew the January 1, 2001 Jeases,

Petitioners have the right

to

have their leasehold improvements purchased at fair market value by

Respondents;
f.

Whether, if the January ]. 200 1 leases are not to be renewed, the

Petitioners have the option to enter into the 2012 lease for the properties they currently lease;

g.

Whether Respondents have imposed the 20] 1 increased rents without the

required statutory and contractual notice and have therefore breached Petitioners' January ],

200 I leases;
h.

Whether Respondents' decisions and related actions on December 21,

20 J0, were not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; and
1.

Whether Petitioners are entitled to their attorney fees under the terms of

their January [. 200 I leases and the statutes of (he State of Idaho.

7,

Petitioners reserve the right to amend this Petition and assen additional issues.

8.

There was no hearing, oral presentation, or evidence presented before

Respondents on December 21, 2010, and therefore Petitioners have not requested that a
transcript or agency record be prepared, because none exists. This Court, however, should afford
Petitioners the opportunity to be heard regarding Respondents' decisions and actions of
December 21, 20 I0, and to thus create a transcript and record concerning the issues raised
herein.
9.

The undersigned certifies that service of this Petition has been made upon

Respondents and that no fee for preparation of any transcript or record is due, because none
exists. Petitioners have requested from the clerk of the Department of Lands documentation
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expressing Respondents' actions on December 21,2010, and will provide that documentation to
the Court after it is received. There is no fee for this documentation.
DATED this

--.Lt day of January, 2011 .
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

~~.~

By
Phillip S. Oberrecht - 0 e mn
Colleen D. Zahn - Of the Finn
Anomeys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18th day of January, 2011, I caused to be served two

ill copies of the foregoing document. by the method indicated beJow, and addressed to each of
the following:

o

STATE BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS
clo LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATIORNEY GENERAL
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor
POBox 83720
Boise, ID 83720

U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
(8J Hand Delivered

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LANDS
cIa LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATIORNEY GENERAL
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd floor
POBox 83720
Boise, ID 83720

o
(8J
o
o

o
o

Overnight Mail
Telecopy

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered

Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Colleen D. Zahn
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Phillip S. Oberrecht

ARCHIE N. BANBURY, CLl~K

ISB /I 1904, pso@hallfll1ley.com

By.

Colleen D. Zahn
ISB 116208, cdz@hallfarley.com

MikeJa A. French

case No

ISS It 8038; maf@hallfarle)'.com

Fled

HALL. FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise. Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
W:\4\4~12.I\PlEAOING5IJudicial

Revtew·HFOB--P.'ttiOl1

r~

~

JAN 1a 2D11
lnIt. Nc. _ _
A.M.

P.M.

RECEIVED BY MAll

JAN 2 0 201t
rlALL FARLEY. OBtl'\RE'CH1
&. BLANTON, P A

St &I Coosl :"awdoc

Attorneys for Petitioners
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the BABCOCK
TRUST; LAURA L. BAReLAY; BARBARA J.
BARSNESS; THOMAS W. BARTON; JAMES D.
and SHANON N. BrVENS; FRANK R. and
ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES and JEANNENE
BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJ-LE TATE and
HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY RUMPH. as
trustee of the SANDRA BROMAGEN TRUST~
GREGG BURJNGTON and H. ANTONIOLl;
MARTIN L. and JANIS G. BURKE, as Co-Trustees
for the BURKE FAMILY 1988 TRUST;'
CHRISTINE M. CARNEFJX THOMAS, as Trustee
of the WENDELLlBARBARA CAR.'1EFlX TRUST;
JONA THA.~ P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the
CHARLOTTE
KINNEY
TRUST;
COLIN
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER
IV LlVING TRUST; ruCHARD E. and JOYCE
COOKE; ruCHARD COPSEY; SERENA L.
CROWLEY~ CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and
MARTIN J. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY;
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative of
the ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D.
DOBBS; BENNEIT G. DAY and DONNA DAY
JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD &
MARJORlE DAY TRUST; DA VlD THATCHER
DUCHARME
and
TERESA
CHAPMAN

Case No. C!. V ~:lf) {, .... I " C-

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW REGARDING
VIOLAnON OF STATUTORY

AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW REGARDING VIOLATION OF STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LA W • i

EXHIBIT
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DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees of the DUCHARME
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; ALLEN and
DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY EDMUNDS; ROBERT
and BARBARA. FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY;
MICHAEL AND PATRICIA FERY; DAVlD LEE
FOLTZ; JOHN W. GENTRY; GERMArN R.
TARRANT and JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C.
GOUL; RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN
M. HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R.
HANJGAN, as trustee of the HANiGAN-ECKES

CABIN REVOCABLE LIVJNG TRC'ST; ULA
HARPER; RODNEY HEATER; KENT MICHAEL
HENRlKSEN and JEANNE C. HENRIKSEN, as
Co-Trustees of the HENRIKSEN f AMJL Y TRUST;
CHARLES HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI
HICKMAN; WADE A. & JOAN C. HILLARD;
WILLIAM and BARBARA HIPP; KARL and
MARGARET HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and
JOSEPH J. HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK
JENSEN, as Trustee of the JENSEN f AMIL Y
TRUST; HAL JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J.
JOSLIN; DANIEL and ANGELINA Ki\UFMAN;
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as
personal representative
the ESTATE OF

CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE
LAIRD; JOSE N1CK a.'1d JAN LARREA; SHARON
L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the LEISY
FAMJLY LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and REBECCA
A. LONGSON; LEE S, and LEEANN LONGSON;
ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN MACK;
RUSSELL F.
VIV1AN MCKNIGHT,
as Trustee
the
& VIVIAN P.
MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST; CINDY KUBENA,
as Trustee of the
1. FERGUSON TRUST;
DONNA MOORE; WILLIAM A. and GALE P.
MOTI; STEPHEN and ANN MURDOCH;
EDWARD F.
as Trustee of the EDWARD
F. O'GARA III
TRUST DATED JULY 8,
1982; THOMAS
SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M.
and K]MBERL Y A.
W. ANTHONY
PARK and GAiL CHALOUPKA; JOE and
KA THY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.;
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as Co-Trustees i
of the ROBERT &
PISTEY TRUST; JEANE I
E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and KA TY L
REYNOLDS;

PAMELA RIDDLE;
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SUSAN C. ROURKE; DAVID ROUSSEAU; JOHN
D. RULE;

EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S5 FAMILY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G. LANCE
and CYNOY SALLADAY; CHARLES and
JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T. SCHULZE;
GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V. SHOEMAKER;
SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH and BARBARA
SMITH, as Co-Trustees of the SMITH FAMILY
TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as Trustee of the

STODDARD/Cl

j

CABIN TRUST; GREGORY

and JULIE
Trustee

I

PETERSON, as

of

THE MCCALL CABIN TRUST;
CHRISTOPHER C. THOMPSON and JULIE E.
THOMPSON;
THOMPSON; LINDA S.
TURNER~
SIMMONS; SALLE C.

UBERUAGA;

STEVEN

C

and

MARY ANN

WALKER; l LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C.
WALKER and
M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of
the WALKER MARITAt
MAR Y LESLIE
HUGHES, as
MARY LESLIE
HUGHES
ROSE A.
WRENN; JAYSON

Representative of the

KEMP
KAREN KEMP
DILLON:
ZIMMER, as

Trustees of

ZlMMER

FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998;
SUZANNE
GLORiA
B.
SALLADAY'
SALLE

MIDDLEKAUFF'

vs.

STATE
and the

Babcock

al.

taken by
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Lands ("Department of Lands") (collectively "Respondents").

Petitioners seek review of

Respondents' determination ilt the Board's regular meeting on December 2], 2010, of the
upcoming 2012 lease rate for cottage site leases at Payette Lake. Petitioners, current lessees of
conage sites at Payette Lake, seek review as follows:
1.

Review is sought from Respondents' December 21, 2010 detennination of the

upcoming 2012 lease ra1e.
2.

This Petition is taken to the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State ofldaho. in

and for the County of Valley, by Petitioners.

3.

Review is sought of Respondents' determination of the upcoming 2012 lease rate

through tbe Board's approval ofa motion at its December 21, 2010 regular meeting that cottage
site leases in 2012 will be offered for a period of ten years, at

II

rental rate of 4% of current

market value of the Jease premises, with no term for premium rent, and that the Board's decision
supersedes its own earlier decision made at its March 16. 2010 regular meeting. which prior
decision increased the rental rale for the leased premises under a different fonnula.

4.

sent a letter to Respondents, dated January 11, 2011, in which they

requested, among other things, a contested case hearing, in order to have the opportunity to fully
present documentary and testimonial evidence, examine witnesses, and present argument in

support of

that Respondents' action, as described above in paragraph 3, violates

[dabo Code, Section 58·310A, and the Idaho Constitution, Article IX, Section 8. Respondents
refused Petitioners' request.
matter and allow Petitioners

This Court should therefore conduct a hearing de novo in this
10

present evidence, witnesses, and argument related to and

concerning Respondents' December 21, 20 J0 determination of the 2012 lease rate.
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5

Petitioners are parties to cottage site leases issued by Respondents, and

Respondents' action, as described above in paragraph 3, has prejudiced substantial rights of
Petitioners.

6.

The Issues for judicial review include the following:
a.

Whether the rental rate adopted for the 2012 leases violates Idaho Code,

not reflect "market rent" and will not promote "stable }eases~n

Section 58~3IOA, since it
b.

Whether the new rental rate for 2012 fails to secure maximum long term

financial return to the beneficiaries of the State trust lands and is therefore uIlConstitu1ionaJ under
Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution;
c.

Whether the rental rate for upcoming 20]2 leases must be re-determined

so that it complies with Idaho Code, Section 58-310A and the Idaho Constitution, Article IX,
Section 8;
d.

Whether Respondents detennined the rental rate for upcoming 2012 leases

in violation of constitutional and/or statutory provisions;
Respondents' determination of the rental rate for upcoming 2012

e.
leases is not supported

substantial evidence on the record as a whole; and

f
tenns of their

Petitioners are entitled to their attorney fees and costs under the
t, 200 I leases and the statutes of the State of ldaho.

7.

f'eiltl(mers

8.

There was no hearing, oml presentation. or evidence presented before

reserve the

to amend this Petition Wld assert additional issues.

Respondents on December 2l, 20 Hl, and therefore Petitioners have not requested that a
transcript or agency record

prepared, because none exists. This Court, however, should afford

PETITION FOR
REVIEW REGARDING VIOLATION OF STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LA W ~ §

433

Petitioners the opportunity to be heard regarding Respondents' detennination of December 21,
2010, and to thus create a transcript and record concerning the issues raised herein.

9,

The undersigned certifies that service of this Petition has been made upon

Respondents and that no

preparation of any transcript or record is due, because none

exists. Petitioners have requested from the clerk of the Department of Lands documentatjon
expressing Respondents' action on December 21, 2010, and will provide that documentation to
the Court after it is {I"I'"",I',,"'-('\ There is no fee for this documentation.

DATED this

of January, 2011.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

~~~, .IL-·

By:
Phillip S. Oberrecht - Oti'theFirm
Colleen D. Zahn - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18th day of January, 2011, I caused to be served two

mcopies of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:

o

STATE BOARD OF LAND
COMMJSSJONERS
clo LA WRENCE G. WASDEN
AITORNEY

o

o

954 W. Jefferson,
POBox
Boise. In 1.13720
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LANDS

clo LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
AITORNEY
954 W. Jefferson,

POBox 83120

U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid

[8] Hand Delivered

o
I2Sl

o

LJ

Overnight Mail

Telecopy

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

Telecopy

Boise, ID 83720

~--=-'~~
0

__
Phillip S. Oberrecht
Coneen D. Zahn
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- - - -----

NO'--------~FU~O~------

ANM~------~~--------

LAWRENCE G, WASDEN
AITOR.'\IEY GENERAL

OEC 0 Z ~10

L. OLSEN, ISS No. 3586
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
STEVEN

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By eARLY \.A'11MORE
OE?I.I'IY

ISS. No. 6385
Deputy AUorneys

eLA YR. SMITH,

954 W. Jefferson,
P.O. Box
Boise, 1D 83720-0010

Telephone: (208) 334-2400
Fax: (208) 854-8073
Anorneys for Plaintiff
COURT
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRICT
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his
capacity as
Gel1eral of Idaho, ex ref.
STATE ENDOWMENT LAND

)

BENEFICIAIUES,

)

}

ey OC

}

No. _ _ _ __

1023751

I

)

Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY

vs.

A",1) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

STATE
OF
COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE BACON,
as
of the

)
)
)
)

)

INTROD!)CTION
Pla:r;tiff Lawrence G. Wasden, in his capacity as Attorney General of

fdaho.
management

aclion on behalf of beneficiaries of the income generated from the
endDwment lands located at or near Payette and Priest Lakes and commonly

referred to as the

sites." Article

Commissioners ("Land Board") responsibility for "the direction,

Defendant
control and

COMPLAINT
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of'

public lands of the state, under such regulations as may be
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law,"

prescribed

Board the duty

Article

Section g of the ]daho Constitution imposes upDn the Land

for the location, proteclion, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore,

"10

or which may

be gnmted to or acquired by the state by or from the general government,

under such

as may be prescribed by law, and in such manner as \vill secure the

maximum long term financial return to the institution to which granted or to the state jf not
specificaliy" and imposes upon the Idaho Legislature the duty, inter alia, to "provide by
of l!lod made

law that the
preserved and ",eld in trust,

respective

~o

congress shall be judiciously located and carefully

disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the

which said grants were made."

The Legislature purported to discharge its duty under Article IX, Section
the cottage sites through passage of 1990 1daho Session Laws

8 with

§ 5

chapter

OA ("]990 Act"). ]n summary, the 1990 Act

"conflict auction".requirements in Idaho Code §§ 58-307 and

removed the ccn;,ge

-310 that

since 1905 (1905 Idaho Sess. L 131,137,138-

39 (House Bill

directed the Land Board instead to "insure that each

leased lot

the duration of the lease."

has purported to fulfill its statutory duty under 56-3 lOA,
to secure maximum long term financial returns, by establishing

and its
rental

interests of lessees above tile interests of the beneficiaries

faleS

and, by

of Land Board members, do not obtain market rent.

admission of a

seeks a determination that the Legislature's exemption of cottage
sites from the

auction

in establishing rents that do not fulfill its constitutional

Land Board is

and statutory

to endowment beneficiaries. Declaratory relief so determining should
and pt:rmanent injunctions that restrain the Land Board and

issue,

Defendant

COMPLAINT

in Article IX, Section 9 is void on its face and that the

om

effect to Idaho Code § 58-31 OA
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Plaintiff

seeks a declaratory judgment that the cottage-site lease

rates established

the Land Board at its March 16, 2010 meeting violate its constitutional duty

to "secure the

long-term financial return" of the affected endov.1llent land

In the event the Court concludes that Idaho Code § 58·310A is constitutional,

beneficiaries.

Plaintive seeks

a declaratory judgment that the cottage-site lease rates to be

term

implemented

the statutory mandate to secure market renl

throughout
F:ACTUAL ALLEGA nONS

A.
matter jurisdic-:ion under Idaho Code § 1-705.1. Venue in

2.

this Court exists under Idaho Code § 5-402.2 because the actions and/or conduct giving rise to
this controversy arose

of Boise, County of Ada.

Plaintiff is the

3.

'Jeneral of :he State of Idaho. The Attorney General of

JV Section 1 of the rdaho Constitution. The Attorney

Idaho is

General is

10

contests or

or

or

holding property

The Attorney General has

trust and to enforce whenever necessary any
purpose of such trust" and to "institute, in the name

noncompliance

necessary to enforce complia11ce with the tenus of the trust or any

of the state,
lheretr~)m.'

benefit income

state lands."

law and under ldaho Code § 67·1401(5), to "supervise .. , persons

authority under

departure

represent the State of Idaho "in all suits, actions,

General

chis action on behalf of entities to whose

site leases accrue, which include Idaho public school districts, Idaho

stale hospital, and such entities' students and patients.

normal
4.

Constitution
Public

is established under Article IX, Section 7 of the Idaho
Idaho officers: Governor. Superintendent of
General, and State Controller. Set: also ldaho

Code § 53-]
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5.

The

of La:lds ("lDL") is the executive agency established to

administer state endowment lands. Idaho Code §§ 58-10 I and -119. Defendanl George Baco;, is
the IDL Director

Defendant Bacon's duties. and responsibilities include preparing endo\o\rment

and countersigning such leases with the Land Board

land leases for Land Board
preSident,

B.

leases for the cottage sites. idaho Code § 58-121.

RELEVANT

6.
Commissioners"

CO~5TnCTIONAI_

Section 7

AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

the Idaho Constitution is entitled "State Board of Land

"Tne gOvernor, superintendent of public instruction, secretary of
shall constitute the state board of land commissioners,

state,
who shall have

regulations
/

.

control and dlSposilior. of the public lands of the state, under such
121W'

of

See also ldaho Code § 58-10 I.
Idaho Constitution is entitled "Location and

dispositlOD
of Ihe state board of land commissioners to provide for tbe location,
rental of
!"L'Ids heretofore, or wlrich may hereafter be granted
or from the general government, under such regulations as
manner as will secure the maximum long tenn
to which granled or to the state if not specifically
shad be sold for less than the appraised price. No
granting any privilege3 to persons who may
lands, subsequent to the survey thereof by the general
derlved by the sale, or other disposition of such
0r indirectly. The legislature shall, at the earliest
the general grants of land made by congress to
and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to
the use and benefit of the respective object for whjch said
icgislalure shaH provide for the sale of said lands
~he sale of timber on all state lands and for the faithful
in accordance with the terms of said grants;
to exceed one hundred sections of state lands shall be sold in anyone
nol to exceed three hundred and twenty acres of
or corpmation. The legislature shall have power to
land ccmm;ssioners to exchange granted or acquired lands
baSIS for other lands under agreement with the United
companies, individuals, or combinations
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lands held in trust); § S8-133 (same); § 58-136

See also Idaho
(same); and §

tbt "the endov,ment lands are held in trust by the state board

to generate the maximum long-term financial returns to

of land
the public

idaho
Leases of

is entitled "Legislative fmdings and purposes-

sites and homesites not subject to contliet

application and

family, recrea~ional cottage site and homesite
of conflict applications to lease said premises and
"" ... ,v .. ,,, cottage sites and homesites have typically

jor as long as fifty (50) years;
for a lease require the state board of land
auction between the applicants and award the lease to
C{)n1pt'""'<:

family, recreational cottage site and homesite

and auction procedure have caused considerable
to the existing lessee at the prospect of losing a longhave been filed from time to time, the
a'Jction or realized any direct revenue from such
constitution of the state of Idaho provides
er,dowrnent lands in such manner as will secure the
to the institution to which granted or to the

fmandal returns to the institutions to which
stable leases at market rent.
fJr single family, recreational cottage sites and
the conflict application and auction provisions of
board shall reject any and all pending and
sections 58-307 and S8-310, ldaho Code, for
homesite leases.
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and auction procedure in the singh! family.
and iease renewal process, the board shaH
and homemc
market rent throughout the duration of the lease.

msure

C.

HISTORY OF THIj: COTTAGE SITES' LEASING PROGRAM
9.

ieases 355 recreational home sites on Priest Lake and

167 recreatioc"l

Lake. The fc:crealional home sites have traditionally been

referred

sites at Priest Lake are located on public school
two are located on public school lands, 56 on

lands. Of the

liinds. The majority of the cottage sites Vverc first

nonnal

some date back to as early as 1924.

leased in the

Each

of Idaho as trustee for public schools, normal

cottage si te

of f:ducation, and Lewis-Clark State College), and

schools

site lots are owned by the lessees.

the state

leases were "subject to disposal at public
Section 8 and [daho Code § 58-310, the latter

auction"

auctions." The Land Board followed practices-

of which

notices of availability only on the local court

such as

as they did on other expiring leases-lhat

house

to 1990, few applications for conflict

discouraged
auctions ",'erc

by public

1

ocecm:a to auction. In lieu of establishing market rents
rernal rates until

0.67 per cent for all cottage site leases.

state was
Thereafter.

1986, when IDL estimated that the

rate of 2.5% of the value of the cottage site, to be

phased in
Land Board, starting in 1981, imposed what it
described
that lessees

15

not rent at all; rather, it refers to the requirement

upon assignment or transfer of the lease to someone

COMPLAINT
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value is determined by subtracting the value of

outside the

the

improven~ems

Board
leasehold

property from the total sale price.

;ntside consultants have repeatedly stated that the large
would not accrue if armual rents werc set at

!S

market rates.

when lessees assigned leaseholds for value, "the

when assigning leases for value.

State COGld

premium rem

IDAPA 20.03.13.25.

By rule,

1992 or until contract rents have been increased to
20.03.13.27. Although the premium rent rule

full market

fact that annual rents remained well below fair

expired in I

rent requirement as a mattcr of policy and

market

contract
site leases had increased significant!y, so that buyers

to purchase ieaseholds from existing lessees.

were
Two

pI

so that

lessees' concerns over application of the contlict-

the Land Board to delay the applications

auction process.

D.
1he Legislature in 1990, cottage site lessees

asserted
State ami

lessees for
fact "the

all conflict-auction proceeds belong to the
amounts of money paid to predecessor

lease The Legislature, expressing concern over, inter alia, the
have caused considerable consternation and

dismay

of losing a long-time lease" (ldaho Code § 58-

3JOA(l

as a means of establishing market rents and

established

'ensure that each lot generates market rent

throughout

COMPLAJ:."I'f
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of [he duty

prepared for the Land Board in 2008, refers to

"market

all conditions

and reevaJua,iu;,

determine the appropriate "market

the public auction requirement. The term

rate"

"the most

~o

sho~ld

bring m a competitive and open market reflecting
lease agreement including lenn, rental adjustments
and expense obligations,"

U[w]hen

Consequently,

estate is nearly equivalent in value to the

fee simpk

to become vacant, the lessor could likely find

another

S<1I:te rent."

following a public auction during the period since

the} 990
through

because all Jease transfers have been affected
h;s~ee

to the new lessee, See Idaho Admin. R

20,03,1

E.
prompted the Board to reexamine its rental

policies

Consuitanls
but the
rate. it ,

to obtain market rent.

Real Estate

lied to lot values, with rates of 4.5% to 5.5%;

Board policy of phasing in a 2.5% rental
, despite being advised by IDL staff

that a

achieve the target of 2.5% of land value

"because

faster than 5,3 % 3..'1J1ually,"
flse in market value and the 5,3% annual

cap on rent
rents be

Board, af,er
the rent

aCIUal rate of return to J %. lDL staff recommended that

achieve a return of 5% of property value, The Land

again rejected staff recommendations to raise
"Nith tI:e understanding that it can be reopened

based on
COMPLAIN;'
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8.
recommended

cottage

were again consulted, and agam such experts
increases to at least 3.5% of property value for Priest Lake

Payene Lake cottage sites. Once again, both

S1tes

the outside
clear evidence

that the presence of large leasehold values was
rnarke~

that such a rate "recognizes and takes into

adopted
consideralw[~

rents. Nonetheless, the Land Board again

site improvements."
rer:;amed ostensibly at 2.5% since J998. but real

on valuation of cottage sites in the face of

returns ha\c

values. and profits enjoyed by lessees upon

rapidly
assignment
obtain market

thus demonstrating the Land Board's failure to
owners have realized in excess of $25 million from
years, the amount of money receIved by

the sale

lessees

of endOvir"e
conveya..'1CC
received

A'.'v~"""

the total rent received by the Board on behalf
nine lessees received $6,482,709 for the
total amount of annual and premium rent
~4,022,676.

F.
two Board members - Secretary of State
Ben Ysursa

Tom Luna· to form a subcommittee to

recommend

cottage sites during the lease term thal starts

January 1, 20

subcommittee held a series of meetings with
methods of calculating rents.

lessees
members of

lessees

desire to work on a "collaborative basis"

~ith

The
the

Board member Luna described the

subcomm i tlee' s

our obligation on the Land Board to bring

some

you know, for those who oV\.'n the leases."

COMPLAI~T
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Board member

to the pi: ght of the cottage site owners as

eScaJallOn of rcnts."

far as

16, 2010 to detennme rental rates for
2011, the

the following recommendation: "rA] target
4.0~/!)

annual lease

at

lot over

10 prior years appraised or indexed values for

each lot

decrease annually from the prior year's rent

of the average appraised value of each

at a constanI

rent in year five. Every five years from the

effective

recalculated using this same methodology and

appraised

years. Lot vabes shall be appraised by the
Cel1ified Appraiser, at the discretion of the

applicable

period urlder t"e lease, the target rent will be

Department.

of the lease,"

calculated

for its reco::nmendations was that "severely

with

impairing

Our

lessees is not in the best

tluctuations in rent "causeD concern for cabin

interest

concern that "raising rents too high would

site lessees,
result ill

of beneficiaries."

subcommittee

member Ysursa described the process

as "balancmg

section 8, prudent investor standards.

whatever

we have WIth the lessees."

G.

RESP(Y~;~r:L) Ai~ILf~D~!HL;;\CTION

2'
staff and

In presenting the

ON SUBCOMMITTEE'S REPORT AND

(;\. :;mmendations were addressed by both IDl
General in his capacity as a Land Board

member.
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(a)

JDL Director George Bacon concluded that while the target rate would be

4%, the effective rental rate (actual rent returns compared to current land value) would vary
between 2.37%) and 2.43% ifland appreciated at 4.&% annually. If land were to appreciate at an
annual rate of 10.30%, the effective rental rate would stabilize at around 1.54%. He further
concluded: "I do not believe the Subcommittee's recommendation insures that each leased Jot
generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease, but neimer does the current system."
Director Bacon also examined recent leasehold sales, which indicated that the contract rate of
2.5% of current assessed or appraised value that was in effect in recent years was below market
value. In 2008 and 2009, two "down" years in the real estate market. 21 leaseholds sold for
$6,392,039, an average of over $300,000 per leasehold. Director Bacon stated: "rb1ased on the
numerous studies previously commissioned and conducted by real estate experts, it appears as
long as there is leasehold value, the rent charged is not at market."
(b)

In 2010, Attorney General Wasden commissioned two economists to

independently examine the issue of market rent generally and to determine whether the
subcommittee recommendation would achieve market rent a..'1d fulfill the Board's duty to

maximize the long term financial return for endowment beneficiaries.

The economists

concluded that the subcommittee recommendation would not fulfill the Board'5 duty to
maximize the long term financial return for me endowment beneficiaries.

They found

particularly troubling the subcommittee's proposal to "smooth" rent increases by using both a ten
year rolling average to establish lot values and a five year phase-in to reach the renl based on
such ten-year average value, since it "guarantees that the state is not securing market rent for the
five year adjustment period." The economists also concluded that the proposal to gradually
increase premium rent until it reaches 50% of leasehold value ;'validates that the board has not
been charging market rents, that below market rents have contributed to leasehold values, and
that the state has been missing out on revenues that a prudent investor would have captured." In
response to questioning from a Board membe,at its, meeting on february 16, 2010, one of the
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economists emphasized that the combination of rolling average and phased-in target rem would
"hamstring the Board in meeting its fiduciary responsibility" to obtain market rent.
22.

Three of the five Board members have explicitly acknowledged on the record that

the rents to be imposed over the next ten-year rental term are below the market rental rate. Two
of those Board members voted in opposition to the rental scheme.

One Board member, despite

conceding that the 4% rental rate, when combined with the subcommittee's recommended
"smoothing effect" resulted in rents "quite a ways away from market rent," nonetheless voted in
favor of such rent. NOlwithstanding this acknowledgment. the Land Board voted 3·2 at its
March 16, 2010 meeting to adopt the phased.in annual rental rate and a modified premium rent

consisting of the greater of 10% of gross leasehold value or 50% of net leasehold value.

H.

FAILURE TO SECURE CONSTITUTIONALLY AND/OR STATUTORILY
REQUIRED FINANCIAL RETURl'iS
23.

In sum, despite unequivocal evidence from leasehold sales and other indicators

tha1 contract rents are below market rate, the Land Board continues to ignore its constitutionallyimposed obligation to trust beneficiaries to secure maximum long tcnn financial returns. The
leases that will be distributed 10 cottage site lessees for the ten year lease term beginning January
1,201], adopt a nominallarget rate of 4% of property value, but such rate is to be phased in over
a five year period, and the property value upon which the rate is based is not current market
value, but the average market value for the years 2001 through 2010. After five years the cycle
is repeated, with rent to be based on average property values from 2005-2015, to be phased in
over five years. As a result, lDL Director George Bacon concluded lhat while the target rate
would be 4%, the effective rental rate (actual rent returns compared to current land value) would
vary between 2.37% and 2.43% if land appreciated at 4.8% annually. If land were to appreciate
at an annual rate of 10.30%, the effective rental rate would stabilize at around 1.54%. He further
concluded: "I do not believe the Subcommittee's recommendation insures that each leased lot
generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease, but neither does the current system."
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24.

The Land Board also continues to impose premium rent, widely acknowledged as

an implicit admission that leasehold values will continue to accrue because contract rent is below
market rent For the next rental tenn, the trusts' beneficiaries v,ill not receive the money they
would receive if the Board were gening market rent for the :eases, as constitutionally and
statutorily required. Members of the Board have acknowledged that the rents imposed by the
Board are not based solely on their duty to maximize income for

truSl

beneflciaries, but rather

are the result of their desire to work on a "collaborative basis" with the lessees to establi sh a
mutually-agreeable rent and their desire to "bring some stability ... to these cottage site leases,
and, you know, for those who own the leases."

One Board member staled he was "very

sympathetic to the plight of the cottage site ovmer:; as far as predictability and stability as far as
these rapid escalation of rents," and described the process

a5

"balancing our constitutional

mandate in article 9, section 8, prudent investor standards, whatever you wani to say, with the
long-tenn relationship we have with the lessees. " ..

l.

CURRENT corr AGE LEASE STATUS
25.

Under its cottage-site leasing practices, the Land Board, actir.g through the IDL,

issued ten-year leases

10

renewing lessees for the periods of 1992-2000 and 2001-2010. It has

directed Defendant Bacon to prepare ten-year leases for execution by those existing lessees
desiring to renew for the 2011-2020 period, but such leases have not been executed by Defendanl
Bacon or co-signed by the Land Board's president.

The period for making application for

renewal leases has expired, and, as of the date of this Complaint, many,

jf not

lessees have submitted timeJy and otherwise valid applications to IDL.

all. of the existing

Upon the Attorney

General's information and belief, Defendant Bacon will forward the renewal leases to existing
lessees on or before December 6, 20 I O.

I.

IDAHO SUPREME COURT OPINION
26.

On December I, 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in Wasden ex

reI. State v. Idaho Stare Board of Land Commissioners, No. 37528 (Idaho S.

en, dismissing a

petition for writ of prohibition filed by Attorney General Wasden and directed exclusively to the
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Land Board's noncompliance with Ihe "ma."Ximum long-rem financial return" requirement in
Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution.

Wasde~l

ex rei Stale v. Idaho S((J/C Bd of Land

Comm'rs, 2010 ldaho No. 128,2010 WL 4861713 (Dec 1,2010). The basis for the dismissal

was the availability of a plain, adequate and speedy remedy at laW-i.e., injunctive relief under
I.R.C.P.65. The Court nevertheless discussed various background facts and stated in part:
(a)

"As leasehold values grew it became clear to the Board that it was not

achieving market rent, and in J 981 the Board invented the concept of 'premium rem' to try to
decrease the amount of profit the Lessees were reaping from the gap between actual and market
rent. The term 'premium rent' is a misnomer; it would be more accurate to refer to this
mechanism as a 'leasehold transfer fee: Premium rent requires that the lessee pay the State a
certain percentage of the value that the lessee receives from selling his leasehold interest in a
cottage site. In 1981 this percen1age was set at 10%. So, for example, if a lessee sold his
leasehold for $160,000 and had placed $60,000 of improvements and personal property on the

land, the leasehold value would be $100,000. Of that $100,000 the Stale would be entitled to
$\ 0,000 and the remaining $90,000 would go to the selling lessee. Premium rent was conceived

of as a temporary measure, the utility and impact of which would disappear as rents reached fair
market value. In fact the IDAPA provision establishing premium rent-IDAPA 20.03.13.027reproduced above, expired on December 31, 1992,

Nevertheless the Board and IDL have

continued to apply premium rent to leasehold sales."

2010 WL 4861713, at "3 (footnote

omitted).
(b)

"From 1905 unti I 1991 the cottage sites were subject to conflict auctions

pursuant to LC. § 58-310, and its statutory predecessors. Idaho Code § 58-3:0 provides that,
when a lease tenn expires and more than one party makes application to lease the property,

all

auction is held amongst the applying parties to detennine which is willing to pay the most to
lease the property. Despite having been subject to this provision, no conflict auction had been
carried out cn a cottage site until 1990.
attributable

to

[t

is Iikely that ;his apparent lack of interest was

lack of public awareness, largely due to the fact that the Board had a policy
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against advertising when cottage leases were expiring, and posted notices of availability only on
the local court house bulletin board. In 1990 the Board received conflicting applications for two
different cottage sites, where both the existing lessees and an outside party applied to lease.
Instead of holding a conflict auction as LC. § 58-310 required, lDL requested that the legisluture
draft legislation exempting cottage sites from I.e § 58-310. As a result, I.e. § 58-310A was
passed, eliminating conflict auctions as a means of establishing the maximum long-term
financial return and instead requiring that the Board ensure that the cottage leases generate
market rent throughout their duration." ld.
(e)

"By 1997, leasehold values had escalated sharply and for some cottage

sites the local property taxes actually exceeded the rent IDL was collecting from the Lessees.
The escalating property value, coupled with the 5.3% cap on rent increases from year-to-year,
meant that the return on the cottage sites was only' slightly higher than it had been in 1986. at
J %.

IDL concluded that it was quite apparent thpt the rent being collected under the cottage

leases was below market rent. rDL concluded that all available market data suggested that
market rent would be somewhere between 3% and 5%, noting that most data supported a 5%
rate. IDL concluded that the Board would not be complying with its constitutional duty if it
continued with

liS

existing rental formula. The Board nonetheless voted to continue the 2.5%

rate, though it did create a new target rent based on the most recent property assessment-to be
updated on an annual basis-eliminated the phase.in period, and removed the yearly cap on rent

increases." 2010 WL 4861713, at *4 (footnotes omitted).
(d)

"The [2007] Cottage Site Subcommittee recommended a new lease

structure with annual rent set at 4% of average market value of each cottage site over the

previous 10 years, to be updated annually (the so-called 'roIling average'). However, the 4%
rolling average would not be reached until the el1;d ,of a

5~year

phase-in period during which rent

would be incrementally increased from its current level to the target rent. The new cottage leases
would also include premium rent, though under a more complicated formula than thal previously
employed. The Conage Site Subcommittee recommended that 'premium rent be calculated at
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARA TORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF - 15
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10% of the gross leasehold value or 50% of the net leasehold value, whichever is the greater
amount for the endo"vment.'

The Cottage Site Subcommittee explained that '[n]et leasehold

value shall be calculated by subtracting the original leasehold value (sales price less the value of
tenant improvements) of the lessee who is transferring the lease from the leasehold value (sale

price less the value of tenant improvements) when a transfer occurs.' It was clarified during a
regular Board meeting that the Cottage Site Subcommittee was recommending the 50% net
leasehold premium rent be phased in over a period of 5 years." 2010 WL 48617 13. at .. 5.
(e)

"The

Director of fDL

analyzed

the

Cottage

Site

Subcommittee

recommendations and determined that the rolling average system of determining rental rates
would result in actual return being approximately 2.4% assuming land value appreciates at 4.8%
a year. or 1.5% if land appreciates at [0.3% annually. The Director concluded '1 do not believe
!he Subcommittee's recommendation ensures that each leased lot generates market rent

throughout the duration of the lease, but neither docs the current system.' On March 16, 2010.
the Board voted 3·2 for the new lease structure as recommended by the Cottage Site

Subcommittee," ld.
(f)

"The

determination

of 'market

rent'

is

fundamentally

a

factual

determination although the statements of three-fifths of the membership of the Land Board do
indicale that the leases in question do not achieve the leveJ of market rent." 2010 WL 4861713,
at *8.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
27.

The allegations in paragraphs 1 through 26 above are incorporated by reference.

28.

Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution requires. in ::-e!evant part, the

Legislature. "at the earliest practicable period, [to] provide by law that the general grants ofland
made by congress to the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in
trust, subject to disposal at public auction tor the use and benefit of the respective object for
which said grants of land were made.' The State acquired the cottage sites pursuant to such a

I
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"general grant[] of land" from Congress, and the term "disposal" includes, inter alia, the leasmg
of such sites,
29.

The exclusion of cottage site leases from the conflict auction provisions in Idaho

Code § 58- J 10(2) in the 1990 Act vlOlates the limitation on legislative authority under Article
IX, Section 8 and is void.

30.

The operation of fdaho Code § 58-31 OA(3) is integrally-related and indispensable

to the operation of Idaho Code § 58-310A(2).

The 1990 Act also contained no severability

provision, Because the operative provisions of the 1990 Act are not severable, the entJrety of
Idaho Code § 58-310A is null and void, and the statute confers no lawful authority on the Land
Board or Defendant Bacon, so that all actions of the Land Board implementing cottage site rents
pursuant to the terms of § 58-31 OA are null and void.
SECO~D

CLAIM FOR RELIEF

31.

The allegations of paragraphs I1hrough 30 arc incorporated by reference.

32.

The Land Board's actions described above, and most recently those at its March

16, 2010 meeting, violate the obligation imposed under Article (X, Section 8 of the Idaho
Constitution to "secure the maximum long term financial return" to endowment land
beneficiaries. In particular, the rental rate set pursuant to authority ostensibly granted under
Idaho Code § 58-310A is substantially below the "maximum long term financial return"
constitutionally mandated-a fact tha1 a majority of the Board recognized in approving the most
recent rental-rate formula.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

33.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 32 are incorporated by reference.

34,

Alternatively, in the event this Court concludes that Idaho Code § 58-310A is

constitutional, the Land Board's actions described above, including, but nol limited to, its
u~ilization

of phase-in periods for rental increases to mitigate perceived hardships on lessees,
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violate the obligation imposed under Idaho Code § 58·}IOA to secure market rent throughout the
duration of each lease term.
RELIEF REQUESTED

33.

A declaratory judgment pursuant to l.R.C.P. 57 and Idaho Code §§ 10-1201 to·

1217 that Idaho Code § 58-3]OA conflicts with, and therefore is rendered void by, the public
auction requlrement in Article IX. Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution and that no substantive
provision in Idaho Code § 58-310A can be given effect.
34.

A declaratory judgment that the Land Board and Defendant Bacon possess no

authority by virtue of Idaho Code § 58·310A to enter into con age site renewal leases for the
20I 1·2020 period without compliance with Idaho Code §§ 58·307 and -.3lO.
35.

A declaratory judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 57 and Idaho Code §§ 10·1201 to •

1217 that the current formula for determining cottage-site rental rates fails \0 "secure the
maximum long tenn financial return" as required by Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho
Constitution.
36.

Alternatively, if Idaho Code §. 58·310A is found to be constitutional, a

declaratory judgment pursuant to l.R.C.P. 57 and Idaho Code §§ 10-1201 to ·1217 that the
currenl formula tor determining and implementing cottage-site rental rates fails to secure market
rent throughout the duration of each lease term.
37.

Preliminary and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to LR.C.P. 65 against the

Land Board ar:d Director Bacon to prevent entry into cottage site renewal leases for the 2011·
2020 period without compliance with Idaho Code §§ 58-307 and -310.
38.

Alternatively, if Idaho Code § 58·310A is found to be constitutional, preliminary

and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65 against the Land Board and Director
Bacon to prevent entry into cottage site renewal leases for the 2011-2020 period without
compliance with the mandate in Idaho Code §§ 58-31OA to secure market rent throughout the
duration of each lease term.
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39.

Such other and further relief as deemed appropriate by this Court.

DATED this 2nd day of December 2010.

LA WRENCE G . WASDEN
A TIORNEY GENER.A.L
STEVEN

L.

OLSEN

Deputy Anomey General

Chief of Civil Litigation Division

BY~~~W..:..-.....-_
CLA YR. SMITH

Deputy Attorney General
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY

i

GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the BABCOCK
TRUST; lAURA L. BARCLAY; BARBARA J. [ Case No. CV 201O-436C
BARSNESS; THOMAS W. BARTON; JAMES D.
and SHANON N. BIVENS; FRANK R. and
ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES and JEAl'-t'NENE ORDER RE: STIPULATION TO
BOYD; NANCY BOYD~ MAJ-LE T ATE and DISMISS CLAIMS
HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY RUMPH, as
trustee of the SANDRA BROMAGEN TRUST;
MONTFORD M. BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON
and H. ANTONIOLI; MARTIN L. and JANIS O.
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE FAMILY
1988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNEFrX I
THOMAS,
as
Trustee
of
the
WENDELL/BARBARA
CARNEFIX
TRUST;
JONATHAN p, CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the
CHARLOTTE
KINNEY
TRUST;
COLIN
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER
IV LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE
COOKE; RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA L.
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and
MARTIN J. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY;
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative of
the ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D.
DOBBS; BEN'NETT G, DAY and DONNA DAY
JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD &
MARJORIE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER
DUCHARME
and
TERESA
CHAPMAN
DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees of the DUCHARME
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; ALLEN and
DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY EDMUNDS; ROBERT
and BARBARA FARBER; JOSEPH 1. FEELEY;
MICHAEL AND PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE
FOLTZ; JOHN W. GENTRY; GERMAIN R.
TARRANT and JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C.
GOUl; RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN
M, HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R.
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES
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CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; LILA
HARPER; RODNEY HEATER; KENT MICHAEL
HENRIKSEN and JEANNE C. HENRIKSEN, as
Co-Trustees of the HENRIKSEN F AMIL Y TRUST;
CHARLES
HERVEY;
CRAIG
and
LORI
HICKMAN; WADE A. & JOAN C. HILLARD;
WILLIAM and BARBARA HIPP; KARL and
MARGARET HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and
JOSEPH 1. HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK
JENSEN, as Trustee of the JENSEN FAMILY
TRUST; HAL JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J.
JOSLIN; DANIEL and ANGELINA KAUFMAN;
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as
personal representative for the ESTATE OF
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA; SHARON
L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the LEISY
F AMIL Y LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and REBECCA
A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEANN LONGSON;
ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN MACK;
RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN MCKNIGHT,
as Trustee of the EDWIN H. & VIVIAN P.
MCKNIGHT F AMIL Y TRUST; CINDY KUBENA, I
as Trustee of the MILDRED I. FERGUSON TRUST;
DONNA MOORE; WILLIAM A. and GALE P.
MOTT; STEPHEN and ANN MURDOCH;
EDWARD F. O'GARA, as Trustee of the EDWARD
F. O'GARA III FAMIL Y TRUST DATED JULY 8,
1982; THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M.
and KIMBERLY A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY
P ARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.;
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as Co-Trustees
of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY TRUST; JEANE
E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and KATY L.'
REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and PAMELA RIDDLE;
SUSAN C. ROURKE; DAVID ROUSSEAU; JOHN
D. RULE; EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S5 FAMILY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G. LANCE
and CYNDY SALLADA Y; CHARLES and
JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T. SCHULZE;
GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V. SHOEMAKER;
SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH and BARBARA
SMITH, as Co-Trustees of the SMITH F AMIL Y
TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as Trustee of the
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STODDARD/CLARK CABfN TRUST; GREGORY
and JULIE SURABIAN; CATHY PETERSON, as
Trustee of THE MCCALL CABIN TRUST;
CHRISTOPHER C. THOMPSON and JULIE E.
THOMPSON; SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S.
TURNER; JOHN L. SIMMONS; SALLE C.
UBERUAGA; STEVEN C. and MARYANN
WALKER; J. LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C.
WALKER and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of
the WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A.
WRENN; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal
Representative of the EST ATE OF KANDACE
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE,
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KAY KEMP
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H.
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER
F AMIL Y TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998;
SUZANNE
ZIMMERMAN;
GLORIA
B.
SALLADA Y;
GREGG
and
SALLE
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS;
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.

BASED UPON the parties' Stipulation to Dismiss Claims and good cause appearing
therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the following claims are dismissed without prejudice
and without any award of costs or attorney fees:

1.

COUNT II[ - Declaratory Judgment (Regarding the Land Board's Violation of

the Idaho Constitution) - of the Amended Complaint.
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the following claims are dismissed without prejudice
and without any award of costs or attorney fees:

1.

COUNT III - Declaratory Judgment (Regarding the Land Board's Violation of

the Idaho Constitution) - of the Amended Complaint.
2.

COUNT IV - Declaratory Judgment (Regarding the Land Board's Violation of

I.C. § 58-31 OA) - of the Amended Complaint.
3.

COUNT

V

-

Declaratory

Judgment

(Regarding

the

Land

Board's

Unconstitutional Application of I.e. § 58-31 OA) - of the Amended Complaint.
4.

COUNT VI - Injunctive Relief - of the Amended Complaint.

DATED thiC]1+ty of January, 2011.

District Judge

f~~~
~
[)~vJ

(Y\

(PY(f

CAerK:.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of January, 201 I, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:

Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby
HA WLEY, TROXELL, ENN IS & HAWLEY, LLP

IT U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

oo

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy 954-5210
Electronic Transmission
mclark@hawleytroxell.com
jashbyialhawleytroxeII.com

877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

o
o

Phillip S. Oberrecht
Colleen D. Zahn
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, PA
702 West Idaho Street, Suite 700
POBox 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

o
o
oo

~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy 395-8585
Electronic Transmission
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Phillip S. Obenecht
ISS #1904, pso@hallfarlcy.<lom
Colleen D. Zahn
ISS ft0208. ccb::@hallfarley.com
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HALL. FARLEY, OBBRRECH1' & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700

Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
W:'\4\4-61l.1 IPLEAOJNOS.vALl.EY COUN'l'YIMSJ Contrtct Clflims.-H'FO'8·Hem4on Atf.dac
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Case No.
lost ~
Filed-_ _-..JA.M ;L~:

p-J.f

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

GLADYS

BABCOCK,

as

Trustee

of

the

BABCOCK TRUST; et. aJ .•

Case No. CV 2010·436C

Plaintiffs,

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF ANNE
HERNDON IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY
IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS;
and OEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,

JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT
CLAIMS

Defendants.

STATE OF {(20

)

fA..

)

County of

) ss.

Anne Herndon. having been rust duly 9WOm upon oath. deposes and says as follows:
1).

I am married to Ruasell McKinley, the bolder of Cottage Site Lease No. 5271.

My busbaod is one of the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action. I have personal knowledge of

AFFIDA Vl'T OF ANNE HERNDON 1N SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PART1AL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT R.E: CONTRACT CLAIMS - 1
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the matters stated herein, am over the age of 18 and am competent to testify thereto. I submit
this Affidavit in support of Plaintiffs' Motion fot' Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract

Claims.
2.

My husband's grandmother, Hazel Fullor. originally acquired our leased parcel

through a lottery. Hazel gifted the parcel to Russell's parents, Margaret Fuller McKinley and
Russell MtK.inley. Margaret and Russell gifted the parcel to Russ. Russ and I hope to someday
give the parcel and cottage to our son, Alex Russell McKinley.
3.

The original cottage was a one-room affair built on a foundation of railroad ties

by Russ' father, with help from family and friends. In the 70's, Russ and his father added a living

room. The next big project was Q fireplace and hearth. Mol'e' recently, Russ and I replaced the tin
roof with the current aluminum roof, and Alex joined us in painting the exterior. Although the

cottaiC is small, it means II great deal to us and to Alex .. We have shared many precious family
moments together at the cabin. and we hope to somehow continue this tradition. Attached hereto

as Exhibit A is a trUe and cOtteCt photo of OIlT cabin.
4.

Our parcel sits adjaccot to Warren Wagon Road. -MlCI'C year-round traffic has

increased immensely. The undesirable location, coupled with the fact that the parcel is leased

land. has made the lot unsaleable on the open market. The market for cottage site leases has
completely collapsed due to unreasonable rents based on purely arbitrary and speoulative VaHey
County assessments. The assessed value for our parcel increased 263% from 2006 to 2007,
which caused the rent to increase to a level that we can no longer afford.. Our leased property is
not a lakefront property. Instead I would call it a sixth tier property, meaning we are set far back

AFFIDAVIT OF ANNE HERNDON fN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION fOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDOMENT RB: CONTRACT CLAIMS - 2

461

02/10/2011 '15: 14 FAl 20839585&

BALLFARLEY

from the fake. and have 2 roads and at least 4 other properties between us and the lake. Our

situation is not unique. Our parcel is surrounded by leased lots that are for sale with no buyers.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

Anne Herndon

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before ~ this ~ day of February, 2011.
(SEAL)

,Idaho
~o~ ~
Reslding at
My Commission Xfrires 05/CJ8"1'2 0 J'i
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of February, 20J 1.1 caused to be SCl'Ved a
true copy of the foregoing document. by the method indicated below, md addressed to each of
the following:

~

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
HAWLEY, TROXELL. ENNIS & HAWLEY. LLP
Overnight Mail
8n Main Street. Ste. 1000
Telecopy
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Electronic Transmission
Fax No. 954-5210
m.clark@hawleyttoxell,com
iashby®lulwleytroxell.CQDl
Merlyn W. Clark

D. John Ashby

B

AFFIDAVIT OF ANNE HERNDON IN SUPPORT OF
ruOOMENT RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS. 4
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MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
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Phillip S. Oberrecht
ISB #1904, p'o@haIlfarley.gom

Colleen D. Zahn
ISB #6208, cdz@halltarley.com

HALL. FARLEY, 08BRRECHT &; BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box \271
Boise. Idaho 83701
Telephone! (20B) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395.8585
W:\4\4-61l.I\PLMDINOS-VAu..SV COVNTYlM$J CoIUrCI Claima-HF08-Hec:ock Attdoc

Attorneys for Plaintl1fs
IN TIm DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIiE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
GLADYS

BABCOCK,

as Trustee

of the

BABCOCK TRUST; et. al.,

Case No. CV 201 0-436C

Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF JIM HANCOCK
Vi.

IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS;
and GEORGE BACON. in his official capacity as
Dl.tector of the Idaho Department of Lands,

IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:

CONTRACT CLAIMS

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of

ddA

)

) as.
)

Jim H-.ncock., bavina been first duly swom upon oath, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am the holder of Cottage Site Lease No. 5215, and one of the Plaintiffs in the
I

above-entitleti bon. I have personal knowledse of the matters stated berein. am over the age of
18 and am competent to testify thereto. I submit this Affidavit !n support of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims.
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2.

1lI034

Fifty years ago my wife and r spent our honeymoon at Pilgrim Cove in a cabin

just clown the lane from our present cabin site. That's when we fell in love with the Cove. We

have had oW" cottage site lease for 49 years. It Is not a lake shore site and is located some
distance from the lake.
3.

In 1958 the leasehold value was zero and our yeMly cost to lease was $30.00.

UnfortU.llAtely with the current outrageous Valley County assessment, the leasehold value has

very suddenly ret:ur:ned to zero and our yearly cost has escalated to about 53500. We can't afford
to keep it and no one wants to buy it at the current rates.
4.

We have invested in improvements that are permanently attached to the land and

have protected the land from fire, erosion, lind other hazards through our efforts and money. We
are not reckless rentel'$ that damage the property and run. We are good stewards of the land.

S.

We grubbed the stumps by hand and cleared a place for our cottage and naJled

every board with our own hands. It was an e1fort that took years of bloodt sweat. and tears. Our

chiJdren took their flISt steps on the rough wooden floors. Both of our boys met their future
wives in Pilgrim Cove as they all grew up together. Our one son and his bride were married there
on the beach. In July 2007. my wife and I cc::lcbrated our 50th anniversary there again with

family and mends.
6.

Now our grandchildren are playing on those same trails and beaches. Over the

years we continued to improve our surroundings in any way we could. We have paid for sewer

ins1al1ation, boat ramps. tree removal. and road Uparades. The state has been tight filrted with
their assistance. They have not graded our road, or oiled the dust or plowed the snow. They have

bluntly told us to do it ourselves. Their only interest in US is to take our money.
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In 2007 the State l'Mloved the Pilgrim Cove water system that we have used for

over SO ycars, which forced all of u.s to diS wells. This was another expense that cost me over

513.000. We can't afford these costs. Many of us are retirees and we arc not rich people. We
started early, worked hard, and made improvements that we love and want to keep. Now the
State is ready to take this away from us.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

s!:.y

of February, 2011.

(SEAL)
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February. 2011, J caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the folJowing:
Merlyn W. Clark
IiJ u. S. Mail, Postago Prepaid
O. JobnAshby
Hand Delivered
HA WLEY. TROXELL. ENNIS & HAWLEY. LLP
Ovmnight Mail
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
Telecopy
Boise, Idaho 83701~1617
Electronic Transm.ission
Fax No. 954-5210
mc1wt@bawIeytroxe1l.com

o

8o

jghby@hawlcytroxsll.9Qm
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Phillip S. Oberrecht
ISB *J904, pao@hllilfarley.com

Colleen D. Zabn
ISB #6208, c:dz@hallfarloy.com

HALL. FARLEY, OBERRECHT &. BLANTON, P.A.

702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
BOise.ldaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500

Facsimile:

(208) 39.5-8585

W:\4\4-6B2.I\PU!ADlNOS-VA1J.EYC01Jl'rTY\MSJConr.ra::ta.iI'l1&-HFO~lkhul.. A1J.doe

Attorneys for Plaintiff's

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF 1HE FOUR'm JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIm COUNTY OF VALLEY

GLADYS

BABCOCK,

BABCOCK TRUST; et. at,.

as

Trustee

of the
CeseNo. CV 20]0-436C

Plaintiff's.
VB.

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES T.
SCBULZE IN SUPPORT OF

IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS;

PARTIAL SUMMARY

and OEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,

JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT

PL.AlN11FFS' MOTION FOR

CLAIMS

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) 55.

County of

)

James T. Schulze, havil1i been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows:
1.

J am the holder of Cottage Site Lease No. 5290, and one of the Plaintiffs in the

abovc-entitled action. I have personal knowledge ofthc matters stated herein. am over the age of
18 and am competent to testify thereto. I submit this Affidavit in support of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Partial Summary J1ldsmcnt Re: Contraot Claims.
AFFTDA VIT OF JAMES T. SCHULZE IN SUPPORr OF PLArNTlFFS' MOnON FOR PAR.TIAL SUMMARY
ruDOMENT RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS· l
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I am a person of very modest means, a former Idaho-boy tu:med Iowa college

teacher who thought he'd found fl. simple little cabin in the woods for summers and retirement in

his beJoved Idaho.
3.

My parents moved to Idaho in 1950 when I was eight years old, and I graduated

from CaJdwell High School in 1960. Soon after our anival in Idaho we traveled to McCaJI to
enjoy a family vacation staying in a small cabin owned by a member of my father's congregation
and located near Payette Lake. I returned to this area every summer to

~oy

fishing, hiJdng and

pickins hucJdebenies. J vividly remember the star fiUed sky of my fitst-ever overnight hike to
Snowslide Lake.
4.

Upon my graduation from colleRe in Indiana, I returned to that same first cabill to

spend my honeymoon. FollOwing graduate school at the Univenity of Nevada (Reno), I
reJuctantly took a job teaching at a sma1J coUege in Iowa, vowing to return to Idaho ("where I

belongedtl ) after 3 or 4 years ofteachinC in the Midwest. During my growing up years in Idaho,
my family not only spent time in McCall, but also made annual tre1cs to Nebraska to visit my

grandparents and countless reJativcs--at which time I vowed never to live in the Midwest.

Clearly I do not have good luck with my vOWJ--baving just completed nearly four decades of
my Iowa 1eal:lhing career. However, I did manage to spend Ilt least a portion of every summer in
McCall since 1950.
S.

By J980 I r~lized I wanted to do more 1han use my parents' home in the Boise

Valley as a base of operations for campillg/hiltinglbackpac:king/:tishinfl trips to McCall and
surrounds, and began searching for my own base in the McCall area. I set up a oamp below
Boulder Meadows Reservoir and rode my motorcycle to town everyday to search

fOf

"my spot."

I looked at I variety of properties. from bare land to be developed. to abandoned pioneer
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homesteads. to Condos, and was finally directed by

~

realtor to a small, not-yct-listed-for-ll8.le

cabin in Pilgrim Cow.
6.

The property was being offered by the oriainal lease holders who had built the

cabin themseJvcs with the help of family members. The cabin remains a simple and basic 16 by
24 foot structure nlsting on logs with a one-roOm kitchen and living area in the channing knotty
pine paneled main floor and a steep ladder leading

10

an attic loft for sleeping. At the time of

purchase, one end of the main floor was a basic fireplace aDd at the other end in the kitchen area
was a wood bumina cook stove.
7.
to

SeEl

Before purchasing the cabint I checked with local friends and a business person.

what I could discover about the State ofIdaho lease proarAm. After checklng around I was

asJUted thB1 the program was faiT. :reasonabJe and stable, and seemed to be a satisfactory WilY to

"own" property. With this assurance and based on my now self-recognized desire to have a small
little cabin in the woods in McCall. I decided to go ahead with the purchase.
B.

Though the putchase price for my cabin was modest, so was my income and I had

to teach summer school and Upward Bound at the college to earn the extra money required to

make the payments over a ten year period of time. On many occasions I would rue the necessity
of beina in Iowa earning money to pay for the cabin in Idaho that I was nOt able to enjoy very
much for havina to be in Iowa in order to be abJe to afford it. However, I did manage to get to
Idaho for at least B portion of every summer and eventually the ten years went by.

9.

Over the years I worked with my father to make a few modifications. He and DW

Uncle Joe built an o1lt$idc stairway and put in a door to the o.pper lever. "Older people are going
to have trouble with that inside ladder," my father said-a piece of wisdom I have now come to
benefit from. When the sewer came to Pilsrim Cove, the old antique wood stove had to make
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sink.. shoWCl' and toilet. My father I.lpgraded the electrical system

to add a couple of circuits and I learned somc basic plumbing putting in the bathroom and a new
ldtchcn sink. The cabtn was very much a family affair.
10.

While they were able to do so, my parents tmveled to McCan to open the cabin

and get it ready for usc by the titne I was able to loavc IO'Wa and set to Idaho. They also took care
of closing the cabin at the end of the season. Together, we enjoyed family fishing expeditions
and huek1ebeny hunts. Even when she was in her late eighties, my mother enjoyed picking
huckleberries in the front yBrd of the cabin, perched on a kitchen chair.
11.

As I spent time this past summer visiting with remaining neighbors who are part

of the older Pilgrim Cove family. I realized that While I was not there to experience some of the
early years that resulted in families formins life-long 'bonds as their children grew up to lD8.l1)'

ldds from the cabin next door, I do share and value a sort of .neighborhood family history that ha$
evolved over time and has brought us closer together as we watch friends forced to leave the
cove.
12.

Though I have lived and workcd in another place for many years. my

heartlsoullbeing remains attached and rooted in Idaho. My father is buried [n the Lizard Butte

cemetery located between Homedale and Marsing. and my mothcn' continues to live in Idaho. I

am an Idaho boy.
13.

I retired from teaching in 2007. There have been challenges and adjustments

brought about by retiring, however, my attitude was senerally positive and 1 had been profoundly
looking forward to much more McCall time, and eventually returning to Idaho as my permanent
residence. That was, however. until I received my 2008 property assessment from the VaHcy
County Assessor and on its heeJ the t1otificatlon ormy Jease bill from the Department of Lands.

AFFIDA VIT Of' JAMeS 1. SCHULZE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOnON FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
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The asseSSJl1ent (and hence lease amoUllt) more than quadrupled in only one year.

Words like shock, dismay, doom. defeat. worry, arudety and stress only begin to chars.cteriz.e the
cloud that bas appeared on my retirement horizon. My first summer of retirement was filled with
thoua,hts of how can I afford to bang on to my simple modest yet drastically expensive MeCall
cabin.
1S.

Friends sugacated maybe I could sell and buy something els&-which seemed like

a reasonable suggestion before I learned about proposed changes to the 2010 lease contra.ct

which make it highly unJike]y that anyone would want to buy into this situation. Meanwhile. the
explosion of development in McCall and Long Valley IUld the subsequent inflated. market ma.kes
it almost impos.siblc for someone of my limited financial means to buy something else.
16.

Imagine my shock and dismay upon completing my 40th year of teaching with

plans to return pennancnlly to Idaho only to discover that my second-tier Pilgrim Cove lease had
qu.adnlpled just 8$ I finally entered retirement with unlimited time to spend in Ic:hsbo but a fixed
income that cannot support staggering rent escalations. As my first summer of retirement

progressed I became incrcasing1y despondent u J realized I was trapped in a no-win situation. It
is unlikely that I can afford to pay the escalating lease payments; hO\vever I have little hope of
selling in a market that has collapsed. Thfs was not the ~ when I bougbt what ( thought was an
investment for my mirement 25 years ago.
17.

I had

plan~ to

remodel/expandlwinterize the cabin or build another structure to

accommodate the move to Idaho. Now, it
uncertainty of being

~le

Seetns

unwise to dcveJop the property given the

to afford the pending increases in the lease, particularly if the new

leases bring with them an increue in the percentage rate. My initial assessment for 2008 was

revised downward by approximately half, but this still doubled the lease amount in only one
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year. 1

W53 reli~cd

by thia in the Ihort run,

p.l

99992$S07~

tht>U8h

the amoij!lt

\VaS

still difficult to

accommodate. However, the fact that these giant increesos ate possible nwcals the proverbial
·wri~ on the

wiUl." Without some usu:rance of moderetion.. it seems completely unwise

to

Proceed. yet. impossible to escape.
FUllmER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this:

.s!-day ofF4!tbnwy~ 2011.

(SEAL)
Notary Publio for ldQho
Residing at _~_ _ _ _ _ _ • Idaho
My Commiuion. Expires _ _ _ _ __

au rECRA

T~OLAR

ABOGADO ARMANDO BOLIO PASOS
DE LA NOTAR~A PUBLICA NUMERO 46

MI

C~GO

ES VITALICIO
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CERTIFICATE OF S&RVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY the:t on the q day of February, 2011. J caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document. by the""&tbod indicated below, and addressed to each of
the. following:

[E U.S. Mail. PO$12lge Prepaid
Merlyn W. Clark
D. Jolm Ashby
DB Hand Delivered
HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS'" HAWLEY, LLP
Overnight Mail
877 Main Street. Ste. 1000
Te!ccop:y
Boise, Idaho 83701·16Z1
Electronic Transmission
Fax No. 954-5110
mc1Bk@hawlcyttoxcll.com
juhby@hawtcytroxcU,CQJn

o

Colleen D, Zahn
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FEB
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.~

.• J

Lvi

Phillip S. 0lMtn:=ht
lIB '1.04. J"OIbaw.rt.y.oo1ll
Collccm D. ZIhn
JIB H2oa- ,...,.11..].,.0=
HALL, FAlU.BY, OBEltRECHT k BLANTON, P.A.
102 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Oftice Bcoc 1211

Boi.e.ldIbo 83701
Telephone;

(208) 39.5-1500

PIICJimlt.:

(2.08) 39S-858!

W:"'~IIP1.EADDIQ8vVALIZY cou:NTY\loGJ CaaarIwII clNnHatC:li.TIIlMIIIJtdoc

~

fOr 1'1.IWI1U&

IN THE DlSTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURni lUDICIAL nmnucT OF mE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF V.AI.LEY
GLADYS BABCOC~ u
BABCOCX. TRUST~ ct. 11.,

Tru&tee

!:If th.

Plaindt'fa,

A.PlI'JDA.V1T OF PATRICIA K.
TOTTEN IN IUPPORT OP

VI.

PLAINTU'FS' MOnON roIt

mAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSION!.'RSi

PARTIAL I!ItlMMARV
IUDGMIiNT IlEI CONTRACT
CLAIMS

aDd GBORGB BACON. Ul hit 05c1al Clpaclty 18
Director oflhc Idaho DopartrDrcDt ofI..lm4s,

otfoadanta.
STATBOFIDAHO
)
CGUfttyof _ _ _ __ )

II.

PATRICIA K. TOTTEN, belni flrIt duly rwotJ1, dIJposcs IIEld 11)'1:
1.

t .at I bebetic:tary and pUt tnIBtee of the Babcock Trust, the boldar of Cottaae

Sica Leuc No. S012. The Bahc:ook Trull I.e

lmowli:dp of tbo mattea stated herein.

O!UI

IDl

Dfthe Pla1ntifti in this matter. I ba've penonal

over the

'III

of 18 and

1m

oarnpetem to tertify

AmDAVlT OF PA11UCUr. X. TOT'l'EN IN 'UPPOltTOP Pu.r:NTlFFS' MOTION 'OR PiJlTTAL
StA04AltY 1t.IPC3MBNT ItS: cmrnucr CLAIMS • 1
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thMto. I tt1halit thlll AffIdavit in ~ ofPla.lntlft\' Motlon for Putill SUCIU1*'y .JudamIUlt
Jit.o. CODtrutC1IJmI.

2.
S5~,

....tI

Our pmdfe.tbcr 1eucd our 0tip.J. ai~ ill 193' for • peziod of' g)l )'I&TB at

Our leasehold fa on .. bluff overlookina tbe Lake. aaxt 1:0 Poaderoa Park: with Pm

ualna OUf boat dock. At that tIma it wu •

IIOIUY 1tWe1 road

4-hour drive to McC.u fi:om Bolte on I. very

blah abovo the GIID),OI1. AI 1 UDd8rrtud it, at that tiJae tbe State had to bea

peOple to iCU6 the Imd bccawc the

trt., to M.:Call

'WII

INCh III Drdeal, Iftd theHfor. tb Stat.

offc:nxi the gg.)'8IU 1euc with an UlU1'IDot the Ie!l.t would always be 1I.ftb%d.abla. At IOIlJe poinl~
however.1:bI P!),.year 1tue w... taken and. we han not been a'ale 1X) d.iacove.r bow or why, yet..
3.

To my bowtedp. my p~ alwa". complied wfEli \Vbatov. tho Dept of Landa

ubd. 11uty agreed to move the

~biM

from their

~

ptivato looeman to

&

crowded. plJ.ce

o.U&ida the padc in tho arly 1950'. when the Stau WU1tecl to cxpIII1d the Po.aderoea Park. My

mother did aot oomplain WD.D the State inItaUed • 6-foot chaiu link feDc:e with 3 B1raI:uh of
bazbed. wiN alona Cbe aide of OLJr let. 1Udq 3 from r..t oft''IIw length of our lot.
4.

Mine WIt ncvc .. wctlthy family. We clldn't ov.n ha'YO a. boat dock. W1ti1 I 'built

ODO back in the late l~O'. out of lop 1d dri1lioa by the millWO&Url. Not havfq 1he \lIU8llab
to)'I. oech J'CNI1' w. childND would roUDd. Up driftmS

'TDaoU1'OU" aDd build I raft to play 00. Only

In t 986 did. I. I1Iter lind he family provide a boat £or the 1Iu:Niy to ~.

5.
10000000DiI

Whal

my :fatl1I1' had

2

or 3 cbildrefl in colleiO and money

WeI W!rf

tiaht,

ofand. him. $:25.000 for OUt leae. My mother told him not to IICll tho property beCl1tJe

It W1I the oo1Ythine: he had to 18&.,..10 bi. \1bJlclreo. Evan ~p M really Deeded tbemono)" be
tumed tbcl offer down.

AnWA VIr 0' PI.nuClA K. TO'IT!N IN' 5UPPOllT Of PLAIN'IlFFS' MOnON FOR PARTIAL
Sl.1)Dl%AJlY Jt.J:DQM!Ml'1I.'!: CO'N"I'llACl'CLAlMS. 2
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My mother wodtcd for my

6.

anrncl6lth1I 1Ditially

wb.q be

rm .bla ll1IurlDle

bu..iaeu &om the CIbin in MoCaU. She ad my father 'MIl. marri.ccl 111 tba w,w..

About 20 years atgo. Icme a1\er our faiher had. pwcd away, the

7.

1'CIDtI It&rted

creoping up to a point 0111: motbtlr could !:lOt ..tfurd. Four o( bar aix c.bi1c1nm were 1Lb1o to pay It
for her. We vowed tbexl ~ wmdd bIma in there Wbatevet it took 1I1q u OUt mother was alive
10 keep the gabiDa Av her Ibd our Amily.

My mother and a sister 1lW there aD

I.

I1.Il1lmm'

other .... :etumJd 1:0 Jdllho to It1eDd coUep becau.

10lli. Bwm. ~ldren Niled 1m.

ot the joya of family vaalltiou at aut

DoIU.m McCalL. Our profeJdona 10011: 3 ofmy S aibU.Dp and me I.....y, yet all bope to mum 11)

Iciabc 1n :aUmnen1.
9.

My brothc baa 3 obildrcn meonece. 'Ifl'l sistor hu 2 uhildren in QCnop and the

third liltar 11 livJDa 011 rttS.tamant inoome. All be.d to borrow to pay the _
yean. We foel dambfOuoded
Idteholda tm4

~

It

for the put aeve.ra1

the pod1ion w. (mel ounelvea In. There 14

:teel certain we will mac the

~crt)'

PO

DWket !or

cur family hal ltroBSled

10

b.ud to

preM:rVa.

Furth.. )'OW' affilJl1; uyeth D81Jiht.

D.ATBDthU~dAyl)tFflbNlry, 2011.

A.wtD,AVlTOP PATNCIAK. TOTTBNtN SU?PORTOFpt.ADlTIPPS' MOTlONPOllPA&TIAL
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a&'I'IFICAD or SEImCl
1 HmtEBY CBltTIFY that em tht ~ day of Fabruary, 2011, I cauaed. to b. mv.clli\
at the tbmaolq doawnent., by the ~ l.tuIJc1ltl!d below. and admellled to each of

t!'WI COP)'

tho tbllowinr.

Mttlyn W. Clark
D. Johtl AIhby
HAM..!Y. TR.OXBLL, liNNlS A; HA WLiY. LLP
877 Main Streat" Stt. looo
BoJJe, Idaho "'01-1617
11u No. 954-1218

AmDAVIT 0' PA'l1UCJA Jt. TOll aN m ItIPPOR.T OF 1'LAI'N'I1.PPS' MOTION Post PAllTlAL
StnGtJ\lty JUDOM!NT U: CC)NTIAOT CLAIMS· 4
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CLERK
BY.
DEPUTY
FEB 1 0 2011
Phillip S. Oberrecbt

CaaeNQ_ _-,lnsLHo__- AM_ _---'A.U5'";OO P."

lSS # 1904, pso@hallf8tley.com

CoUoenD. Zahn
lSB #6208. cdZ@hItUfarIey.c:om

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271'
Boise.Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile:

(208) 395-8:585

W:\4\4-682.1\Pte.\D1N(15-VALLEY COl1N"l'Y\Cma MSJ.cO/llnCf Cltdmr-HPOIloOpp MMno,doc

Attorneys for Lessees
IN TIm DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE FOURTIi JUDICIAL DiSTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

GLADYS BABCOCK,
BABCOCK TRUST; et ai.,

Il$

Trustee

Plaintiffs,

of the
Case No. CV 2010-436C
PLAINTIFFS LESSEES'

MEMORANDUM IN oppOSmON TO

VS.

DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION

IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS; FORPAR~S~Y
and GEORGE BACON, in his offioial eapacity as JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands.
CLAIMS
Defendants.

Plaintiffa Babcock, et aI. (hereinafter 'ILessees''), by and through their undersigned
counsel of record, hereby submit this Memorandum In OppoSition to Defendants' Cross-Motion
for Partial Summmy Judgment Re: Contract Claims.

For the reasons set forth below,

Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be denied in its entirety. Lessees' opposition
is also supported by the Affidavits of James Schulze, Patricia Totten, James Hancock. IIlJd Anne
Herndon filed herewith, the Affidavit of Phillip S. Obcrrecht previously submitted in opposition
to Defendants' prior motion to dismiss andlor stay this matter, Lc5sees' Memorandum in Support

of Motion fur Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims, the Affidavit of Colleen O. Zahn
PLAINTIFF LESSEES' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON TO DEFENDANTS' CROSSMOnON FOR PARTlA.L SUMMARy JUDGMENT U: CONTRACT CLAIMS. 1
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submitted in SUpport of said motion, the Affidavit of W. Anthony Park submitted in support of
Lesgees· Motion to Consolidate, and the other pleadings and papers on file in this matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendant! argue both: (1) that there is no right to renew in the January 2001 cottage site
leases, and (2) that if they breached the leases by raising rents so high they exceed market rent,
Defendants sbould not be forced to fulfill their contractual obligation to compensate Lessees for
the fair market value ofLes8ees' improvements. Thi$leaves LeS8CC& with a Bobson's Choicesign up for

DIlOther

period of escalating rents they cannot afford and are man: than the market

will bear, or abandon their generational hopes, dreams, and substantial monetary investments.
Defendants assert this Court should ignore the renewal provisions DefendaPts included in
the January 2001 leases and instead allow Defendants to

rcvm.tc the

lease tcmns because they

believe it necessary to do so. Defendants, both of whom are state entities, believe that they
should bell no responsibility for rewriting their contracts with Lessees because Idaho statutes

and the Idaho Constinrtion supposedly require them to raise rents. Defendants fail to cite any
Jegal authority pcnnitting them to unilaterally rc'Mite contracts as they d.eetn necessary, or to
impair the 2001 lease agreements to such an extent that Lessees will never be able to recover the

monetary invcstJllents ntade in their respective leaseholds.
Defendants should not be pennitted to ignore their contractual obligations. The January
2001 lease agreements have an enforceable renewal provision. permitting Lessees to renew the
leases on the existing terms and conditions. including the existing rental formula. Defendants
opted to violate that provision. and they should be compelled to either offer a renewal

OIl

the

2001 lease terms or comply "ith the lease and pay the costs required as a consequence of the
breach-the fair market value ofL~sees' improvements.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGBOUND'

Lessees' contract claims in this lawsuit concern two lease sections. which grant Lessees
the right to renew the January 200 I leases. Lease section C.l.1 sets forth a general right to

renew:

LEASE TERMlRENlWAL

C.

~

term of this lease shall be for no more than ten
(10) years pursuant to Idaho Code (I.e.) § 58-307(1i, end for the period of years
as set forth in the attached cover lease. Renewals of this leu~ may be granted by
the LESSOR I1S determined by the LESSOR at the LESSOR'S discretion pursuant
1.1

to

provided by Statute.

I.C. § S8-31OAl.

(Emphasis added). Lessee,' right to renew is again addressed in lease scction K.1.4.b, which
affirms that the State will not unreasonably withhold approval of Lessees' applic:a.tions to renew:
I.4.b. Upon Non-Renewal By Lessor. Should LESSEE apply to renew this

lease in the manner provided by law 8lld such application be denied, then
LESSOR shaH purchase the approved improvements placed or caused to be
placed on the leased premises by LESSEE. at the fair market value of such
improvements as of the effective date of the expiration. Fair market value of
LESSEE improvements shall be established by appraisal. A request for renewal
In' lbc LESSEE shall not be UDlCuonably withheld.
(Emphasis added). This section also provides that if the Land Board denies renewal applications,

it wiU compensate Lessees for the fair market value of1heir improvements.
The January 2001 leases do not specify a rental tate to be charged during the renewal
term that is any different than the leases' rental rate fonnula during the original lease period.

Section 0.1.1. provides the rent formula to be used:

I The factuallllld procedural backgound of dUa matter is set forth In full detail in Leuns' Memorandum. In Support
of Motion for Partial SummlU}' ludiJ11ent Ro: Contract Cltim$ ao4 is Incorporated heroin by mmnee. In the

iDU:rut of avoiding unnecessary duplu.ati.on. artd collllidering both motions are being beard at the same date and
t1mo, Lessees' will summarize those facts and procedure releVI1l1 to !be pending modon.
2 At ttn: time the leases were executed, Idaho Code Sed Ion 58-307 provided for a maximUIll 10- year Icuo term.
~ Jdaho Codo Section SS-J lOA provides that cottage site teaaes are not subject to the eonflict auction procedun
appiir.abJo to other eateeonos of State endowment land$, IUld that in the ab&cncc of eontli~ auctions tho Lan d RolTd
Is to InJure that there are stable lwei In piau thllt ien~ market rent.
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ReDtal Rate. Rent shall be two and one balf (2.5%) of current fcc simple
value of the leased premises, as determined by valuation admlnistcred by
the LESSOR or by valuation as determined by the assessor. The value of
the leasea premises shall be determined as though the leased .premises is
vacant and unimproved, subject to any outstanding rights and reservations
of record. and without any deduction or credit for LESSEE-owned site
improvements. This rental rate was adopted and approved by the Idaho
State Board of Land Commissioners on December 14. 1998.

After the Land Board voted at its March 16.2010 meeting to increase the rental rate from

2.5% to 4%, Lessees timely applied to renew their January I, 2001 Jeases. The Department of

Lands refused those renewal requests and sent Lessees. drafts of a new template lease, indicating
the template wu subject to revision. The Department also stated that renewal would only be

available on the terms offered by the Land Board in their entirely new lease. The Department
indicated 8.!1 well that in early fall it would send out lease documents for the new leases to those
lesaees that returned II D~partm.~t ofLtmds' form included with the template lease.
Out of an abundance of caution and not wanting to give the Department of Lands a
reason to ariuc Lessees failed to timely apply for renewal,

Lesse~

returned the DepartmMlt of

Lands' renewal fOnn5, reserving their rights to protest the imposition of a new lease on them by

the Department of Lands. Sel Parle Aff., ~ 6, Exh. D.

In order to protect their lease rights, Lessees filed this suit on October 22,20] 0.4 The suit
alleged two cJaims for breach of contract-one seeking; to compel specific performance of the
renewal term, including continuation of the 2.5% rent formula. and the other an alternative claim,
seeking compensation for site improvements due to the Land Board's refusal to renew the

current leases. Set A. Comp/., m\28-41. In addition, Lessees alleged that the Land Board and
Department of Lands violated Idaho Code § 58-310A and Article IX, Section VIn of the Idaho

.. On Novemb« 10, 20 10, Losseo& tllod an Amendod Complaint, whlcb added four new Plaintiff leaseholders u
parties, but othorwlse did not add to or cbllniO tho claims sot forth In the orillnal Complaint.
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Constitution, by their imposition of the new rent [onnula. Set id," '" 42-54. Lessees also sought
injunctive relief, prohibiting the Land Board and Department of Lands from implementing the

4% rental formula. and instead requiring them to obey the

co~act

IUld offer LeSSMs a lease

under the existing lease tenns, including the existing rental. rate of 2.5%. See td.• ~ SS·S7.

On December 2. 2010, the Idaho Attomey General filed suit against the Land Board and

the Department of Lands in Ada County. seeking an irUunction preventing them from issuing the
proposed lease template. On December 16.2010, the Honorable Deborah Bail granted Lessees'
motion to intervene as defendants in that action and also srant:ed a motion for a preliminary
injunction against the Land Board and the Department of Lands.! The itijunction was entered by
the court on December 17,2010. It prohibits Defendants Land Board and the Department of
Lands from entering into new leases and

OrdCl'1S

them

to

maintain the status quo under the

January 1. 2001 leaaes.

On December 21,2010, at the regular meeting of the Land Board, the Land Board voted
to offer existing Lessees of cottage site parcels a

one~year

lease under the tenns and conditions

of the existing lease. including rent calculated as 2.5% of current market value. Defendants also
approved a second motion that cottage site leases be offered in 2012 for a ten·year term, at a
rental rate of 4% of current market value of the leased premises. Finally, Defendants voted to
clarify that adoption of the second motion superseded their earlier decision made on March 16.
2010. As such. Lessees entered into a stipulation with Defendants in this matter to msmiss
Lessees' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, and this Court entered an Order dismissins
those claims on January 26, 201 L In addition, on JlUluary 18. 2011, Lessees filed two petitions
for judicial review with this Court, seeking review of Defendants' December 21, 2010 actions as
on December 16. 2010, LeSUBI filed a motion asking this Court to ~IOtjdat8 the AttarnC)' General's Ada
County suIt against the Land Board and Dllpartment ofL1Il1ds into this ,uit against them.

, AIIO
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they relate to 1) t.he January 2001 lease agreements and 2) constitutional and statutory
authorities.
In late December 2010. pursuant to the decisions made by the Land :Soard at its
December 21, 2010, regular meeting, Defendants sent Lessccs letters indicating that if they
wished to remain in possession of their !eased premises, they would have to not only sign oneyeat renewal agreements at substantially increased

rents,

but also submit one-half of the

increased rent amounts by February 1.2011. The rent increase violated statutOI)' la.w, 88 wen as
the terms of Lessees' January 1,2001, lease agreements because the rents were

increQ~

without

the required t 80 day written notice. This action also amounted to contempt of the Ada County
court's December 17, 2010 Order Orantins Preliminary Injunction. As such, Lessees fUed a
motion !LIking the Ada County court to S2IDction Defendants for contempt.

Defendants contond they arc entitled to summary judgment on the contract claims it! this
matter because: (1) Lessees' contract claims concem agency action under the Administrative
Procedures Act C'APA") and Lessees did not timely file a petition for judicial review; and (2) the

January 2001 [eases do not provide a right to renew under the same lease tenns and conditions.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' arguments are without merit. and their motion

$hould be denied.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, affidavlts and
admissions on file show that there is no genuine asue of material fact and the movant js entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. J.R.C.P. S6{c). All disputed facts must be liberally construed in

favor of the nonmoving party, and a11 reasonable

inference~

th.t can be drawn from the I'Ccord

must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Eagle Water Co., Inc. v. Roundy Pole
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Fence Co.. Inc.• 134 Idaho 626. 628, 7 P.3d 1103, 1105 (2000). If the Court finds that
reasonable minds could differ on the conclusions dra'Wll from the evidence presented, the motion
must be denied. Wattenbarger v, A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 36245,2010 WL 5185735 at ·S
(Idaho Dec. 23. 2010). The burden of demonstrating the absence ofa genuine issue ofmatcrial

fact is on the moving party. See id If the moving party has demonstrated the absence of a
question of material

fac~

the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate an issue of

material facl that will preclude summary judgment. Id

ARGUMENT
A.

LeI. eel , cOntract claims do Dot fall UDder the AlA.

1.

The COltract claims do Dot challenge the validity ormpn' Iction.

Defendants jump to the conclusion that the Land Board's decision at its December 21.
2010 regular meeting constituted "final agency action other than an order in a contested caseo"
and argue that pursuant to I.C. § 67-5270(2), judicial review is the sole remedy available to
address claims concerning the Board's decision. Defendants, however, misconstrue Lessees'

breach of contract claims.

Rather than challenging the admhrlstrative process leading to

Defendants' decisions on December 21, Lessees' breach claims arc instead concemed with the
effect those decisions have on Defendants' contracts with Lessees. For this reason., Lessees'
contract claims do not falt under the Al'A.
The Oregon Court of Appeals explained this distinction in a case addressing whether
judicial review was the sole remedy for a lessee raising a breach of contract claim against the

Oregon State Lottery:
The sole avenue for review of the validity of finaJ agency orders is through the
APA. Even if the letter is an order in other than a contested case, however.
plaintiff is not precluded from pursuing a breach of contract action against an
agency that allegedly used the order to breach the agreement. Pla.intiffs elaim
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does Dot challenge the validity of the order; it claims that the order communicated
the fact of the breach of the terms of the contract. Thus, it is not seekjnp j»5ljlCial
review Qf tba Bi,ney action for compliante with admlnistratiy,c law. but instead is
scekiQi a remedy for the conseguences QIUS,d by the order. i.ft.! it allegedly
constituted. a breach of the cQQtract. tm; Question of whether sa agencV's action
is in Violation of the tenus of an agreement the agency has made with another
Rilly is not a question of administrative law; it is a cllSsic guestion of sronttact

law.
An agency can breach a contract in various ways. • .. [l)t may
communicate a breach through a letter that constitutes an administrative order.
When an agency uses the administrative process to violate an agreement, the other
party may seek to invalidate the agency action that constituted the breach, on the
basis that the action did not comport with admini5trative law. In such a case,
APA review would be exclusive Q to the validity of the agency action. ~
plaintiff is not claiming tltat the agency actioP violalCQ a statute or rnle or was
otherwise in violatiop ohdtpinigtrauve law. Instead. it is claiming that the ACtion
constituted a breach of t1w 6CDCY·S agreement. Thus. plaintiffs cJajm docs not
fall undtr the APA anY more than it WOuld baye had defendant's al1eged breach
occurred through conduct rather than through issuance of an ordq.

Premier Tech. v. Stale By & Through Oregon Stale Lottery, 90] Pold 883, 887·88 (Or. Ct. App.
1995) (emphuis added). The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld this holding in a case allegiDj

claims for breach of grazina leases against the Creaon Division of State Lands:
In this case, in their reformation claims, plaintiffs do not st.ek judicial
review of an agency order for compliance with lillY administrative Jaw....
Instead, as in P"m;tl'• plaintiffs contend they entered into Et contra.ctuaJ
reJationship, with the agency and that, on the basis of that contractual. relationship
alone, it is entitled to certain remedies. As in PremIer, plaintiffs' refonnation
allegations present "a cJ ISSie question of contract law. n

In this case, plaintiffs' rcqueswd relief in no way depends on the validity

or invalidity of 8.D agency onUJr-. It is predlcated exclusively on principles of
contract law that are brought to bear as a co.l'lSequencc of the parties' conduct.
regardless of the validity of the orders themselves.

Mendieta v. State. By and Through Div. of State Lands. 941 P.2d 582. 602·03 (Or. Ct. App.
1995) (internal citation omitted).
AI;,

in Premier and

Mtmdiela~

Lessees' contract claims are concerned not with the

procedural validity of Defendants' decisions on December 21, but instead with the result of those
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docisions-tbe breach of LcsleOs' contracts with Defendants. As with the holders of the grazing
lel!Jcs in Mtnditla, Lcsscc:s' claims solely concern principles of contract law. Idaho's courts
have repeatedly allowed breach of conb'act complaints against state agencies to proceed, t"ther
than relegating them to the remedy of judichu review. Ste Hayden Lake Fire Prol. Dist. v.
.Alcor~

141 Idaho 388, 400, III P.3d 73, 85 (2005) (involvina c:Jaims against the State Insurance

Fund for breach of insurance agreement); J & J Contractors/a. T Davis Construction, A..J. V.

'11.

State, 118 Idaho 53S. 797 P.2d 1383 (1990) (involving claims against the Idaho Board of
Transportation for breach of construction contract); Challis Irrigation Co.

'11.

Staze, 107 Idaho

338, 689 P.2d 230 (1984) (involving claims against Idaho Department of Fish and Game for

breach of contractua1 obligation under license agreement) Lessees' contract claims are likewise
not relegated to the remedy of judicial review.

The fact that Lessees filed two Petitions for Judicial Review does not alter this

conclusion. A review of Defendants' prior motion to dismiss will reveal that the bulk of that
motion was concerned with the allegation that Plaintiff failed

'0 timely file its Petition(s) within

the required timeframe. Out of an abundance of ca.ution, and choosing to plead alternative

theories

90

that at least one of the legal actions survive this first tClund of motion practice,

Defendants filed the two pending Petitions for Judicial Review. Nothing ~!I.bout the filing oftho!e
Petitions was intended to

state

or convey the impression that Defendants" contract chums

concern agency action and are subject to review under the APA.
#

#

#
II
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Defend.ap' deeilion, do not COD,Utute orden mimab •.: under
tbeAPA.

In the event the Court construes Lessees' contract claims as contesting the procedures for
agem:y action. Defendants assert Lessees' sole remedy is judicial review, based on I.C. § 67-

A person asgrleved by final ageney action other than an order in a contested case
is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person complies with the
requirements of5CCtions 67-5271 through 67·5279, Jdaho Code.
The APA defines "agency actionn as:
a.

The whole or part of a rule or order;

b.
c.

The failure to issue a rule or order; or
An agency's perfonnance of, or failure to perform, any duty placed on it
by law.

See IDAPA 20.01.01.005.03; see also I.C. § 67-5201(3). A contested case is defined as "[a]
proceeding by an agency ... that may result in the issuance of an order." I.e. § 67-5240. Thus,

for jurisdiction to exist wuie:r subsection 2, Lessees must be challengins

I!I.

final agency action

that is nor an order in 8. contested cue as that term is defined by statute.

An order is "an agency action of particular applicability that determines the legal rights,
duties, privileges. immunities, Or other legal in[emsts of one (1) or mor6 specific persons."
67.5201(12);

I.e. §

set also IDAPA 04.11.01.005.12. Although the APA's definition of agency action

discusses three types of action,

I.e. § 67~S270(2} rules ou1 reviewability for orders in contested

cases, so it must therefore only permit judicial review of: (1)

rules~

or (2) the agency's

performance of a legal duty. See Laughy v. Idaho Dttp't o/TransporlaliOIf, 149 Idaho 867, 871,
243 P.3d lOSS, 1059 (2010).

Further. while I.C. § 67-5270(3) pennits review of orders in

, Ahhough Dcfcndlmtl cite I.C. § 67·5269 u the 'QU1'ce for thillanguqe, that eode section hu been ruerveci The
cited IanSUB811 actually appears In [.C. § 67-S210, and therefore L050es wfll cite that C<lde refmnce In their

lfI\1IDont on this Issue.
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contested cases. I.C. § 58·122 provides that the Land Board's decisions involving "the direction,
control or disposition of public lands" are not considered contested cases.
Defendants contend the December 21 decisions constitute agency action beoause they
qualify both as uorders" and IS the "pcrfom1llI1cc of. or

fa.il~

to perfonn, any duty placed on it

by law." Addressing Defendants' "order" argument first. for the reasons set forth above. even if

DefendantS actions constituted an. order, they are not reviewabJe under I.e. §§ 61.5270(2) or (3),
because orders outside of contested cases do not fall under the APA, ond the Legislature hll$
specifically stated that Defendants' decisions do not constitute orders in contested cases.
Further. the: decisions rendered by Defendants on December 21 did not concern the legal rights

of one or more specific persons. Instead. the decisions determined the lease terms that would be
offered to prospective lessees. as opposed to specified individuals. Defendants' decisions did not

concern the Jease rates that would be offered to specified individuals and therefore do not
constitute orders under the AP A.

3.

Tbe decisloD' did oot Wolve the performancc 01. leul duty.

Idaho Code § 58-104 sets forth the powers and duties of the Land Board. The only
subsection possibly applicable to the December 21 decisions is subsection (1), which states that
lbe Land Board has the power "to exercise the iCncral dixcction. control and disposition of the

public lands of the state." (Emphasis added.) The setting of specific rent formulas for upcoming
lease periods does not constitute 2etlera1 direction, control or disposition of public lands. Rather.

it involves setting specific terms for new leases to be issued. The Land Board's decision
therefOTe does not constitute the performance of a legal duty.
Rather. the Land Board's decision instead involves the exercise of agency discretion
committed to the Land Board under state law, which does not constitute agency action under the

PLAINTIFF LESSEES' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON TO DEFENDANTS' CROSSMOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS. 11

490

02/10-/2011' 15:07 FAl

ZOU9S8$8~

@on

HALLFARLEY

AJ!A. S" Hayd~11 La~ Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 400, 111 P.3d at 85. In

Hayden Lau, the Idaho Supreme Court considered a case involving breach of COntract chums
insureds brought against the State Insurance Fund (''SIF''). Id The Court held the AP A does not
preclude judicial review of "agency actions that are committed to agency discretion by law." See
id.

Because the insured's claims arose out of their contracts with SIF and related to SIF's

discretion in distributing surplus and dividends, the Court held the AP A did not apply to the case.

See Id The Land Beard's December 21 decisions likewise constituted an exercise of agct1cy
discretion under I.e. § 's8-304(1), which &ivea the Board discretion to set lease terms, including

rental fonnulas. For the$e reasoN, the Land Board's decisions do not constitute agency action.

B.

De 2001 lea" WteIIlegts gragt Leise. a right to reg11M' RDder the enstilg
lease term, and (lODditiODJ.

Defend811'tS contend Lessees fail to state breach of contract claims boc::lWsc the January

2001 leases contailll no right to renew. On December ~. 2010. Lessees filed IS Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment coneeming their contract claims, which sets forth the contractual language
and Jegal authorities supporting their COntract claims.

Lessees inrorporate the arguments

contained in their memorandum and affidavits in support as if set forth in fuU herein.

1.

The leu" unambiguously proyide Leu,n , d,bt to realM the
exyting legq.

A leage is a contract, and therefore what controls when interpreting a lease is the parties'
intent and the plain meani.ng oftbe contract language.. J.R. Simp/Dt Co. v. Rycoir, J,,,c., 138 Idaho

557.564.67 P.3d 36, 43 (2003). The intent of the parties should. if possible, be ascertained from
the language of the documents.

Twin Lalars Vtllage Property .Assoc.• Inc.

\I.

Twin Lakes

Inyestment. 124 Idaho 132, 135, 857 P.2d 611, 614 (1993). In construing a written instrument,
the court must consider it as a whole and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the
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extent possible. Selkirk Sled Co. v. Stat, ins. Fund. 135 Idaho 434, 437. 18 P.3d 956, 959
(200 I}.
The detttmination of a contnlct's meaning and legal effect is a question of law when the

contract is clear and unambiguous. ld. In deciding whether a document is ambiguous, a court
must determine whethet it is "reasonably subjC<.1t to conflicting interpretation.1t Chavez v.
Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 219, 192 P.3d 1036, 1043 (2008). In the absence of ambiguity, the

document must be construed in its plain, ordiNU')' and proper

derived fTOm the plain wording of the instrument. Se.e Id

SCDSC.

according to the meaning

In other words, unambiguous

contnlCU must be interpreted as written. Culp v. Trl-County Tractor, Inc., 112 Idaho 894, 899.
136 P.2d 1348, 1353 (el. App. 1987).
The January 2001 leases at issue in this matter unambiguously provide Lessees with a
right to renew the leases under the same terms and conditions, including the same rent formula.

Section C.l.t provides for renewals of "this lease," Neither Section C.l.I. nor any other section
of the Jeases imposes or provides for any different terms upon renewal. While SC<.1tion C.l.l
docs provide renewals may be granted at the Lessor'$ discretion, Section K.1.4.b provides that
approval of a request for renewal shall not be unreasonably withheld. Defendants argue the two

lease sections must be read separately because section C is titled "Lease Tcrm!R.encwal" and
section K is titled "Construction of Improvements. 1I The assertion that the two sections m'LISt be

read separately is without support in either the law or the lease. Idaho's a.ppellate courts have
repeatedly held that a contract must be interpreted as a whole. with all provisions read together
and given effect if possible. In this instance. the January 2001 leases specifically provide in

Section X.I.3 that, "[t]be paragraph headings, titles and captions used in this Lease are for
oonveoience only and are not part of the Lease."

492
MOTJON FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: CONI'RAcr CLAIMS - 13

02/1n/%Dl1' 15:08 FAl 20S3988S8~

BALLFARLEY

When read tog~ther, lease provisions C.l.l and K.l.4.b provide Defendants with the right

to renew or reject an application for renewal, but indicate that in the evenl Defendants refusa an
application for renewal, they must compensate the lessee for the fair market value of his
improvc:ments. Contrary to Defendants' IlSsertions, there is no indication in lease section C.l.1

that Defendants have the right to change lease terms or conditions upon renewal. Idaho Code §
58~31 Oed)

states. "rtJhat existing statutes allow(ed] the Board

applications" to lease sbite land.

DO

discretion in rejecting

A3 such, the language in lease section C.l.I providing.

"Renewals of this lease may be granted by the LESSOR as determined by the LESSOR at the
LESSOR·s discretion pursuanl to

I.e.

§ 58-310A," (emphasis added). refers Dot to a right to

change lease terms and conditions as it pleases) but instead refers to Defendants' right to

independently detennine whethCT they win approve or deny applications for renewal without the

requirement of holding conflict auctions.
Lessees have complied with all statutory and contractual requirements to renew their

leases. Sse A.jfidavft ofColleen D. Zahn,

~f12-3

and Exh. A. There is no n:a.son to believe that

Lessees have defaulted under, or otherwise failed to comply in good faith with the tenns of the
leases. The Department of Landa, however, bas rejected the Lessees' notices of renewal without
explanation for its refusal to renew the existing leases. Defendants. therefore, have breached the
leases by refusing, without :reasonable cause, to'renew the leases.

A, sta~ previously, in the event Defmdants choose not to consider or arant 11 request to
renew, the lease unambiguously requires Defendants to compensate Lessees for the fair market

value of their improvements:

1.4.b. Upon Non-Ronowal By Lessor. Should LESSEE apply to t"enew this
lease in the manner provided by law and such application be denied. lhm
LESSOR sbWl purchase the approved improvements placed Of caused to be
pl",d 00 tbcr leased prszmi§cs by LESSEE. at the fair market)1l1ue of such
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imProvements as of the effective date pi She expiration. Fair market value of
LESSEE improvements shall be established by appraisal. A request for renewal
by the LESSEE shall not be wn-easonably witbheld.
(Emphasis added.) See ld. at § K.1.4.b.
The failure to speclfr • nnt formula for the renewal period men' the
exJsUog rent forllula apRUes durml the nomal period.

2.

Although ldaho·s appellate courts do not appear to have adchessed the rent term to be
applied during a renewal period when a lease fails to specify such

Il

rental rate, multiple other

appellate courts have done so. As is intuitively obvious, where a lease covenant for renewal is
generaJ and does not state the terms of t.he renewal lease, the new lease is to be upon the same

general terms and conditions as the old lease, including that of rent.

Enterprises, Inc.

Y.

StU!

Lillie Caesar

Bell Canyon Shopping Center, L.C., 13 P.3d 600.604 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)

(quoting Cummings v. Ryttbfg. 207 P.2d 804. 80S (Utah 1949) (nIt bas 10118 been settled in Utah

that "[wJhere the covenant for renewal is general and does not state the terms of the renowaJ

lease, the: new lease is to be upon the same general terms and conditions as the old leasem))i see

also Bishop Cafeteria Co. ofOmaho \I. Ford, 129 N.W.2d 581. S87~88 (Neb. 19(4) ("[w]here the
covenant for renewal is general and does not state the terms of the renewal lease, the new lease is
to be upon the same general terms and conditions as the old lease, which are applicable to the

renewal period"); Yamin v. Levine, 206 P.2d 596, 597 (Colo.1949) (U[aJ general covenant to
extend OT renew implies an additional term equal to the first, and upon the same terms, including
that of rent"); Idol v. LillIe, 396 S.E.2d 632, 633-34 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) ('C [a] ccordingly,

consistent with McAdoo and YOJII'Zg,

I.Ul

optional renewal provision in a lease which is silent on

the 1Il10unt of rent due upon renewal of the lease and which does not provide that the renewal
rent will be set by the parties> future agreement is vaJid and enforceable, and the amount of rent
due upon renewal is impliedly the QrnQunt of rent due under the original lease"); Aldtldge "'.
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Young. 689 S. W.2d 342, 347 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) ("[i]t is an established rule that a general
covenmt to renew or extend a lease which is silent as to the terms of the renewal or cxten!4ion
implies a ren6Wa1 or eldension upon the same tenns and conditions as provided in the aniinal
leue ... it is implied that the rent is the same as that provided in the original lease"); Pen/lla v.

GersttnkDrn, 261 P. 488, 489 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1927) ("[a) general covenant to extend or
renew implied an additional term equal to the fmrt. and upon the same tenus, including that of
rent, except tile covenant to renew; to include which would make the lease perpetual"); accord

52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant §§ 101, ]02 (2010); 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenanl § 134
(2010); Milton R. Friedman, Friedman on Leas,s, § 14:] at ·14-18. (2010). The inclusion ofa

general renewal clause. however, only entitles the lessee to one additional term of renewal and
does not incorporate another renewal. term unless a new agreement is executed that provides

otherwise. See Bishop. 129 N.W.2d at S87i Penilla, 261 P. at 670. Friedman on Leases, §14:1 at
14-11.

Of particular significanoe in this case is an Arizona decision holding that a clause

grantiol the lessee an option to renew ''this lease" incorporated by reference all terms of the

I!xistins lease:
The contested language provides the lessee with an option to "extend this lease."

which is 8. genera.l covenant to renew devoid of any explicit recitation of the
amount of rent to be paid during the extended term. However. by referrin8 to
"this" l~ the option provision incorporates by reference all the rest of the lease
agreement. including the provision specifying II rental rate of 51400 per month.
Thus the option provision Imports e. new lease on the same tenns and conditions.

McCutchfn v. SeA S,rvlcu of Arizona, Inc., 709 P.2d 591. S92·93 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). Thl!
same ''this leQe" languaic is used in the renewal provision contained in section C. ].1 of the
January 200 1 leases. The Land Board drafted the lease and therefore could have easily incl'uded
lansuaae clumging the rent to be charged for the renewal tcnn. Instead it chose to remain silent,
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thereby indicating its intent to continue under the same rent formula for the renewal term. The

lease tcnns provide for the adjustment arrent on 180 days notice based on the appraised value of
the properties, thereby ensuring the leases generate market rent during the lease tenn.
The Land Board determined the tenns of the existing leases and decided to grant a

general right of renewal. The Lessees agreed to the lease tenus. The Land Boaed cannot now
isnore the lease tenns that it drafted. and unilaterally discard the very lease provisions it created.
The Court may not impose 11 term On the parties' contract that was not otherwise agreed to by the

parties. Electrical Wholesale Suppl}l Co. v. Nie/sen, 136 Idaho 814, 823, 41 P.3d 242, 2SI
(2001); Medical Svc's Group, Inc. v. Boise Lodge No. jl0 Be1UrV. And Prof. Order of E/lcs, 126

Idaho 90.95.878 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 1994). The Land Board's attempt to force new and
different lease terms on renewing Lessees constitutes a breach of the January 2001 leases'
renewal provisions and will prevent Lessees from cr\ioying the benefits of their lease contracts.

violating the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract. The unilateral
rewriting oflease terms also constitutes a denial of Lessees' request to renew, thereby breaching

the 2001 lease provision granting Lessees a right to renew the 2001 lease.
C.

Ib, uil.tAU or. neht to renew doel not viol~te Idaho law.

Defendants assert that providing Lessees a right to renew would be conb:ary to AIticle

IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code § S8-310A. Defendants contend that

rencwmg the January 200) leases for an additional 10 year period would violate the directive in
I.C. § 58-310A that Defendants insure each leased Jot gencirate mlU'kct rent throughout the

duration of the lease. Underlying Defendants' argument are two unstated asswnptions: (1) that
there is no way Defendants can insure lots generate market rent for longer than a 10 year period;

i
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and (2) that the: January 2001 lease rental formula of 2.5% is not market rent.

Neither

assumption bas any suppon in the record or the law.
First, Defendants have provided no evidence indicating that the 2.5% rate is below
market rent. Without any evidence supporting this unstated contention, there is no basis to
conclude that renewing the January 200) leases and the 2.5% rental fOtlllu]a would violate Idaho
law. As for the assumption that any lease that maintains the same fonnula beyond the initial ten

year period will automatically violate

I.e.

§

58~310A,

the: Legislature believes otherwise. In

2008, the Legislature ameru:led le. § 58·307 to extend the maximum duration of cottage site

leases from 10 to 35 years.

With this action, the Legislature clearly indicated it believes

Defendants can legally utilize the same rental formula for 35 years. thereby demonstrating one
rental formula can generate market rent for up to 3S years without adjustment or modification.

The 1969 Idaho Supreme Court decision Alltln v. Smylie does not compel a different
conclusion. 92 Idaho 846, 452 P.2d 343 (1969). Although Defendants assert Allen "squarely
rejected" a right to renew Land Board leases, in reality it holds no such thing. Allen did not
interpret a contractual lease provision. but instead concerned a statutory preferential right to

renew. 'That statutory provision stated, in relevant part that:
All mineral leases of state school land shall be for a period of five years, upon
condition that at the end of each five·year period sucoccding the first day of the
year in which the lease issued the leaseholder shall be given a preferential right of
renewal under such readjustment of terms and conditions as the board may
dCtmn.ine to be nece!JS8J)' in the interest of the state.
.
Jd. at 848, 452 P.2d at 345 (emphasis added). The Court held that the statutory language

permitting readjustment of lease terms and conditions c::reated a right of first refusal, rather than

an option to renew.
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Unlike Allen, the cottage site leases are not governed by 8. statutory provision providing
for rcaajustmcn1 of lease terms and conditions. The Lc:gislaturc could have included such
language in I.C. § 58·310A if it intended to provide Defendants the right to readjust terms upon

be readjusted upon renewal.

Instead, the State's grant of

reservation of a right to change the lease terms
to renew on the existing lease terms and

Or

I'l

right to renew, without any

conditions, means that the State granted a right

conditions. incl\lding the lease fonnula. Such a rlSht to

renew docs not violate Idaho law.
In actuality, it is Defendants who arc acting unlawfully by advancing an unreasonable
interpretation of the January 2001 lease provisions and refusing to abide by their contractual
oblisations. Contrary to Defendants' contention that the:y are free to alter tbe terms of private:

contracts under the guise ofcomplyins with Idaho's constitution and statutes, the law provides:
The state is bound by the terms of a contract into which it enters. The state, in
entering into c:.ontracts, lays aside some of ita attributes of a sovcrcisn and like
private partie5 the state is bound by the ~rm5 of the contract into which it enters.
The state is liable for its breach of contract, 8lld the doctrine of govcrmncntal
immunity does not apply.
81A CJ.S. States § 291, citing CQlt/e. Rock Const. Co. v. Department ofTransp,. 74 P.3d 491

(Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
By issuing decisions alterlni itli contracts with prlvate parties, Defendants are taking

actions that interfere or impair existing contracts, thereby violating the contract clauses of both
the United States and Idaho Constitutions, which provide in relevant pan that "[n]o State shall ..

. r>W any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ... ," U.S. Const. art. I. § 10, c1. 1. and
"[nlo ... law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed." Idaho Const. art. I, §

16.
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals restrained the State of Mississippi from
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taking similar steps to rewrite its contracts with lessees of S1ate endowment lands, holding that
Mississippi's actions violated Article I, § 10, c1. 1 of the U.S. Constitution.

[WJhen the State is a party to the contracts, the court cannot defer to the State
because the State's self-interest as It party is implicated. Instead, the court must
engage in a two-part inquiry. FirSt, the court should detennine whether the
contracts surrender ~IM essential attribute of [the State's] sovereignty." If so, the
Contract Clause does not prevent the State from impairing such an obligation.
because "'the lefP,sla.turc cannot bargain away the police power of 8. State." Purely
fmanciaJ obligations. however, do not surrender aspects of the State's
sovereignty, and thus are subject to the Contract Clause. Second, even if the
impainnent is subject to the Contract Clause, the court must determine whether
the impainnent is "reasonable and necessary," without giving "00mplete
deference" to the legislature's judgment.

Lipscomb v. Columbus Mun. Stparate Soh. Disr., 269 F.3d 494, S05-06 (5th eir. 2001). The
court in Lipscomb concluded the State could not establish a reasonable and necessary l'elSon for
rewriting the renta] rate term of its existing lease agreements and their actions therefore violated
the contract clause:
In discharging its obligations to administer the lands for the benefit of
education. MiSSissippi faced oenain realities. Unsettled land genarates no revenue
for the State; yields no agricultural bounty; supports no population; and generates
no comnteree. Both salcs and long-tcnn leases at low rates encourage settlement
and private investment in new lands.

But a lease that is renewable forever is here superior to a lmd sale. By
retaining title to the land, tM State protects itself against default. A lease ensures
a perpetual stream of inecme, however small. that guarantees that misfortune or

mismanagement of sales proceeds cannot completely dissipate the income from
the lease. Selling land for a lump-sum risks such a 10ss.
rno this day Mississippi continues to receive iu bargained-foT benefit from these
IclScs, just as the leaseholders reap the benefit of (now) extremely favorable
rental rates. The leases have generated a constant stream of revenue that is
sccured by the State's continuing ownership in the land. For the first 50 years Or
so the rental income sustained the schools. The 8'W1n1Iltee of perpetual low lease
rates attracted settlement in Columbus, and the leaseholders improved the land
they held, increasing the general wealth of the community and enlarama the tax
base for latC1 property taxes to support schools. Upsetting this balance by
invalidatini the rencwallcase rates would substanti.tly impair the contracts.
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ld,. 269 F.3d at 510-11.
Similarly, in this case Defendants can not substantiate that rcwritina iti contracts with
Lessees is either reasonable or necessary. Defendants have been receiving the benefit of the
bargain for years. They drafted the leases, which allow for readjustment of rent on an annual

basis with 180 days written notic~. Defendants granted Lessees' the right to renew the lease on
the same tcnns, including tho same rent formula. Their decisions on December 21 COIlStitutc

interference with existing contracts. They have not set forth either a reasonable or a necessary

reason for now unilaterally rewriting the contract terms. Defendants' refusal to acknowledge the
very renewal clause they

drafted. and subsequent d(loisions impairing their contractual

obligations and rights of the Lessecs' under those agreements. is in direct violation of the

ccm1ract clauscs of both the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions, as well as a

bre~h

of the 2001 )cuc

agreement.

Idaho has likewise restrained state attempts to rewrite private contracts under the pretense
of protecting the public interest. See Agricultural Products Corp. v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 98
Idaho 23,557 P.2d 617 (1976). In Agricultural Products, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the

Idaho Public Utilities Commission could not alter a customer's rate contract without a speCific
finding that the rates paid were adverse to the public interest, and that such a showing could be
made only by way of showing unreuonable non·unifonnity in utiHty rates. Otherwise, such

action would constitute governmental interference with contracts in violation of Article I. § 16 of
Idaho Constitution.
Defendants should be constrained from rewriting the January 200 I leue agreements.

The substantial change in the lease rentaJ
revisions

win

me is neither reasonable. nor necessary.

Defendants'

substantially interfere with Lessees' contract rights, and prevent Lessees from
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enjoying the benefits of their lease oontracts, in violation ofthc lOOlleasc's renewal provision.
D.

The LUI. have Dot takea all inconsistent po,jtion.

Defendants also attempt to state a veiled quasi-estoppel claim. arguing that Lessees'
contract claims should be dismissed beoausc they did not present them during Defendants'

meetings to con&ider new lease terms. Defendants suggest that allowing Lessees to present their
contraCt claims now would somehow be unfair. Defendants never mention the word "estoppel"

during this discussion, most likely because they realize they cannot make out even a bBl'C claim
of quasi.estoppel.
"Quasi-cstoppcJ is essentially a last-gasp theory under which a defendant who

tan point

to no specific detrimental reliance due to plaintiffs' conduct may still assert tha.t plaintiffs arc
estopped from asserting allegedly contrary positions where it would be unconscionable for them
to do so," Thomas

The doctrine of

11.

Arkoosh Produol, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 357,48 P.3d 1241 t 1246 (2002).

qUQi~estoppel

requires that the offending patty must have gained some

advantage or caused a disadVlU1tage to the party seeking estoppel; induced the party

~ng

estoppel to change its position to its detriment; 8Sld it must be unconscionable to allow the

offending party to maintain a position which is inconsistent from a position from which it has
already derived a benefit. Jd. Silence can generally not be relied. on to support estoppel. Td. at
352,48 P.3d at 1247.

In this instance Defendants cannot establish the Lessees gained any benefit or caused the
state any disadvantage by not disclosini their breach of contract theories. Rather. Defendants

had the upper hand during these meetings-they were free to adopt their own administrative
procedure to consider new lease terms and according to them, were free to adopt whatever they
felt reflected market rent, l'Cgardless of testimony that tended to show the new rental fonnulas
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constituted a hardship. During these mectlngs, Lessees were at the mercy of Defendants, trying

I

to set forth arguments that would win Defendants sympathy and convince them Dot to tum th1tir

backs on their contracts with Lessees.

The Lessees were ultimately unsuccessful In this

endeavor, and Defendants' unilaterally escalated the rent formula set forth in the parties'

agreement.
The arrogance in Defendants' argument is 8.ppatent, considering they hold all the power
on setting terms for the cottage site leases. Yet they argue that Lessees acted unfairJy by
presenting Defendants with evidence that Defendants' proposals for market rent were skewed
instead of 4l'guing in an adversarlal fashion that adoption of a different lease rate would breach

the parties' contracts. Lessees participated in meetings with Defendants and raised what they
beUewd at the timo were their most persuasive arguments. which centered around evidence

indicating marlcot rent was lower than that being considered by Defendants.

It is no surprise that Lessees worked so hard to negotiate a cooperative agreement with
Defendants on new leases. A review of the Affidavits of James Schulze, Patricia To~ James
Hancock, and Anne Herndon demonstrate the efforts these individuals have gone to for their

cabins and the hardships that Defendants' actions have caused. Many lessees worked very hard
to obtain a lease. Some grubbed stumps, cleared the site, and built the cabin. Su Hancock..ctf..
, 5. Others received the lease as it was passed down from generation to generation, but have
made substantia] improvements. See Herndon A/f.. ,3; See also Totlen A/f.. " 3-4. Still others
purchased a lease with the intent to return "home"

to Idaho and settle in for retirement, which

required working extra hours to pay for the property. See Scl1tdze AJI.

ru 3-8. 13.

Many

incurred substantial financial obligations as they purchased, maintained, and improved the leue
site in addition to pa.ying the annual rent. See Herndon Aff.. ~ 3; Totten 4fT..

". 3·4; Hancock
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Aff., " 6--7; Schulze AjJ.. ,,8·9. Despite tsSU1'8.llCeS that Defendants would be fair end the lease
rates would remain stable, Lessees have been threatened with extretno rent increases for the past
.several years, which include a 263% rent increase for one leaseholder, and a quadrupling for

another after he retired. See Schulze AJf.. ,

16~

Herndon AJI.. , 4. Many have had multiple

generations stay at the cabjns, and have dreamt ofpassini their lease down. See Herndon A/f.. ,

2; Totten AJJ.. "5, 7-9; Hancock AU, ~ s· 7~ Schuhe Aff.. , 13. With the drastic rent increases.
the market for selling leaseholds coUapsed, and many lessees find themselves holding properties

they cannot afford to keept but cannot find anyone to buy. Set Herndon Aff.. , 4;

Tollen

Aff.. ,

9; Hancock AJf.. ft 6-7; Schulze Ajf.. ,,14-17. Lessees have repeatedly advised Defendmts of
the personal financial crises the proposed. rent increases would cause them. However, instead of
trying to work: with its Lessees. Defendants ignored the economic redities &eing its leaseholders

and increased rental rates.
Apparently Defendants do not believe in the sanctity of contracts. Defendants drafted the
leases, dotennined whether to allow renewals of the leases. and unilaterally changed the lease
teIms

they imposed. If the Lessees cannot e.1ford the increased rents, then Dcfenda:xlts contend

their Only option is to walk. away from their financial and emotional investments, because

Defend8Jlts do not believe they should pay for the improvements of 'those Lessees who can no
longer afford the lease payments.

Defendants contend the law of contracts creates a straight jacket. like approach. See Deft'
MS.I Memo .• p. 17. In reality, however, the law of contracts provides certainty and a way for
parties to avoid a bad deal. if Defendants believe the 2001

]caJe

rental fonnula no longer

constitutes market rent, it is free to refuse to renew the 20011eues and instead adopt a new lease
to be offered to Le5$e!es. The law recognizes this as an "efficient breach."

See Globe Ref/ning
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Co. v. JAnda Collon Oil CO., 190 U.S. 540, 547 (1903) (holding the concept of "efficient breach'·

is built into our system of contracts, with the understanding that people witl sometimes
intentionally break their contracts for no other 1'CaSon than that it benefits them ft.nanciaJly).

Far from trying to force .Defendants to stay in a contraetua.l relationship, Lessees are
simply seeking to enforce the contract terms agroed to in 2001. This is not an inconsistent
position, but instead a legally supportable claim for relief

E.

Summar;y Judpne»t ShODld be mDted.lD favor of LesseeJ:

The language of the 2001 a.greements clearly sets forth a reneWil cla.use, lUld indicates
approval of a request to renew sha.ll not be unreasonably withheld. Public policy provides a
landlord should be :free to reject a proposed tenant when the rcjec1ion is made for leglthnate
reasollS oftbe landlord. Funkv. Funk, 102 Idaho 521, 524.633 P.2d 586,589 (1981). However.

no desirable public policy is upheld by withhoJdins consent for purely fmancial reasons. Id.
Defendants' imposition of new lease tenns constitutes a breach of the renewal provisions of the

20011easea and an unreasonable refusal to renew. Lessees should therefore be given the option
of renewing under the 2001 lease terms or receiving the fair market value for the improvements.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' motion should be denied and summary

judgment entered in favor of Les~ on their contract claims.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of February, 2011.
HALL. FARLEY. OBERRECHT &:.
BLANTON, P.A.
By:

~\);'~Q

Phillip S. Oberrccht-fth: Finn
Colleen D. Zahn - Of the Finn

Attorneys for Lessees
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Artomeys for DefendaiLts Idaho Board of Land
Commigsioners and George Bacon

fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
OLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST, et aI.,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

IDAHO BOARD OF LAND
COMMlSSIOl\r:ERS; and GEORGE BACON.
in /.Us official capacity as Director of the Idaho

Case No. CV 2010-436C

DEFENDANTS' RaPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
CROSS~MoTrON FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RB:
CONTRACT CLAIMS

Department of Lands,

Defer.dants.

The Idaho Board of Land Commi5sioners IUIQ George Bacon (collectively, the "Land
Board" or "Board"), submit this reply memorandum ill support of its Cross-Motion fot' Summary
Judgment Re: Contract Cl~ms.
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L ImRODUCTION

Counts 1 and 2 of the Pla.intiffPayettc Lessees' Amended Complaint contends that the

Land Board has breached the Payette Le$gees' alleged contrachUll right to renew their cottage
site leases for a to-year tenn at lhe 2.5% rental rate provided for in the 2001 Leases, Summary

Judgment shoulc:l be granted in favor of the Land Board for two iodependent reasons. First, the
Land Board's December 21, 2010 decision to implement new leases may be challenged only
pursuant to a petition for judicial review under the Idaho Ac!ministrative Procedure Act
(HIAPA"), Secant:!, the 2001 Leases did not grant the Payette Lessees aright to renewal at all.

much less at tho old 2.5% lease rate, Rather, the 2001 Leeses expressly provide that a renewal
"maJ: be granted by the [Land Board]," and that the terms of arty renewal would'be "as
determined by the [Land Board] at the (Land Board.'] discretion."

11. ARGUMENT
A.

The Exclu.ive Remedy For Review OfTbe Lltnd Board', Decillions Reh.ted To The
Lease Is Througb A Petition For Judicial Review

I.

The Land Board's December 21,2010 1 DecisiQD b KAgency Action tt Subject

To Judicial Review.
Idaho Code § 67~S270(2) provides that a "person aggrieved by fmn! agency &etion other

than all order in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person
complies with the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279. Idaho Code." Idaho Code

§ 67-5201(3), in turn. defines "Agency action" as: "(a) The whole or part ofa rule or order; (b)

The Amended Complaint actqally cbaUcnges the Land Board'lt Maroh l6. 2010 decision,
which was superseded by the Land Board's December 21, 20 10 decision. Any ohallec.ge to
the March 16. 2010 decision is moot.
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CROSS·MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS - 2

507
I

Received Time Feb. 17,

;:59PM

j

FEB. 17.20t1

1:36PM

NO. 001

P.2V29

The failure to issue a rule or order; or (c) An agencyl~ perfomumce of. or flliltu'e to perfonn, any
duty placed on it by law. U
Here, the Land Board's December 21,2010 decision to implement a one-year lCMe at a
4% rental rate is M agency "order" that determines the rights oftbe Pilyene Lessees with reaard
to the lease ofconage sites. rndeed, tho Idaho Supreme Court has held that decisiOns of the Land
Board are subject to judicial review under IAPA. See Idaho Watersheds Project. Inc.

Y.

State

Rd. ofLal1dComm'rs, 1281daho 761, 764,918 P.2d 1206, 1209 {I 996). See Idaho Code § 67-

5201(3) (defining "Order" as "an agency action ofparticuJar applic~bility that detennines the

legal rights. duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one (1) Of more specific
persons'"), In arguin,gtha£ ilic:: December 21, 20 I 0 decision is not an aaMey :'br4er,P the' Pllyi;ttc
Lessees cite to Idaho Code § 67-5201(12), which defines an agency "order" as «1m agency action

of particular applicability that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges,lmnumitie.s, or other
legal interests of one (1) or more specific persons." The Payette Lessees incorrectly asseJ1 that
the December 21, 2010 d.ecision "did not concern the legal rights of one or more specjfic

persons," To the contrary. the December 21.2010 decision determlnecf the rights of each of the
Payette Lessees with regard to their lease of cottage sites.

The Payette Lessees are ruso mistaken in their contention that a petition for j~dicial
review can only be brought with regard to "contested cases."2 See Plaintiff L~sees'

2 Idaho Code § 58-122 provides that the Land Board' s dec~siotlS related to the ,U~PQ~ition of
pQblio Jands "shall not be oonsidered to be conteste4 cases .. , unless thf! board. in its

discretion, determines that a comested case hearing would be of assis't4nce fa the board in the
exercise afits duties and a~thorities." Here, the Board determinecl that a contested c~e
hearing would not be helpfUl and denioQ the Lessees I reques~ for such a hearing. The
Supreme Court hItS not addressed specifically the question whether Idaho Code § 67-.5240
requires any "order" to be issued through a contested case proceeding, but its recent decision
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Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants? Cross-Motion fOT Partial Summary Ju4gment Re:
Contract CJa.im.s ("Payette Lessees~ Opposition Brief'» p. 11 (asSerting that "orders outside of
contested cases do not faU under the APN'). To the contrary, Jdaho Code § 67-5270(2)
expressly provides fot judicial review of "finaL agency action other thW an Qrder in a ponte.sled
~."

(Emphasis added). Idaho Code § 67-5270 provides for judicial reviow both of "contested

cases," under certain limited circumstances, and orders "other than an order in a contested case,"
Alternatively, even if not an ilolder," the December 21\ 2010 4ecision constitutes "agency
action" because it is the Land Boar4's "performance of. or failure to perfonn, any duty placed on
it by law. n See Idaho Code § 67·520 I (3)(c). The December 21) 2010 decision is lhe Land
Board's attempt to comply with its constitutional fjJ\d &tatlltory obligations to 1e~se endowment
lands in a way that maximizes financial returns. &e Idaho Const., Art. IX. § 8 (''It shall be the

duty of the state board of land conunissioners to provide for the location, protection, sale or
rental of [endowment lands] ... in such manner as will secure the maximum long-term financial
return to the institution to which granted ... ,"); Idaho Code § 58-31 OA (fi[T]he bovd shalt
insure that each leased lot generates market rent throughout the d~tion oftbe lea.se."). The

Payette Lessees cite Hayden Lake Fire ProtecNon Disl. v. Aloorn, 141 ldabo 328, 111 P.3d 73
(2005)j for the proposition that the Land Board's decision does not COD$titute the performance of
a duty placed on it because Idaho Code § 58·304 grants the Land Board discretion with regard to
setting lease tenns. Hayden Lake says just the ol'Po$ite, Hayden Lake explains th~t lA.PA does

in Laughy y. Idaho Deparrmenf o/Tran.rportclfian, 149 Idaho 867,243 P,3ql05S (2010).
can be read to suggest th4t conchtsioll. Id.• 243 P.3d at 1060. Howeverl the effect of
§ 58-122 is to sever any lin1\ between the existence of an "order" and a contested case

perh~ps

proceeding that may arise under § 67-5240; i.e., the Land Board actions that otherwise meet
the definition of "order' need not be issued throagh t\ contestc4 case proceeding.
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"not contain a provision precluding judicial review ofagency actions tha.t arc '(;ommittcd to
agency discretion by law. ) which is found in the federa.l counterpart. II Id, 14 J Idaho at 400

(emphasis added). Thus, lAPA provides for judicia! review of agency action in tho form of an
agency's performance of a duty place On it by Jaw, regardless of wh~ther the law gnmts the
agency ciiscretion in how .it wHl perfonn its duty.
Given that tho Land Board's December 21, 20}O decision is "agency action" subject to
judicial review. judiCial review under IAPA is the exolusive remedy for challenging the Land

BomPs decision. See Bone \I, City ofLswtston. 107 Idaho 844. 847-48, 693 P.2d 1046. 1049-50
(1984) (holding that a petition for judicial review under fAPA is a "complete, det4i1ed. and
exh~\.iSti;je

remedy upon which an aggrieved party can appeal" iUl adverse lj,gency' decision, and

that, where judicial review is available, judicial review "is the exclqsive source of Appeal" for

adverse agencydec;sions); see also Cobble)J v. C/tya/Challis, 143 Idaho 130,

133~34.

139 PJd

732, 735-36 (2006) C'It therefore goes almost without saying tMt if the exclusive ana. ptherwise

unavailable method is set forth in the prOVided-for judicjaf review procedures, one cannot
challenge in a sepfU'f1te civil suit the action of a board whore thq,t board has acted on matters
within its jurisdiction,").
2. The Payette Lessees Reliance On Out-Of-State Authorities Is

Irr~Jev411t

Rather than rely on the language of the applicable ldaPo stat1.1te. the Pa.yette Lessees rely

on Oregon Court of Appeals cases holding th~t a plaintiff C&n bring a breach of contract action
separate from a petition for judicial review proceeding if the Plaintiff contends that an agency's
action violates Il. contract provision. Those Oregon cases, of course, ~e Slot binding on this

Cou.rt.
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Notably, the Payette Lessees' argument that the Land Board's decision to issue new
leases is not "agency action'" is contrary to the very authority they oite, In Mendieta v. State oj

Oregon, the Oregon Court of Appeals beJd that the Oregon Division of State Lands decision to
I

issue grazing leases constituted "agency 'orders' issued in other ttum a contested case. It Id, 941
P.2d S82, 592 (Or. App. 1997). However, the Oregon Court of AppeLl1s held that, even though
the Oregon Division of State. Lands' docision was an agency order that would nonnally be
subject tojudlcial review, the pJaintiffcould bring a separate contract.-baseQ action. This
approach is contrary to the well-~ttled Jaw In Idaho that. where agency action is supjecf to
judicial review. judicial review is an aggrieved party's "exclusive" remedy. See Bone, 107 Idaho
at 847-48,

Rather than follow cases from IUlOther state,3 this Court should. apply the clear language

of Jdaho Code § 67·5270. See Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 ldaho 879,881,231 P.3d 524,526
(2009) e'Ifthe language of the statute is clear, the Court should apply the plain meaning of the

statute.''), Idaho Code § 61·5270 clearly and unambiguously provides that ~ ''person ~ggrieved
by final agency action other than an order in a contested case is entitled to judicia! review under

this chapter, .!' The Payette Lessees concede, as they must for .standing purposes, that they are
aggrieved by the Land Board's Deoember 21; 2010 actions. See Pit-yette Lessees' Opposition
Brief. p. 2 (contending tbat the Land Board's decision forces the Payene Lessees to "abandon

their genera.tional hopes, dreams. and substantial monetary inve~ents~1. Under the clear

3 The Idaho cases cited by the Payette Lessees do not involve any discussion of whether
agency action must be challenged through It, petition for judicial review, Nor 40 they involve
a situation, like that presented here, where It, part)' is attempting to bring both a civil ~tiOll
for breach of contract and a. separate petition for juqicial review.
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language of the statute, the Payette Lessees must seekjudichll review of that final agency aotion

under IAPA.
Moreover, this case is distinguishabJe from Mendieta on its facts. In holding that a

plaintiff could bring a contract action !ep~ale from a judicial review proceeding, the Oregon
Court of' Appeals noted that the plaintiff was not challenging the valic:lity oftbe agency action.
See MendletQ, 941 P.2d at 603 ("Tho validity of the agency oIders - the mte grazingJeases:: is

DPt challenged.U) Here, of course, it i!r that agenc), action itself-and only that action--dlat the
Lessees claim aggrieves them. They c~ot escape § 67~5270 once they so concede. This is not
a situation where the Land Board's action is alleged to be rulmittedly proper under controlling

situation where otherwise valid st&tutory authority allegedly has been misused,

B.

Summary Judgment Should Be Granted In Favor Of Defendants On Counu 1 And
2 Of The Amended Complaint
1. The 2001 Leases Po Not Grant The Payette Le!Jlee~ A Right TQ Renew
Even if this Court finds that fhe Payette Lessees can bring a breach of contr~t claim

separate nom an IAPA-based petition for judicial review, the Paye1te Lessees cannot c~blisb a

breach of contract. The Payette Lessees' broach of contract claims rely on the unfounded
assertion that the "2001 leases at issue in this matter unambiguously provide Lessees witll a right
to renew the leases under tlle same terms and conditions. including the same rent formula." See

Payette Lessees' Opposition Brief, p. 13. That usertion is patently false. The 2(}Ol Leases
simply do Dot grant the Payette Lessees a right to renew the lease, much less on the slUne terms

as the 2001 Lease.

The 2001 Leases provide that ~ renewal ".!mY be granted by the [Land Board] ," See First
Brammer Aff., Exh. A, ~ C.l.t (emphasis added). Moreover, the 200t Leases expressly provide
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that fiUly renewal will be granted "as determined by the [Land Boarel] ~t the [Land aoard's]

discretion pursuant to I.e. § 58-31 OA." 14. (emphasis .added). Thus, the Land BoiUU "may"
grant a renewal if it chooses to do so. but the 2001 Leases grant no renewal right to tbe Payette
Lessees. Iftbe Land Bo~r<l chooses to offer Ii renewal of the leases, the renewal wiH be offered
"as detennined by the Land Board," i.e., on terms cletennined by the Land Board: A right to
renew the 200 1 Lease at the same rental rate cannot be read into the 2001 LefJse.

SC~

49 Am.

Jur. 2d. § 134 (2010) C'[A]n option or right to renew a lease is not presumed, and specific

language granting tbe renewal or extension right is requited."); Milton R. Frieqrnan, Friedman
on Leages § 14: 1 (4th ed. 1997) C' A landlord is not bound to renew a lease without an e~press
covenant to this effectt)...

.. .

. .
.......

,"

-,

-

-'" ....- .
"

..

A contractual right ofrenewal similarly cannot be found. as the Payette Lessees contend.
in Section KIA.b, which provides that a "request for renewlU by the LESSEE shall not be
wucasonably withheld," As the Payette Lessees cOITectly point OUI, all

p]'ovi~ions

in the 2001

Leases should be read together as a whole. See Payette Lessees' Opposition Brief, p. 13. When
read as a whole, the meaning of this provision is clclU'. The decision ofwhethor to renew the
Leases, and the terms of any lease renewal) is "dctermined by the [Lal1d Board] at the (Land
Board'] discretion," Once the Land Board determines the terms of any renewal lease. a "request
for renewal by the LESSEE shall not be unreasonably withheld."
2.

The 2001 Lea5e InterpretatioD Oft'ered By The Payette Les~ees Would Be

CorJtrary To 14aho Law
The Payette Lessees offer e. lease interpretation that would entitle them to enew their
leases for an additionall O-year term at the 2.5% rental rate, Not only is such a contractual
provision absent from the 2001 Leases_ but that interpretation would be: contrary to Idaho Law.

The 2001 Leases provide that, if the Land Board decides to renew the lease, it will clo so "at the
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[Land Board's] discretion pursuant to I.e. § 58-3 lOA." (Emphasis added), Section 58-3 lOA

requires the Land Board to "insure thp.t each leased Lot generates market rent," Thus. the 2001
Leases make cleat tbat any renewaJ would be at tho rate tha.t the Land Bo~ Qeterminei, in its
discretion, constitutes market rent,
Indeed, this is the same cODclusion reached by tbe Idaho Supreme Court in 411en Y.

Smylie, 92 Idaho 846 (1969). There. the Idaho Supreme Court beld that a statutory right to

renew leases of endowment lanas must be re1ld consistent with the Land Board's 4utr to
maxinUze returns. The Payette Lessees correctly point out that the contract in .A.lI(ln involved a
statute providing that any renewal would be "under such rea4justment of tenns ana conditions as
the board may determiue tu be necessary in ~ inierest of the state." Here there iSM sta.t~
providing that any renewal terms would be detennined by the LLUld Board..

ln~tead,

the contract,

itself, provides tl14t any renewal tenus would be "at the [Land Boar4's] discretion pursuant to

I.e. § S8 31 OA.'~
R

The reasoning in Allen is equally applioablo in this case.

The Payette Lessees characterize this argument as an attempt to I'unilaterally rewrit[e] the
contract terms," See Payette Lessees' Opposition Brief, p. 21. To the contrary, Defendants are
not suggesting that anything be re-written. Rather. the 200t Leases expressly prov.lde that ally

renewal would be "at the [Land Bo8f4's] discretion pursuant to I.e. § 58-3 lOA," i.e., at the

market rate determined by the Land Board.

Nor is the Land Board proffering an interpretation of the contract tha~ is clifferent from
the clear language of the contr8!:t. Indeed, as set forth previously, the Payette Lessees and their
lawyers have consistently taken the position that ~y renewal of their leases must be at "market

rent.1t Only now that their calculation of "llW'ket rent" has been rejected have tho)' switched to
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their creative. but unfOLUlQecl, theory that they have a contractual right to renew their leases for
an aqditional

lO~year

terms at the old 2.5% Jease rate.

W. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons. the Land Board respectfully l'eqQcsts that S\Ul1.llWY ju4gment

be granted in its favor on Counts 1 and 2 of the Payette Lessees' Amended Complaint.

DATED THIS

IT day of Janusry, 2011.
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Facsimile: 208.954.5210
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Attorneys for Defendants Id~o Board of Land
Commissioners and George Bacon

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FCIJRTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN A...'ID FOR. THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST. et at,
Plaintiffs,

~

Case No. CV 201()..436C

)
)

~)

VS.

IDAHO BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS; and GEORGE BACON,
in his official c8pQ.City as Director of the Idaho
Departtnent of Lands.

~
~
)

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
CONSOLIDATn

)
)

Defendants.

The Idaho Board of Land Commissioners and George Bacon (collectively, the c'Land

Board" or "Board"), submit this memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to consolidate
into this proceeding Wasden v. Stat(4 Board of Land Commissi(J7Utrs. No. CV.. OC 2010·23751
(Founh Jud. Dist., Ada COmIty) ("Wasden''). The Attorney General, in his capacity as plaintiff
in Wasden. has authodzed the Lalld Board to state that he joins in this memorand'lUll.
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INTRODUCTION

Settled decisional authority establishes that the purpose ofIRCP 42(a)'8 authori2;l\tion for

caso consolidation is to facilitate expeditious, efficient resolution of common issues of fact and
law. Ordering (1onsolidation will not further that purpose. There are no common questions of

fact and law between this action and the proceeding now pending before
County. Plaintiffs represent their remaining Counts bere

l.\S

J~ge

BaH in Ada

"breach of contract" olaims, while

Attorney General Wasden's remainins claim in the Ada County litigation involves Ei challenge to

the col1rtitutionality of Idaho Code § 58·310A because of its inconsistency with Article IX,
Seotion 8 of the [daho

Con~itution.

Consolidation also will not serve th.e objective of

expeditious. efficient dispute resolution. Not only bas the Ada County Di$ttict Court devoted
substantial attention to this matter, but it also is impr4icticable, if not wholly legally foreclosed.

for this Coun to reach the motion without fim 4eciding the merits of the pending

cl'oss~motions

for summary judgment. Plaintiffs are asking the Court to consoliciate the Wasden swt in10 this
proceeding after it has already been decided. Their motion additionally flies in the face of the

conditions upon which the Attorney General predicated his consent to the Payette Lake Lessees

I

intervention in the Wasden litigation-conditions that they appeared to accept. Consolidation
should be denied.
II.

A.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND ANn PROCEDURAL POSTUQ

Bltekground or The "Cottilge Site" Leases

TIle Idaho Department of Lands C'lDL") is the executive agency established to
ildmiruster state endowment lands. See Idaho Code §§ 58-101 and ~119. George Bacon is the

IDL Director.

See Amended Complaint. , 5.

Under Article IX. Section 8 of the Iclaho
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Constitution, the Land Board is the trustee of public schoolp• normal schools and

state

hospital

endowment lands. The Land Board consists of five members: the Governor, the Secretary of
State, the Attorney General, the Controller IUld the Superintendent of Public Instl'Uction. See
ldaho Canst., Art. IX. § 7; Idaho Code § 58·101.

The Land Board is the trustee for almost 2.5 million acrQs of endowment lands granted to
Idaho at statehood for the purpose of supporting public schools and other public institutions. See
Affidavit of Bob Brammer, filed November 18, 2010 ("First Brammer Aff. It). Ex. B, Idaho's
endowment trust assets include 354 lots on Priest Lalce and 168 lots on Payene Lake, [d. The

State leases the lots. and lessees are authorized to construct and own single"family residences on
the sites. ld. The lots are generally referred to ll:ii "cottage sites,'·
As set fonh in the Amended Complaint. the Payette Lessees and/or their predecessors in

interest, entered into the 2001 Lease for certain cottage site

lo~s

surrounding Payette Lake.

Amended Complaint, ~ 12; see also First Brammer Aff.. Ex, A. The 2001 Leases were for a 10year tenn and expired on December 31,2010. [d. (cover paget provicling that 'I[t]his lease shall
commence JANUARY J, 2001, and terminate DECEMBER 3), 2010").

The 2001 Lease

provides for lU1lllJal rent of2.5% of the fee simple value of tho leased premises. adjusted annually
based on assessed values determined by Valley County, Id at

~ 1.1.

The 2001 Lease further

provides that lease renewals "rna;>: be granted by the [Land Board] as detennined by the [Land
Board) at the [Land Board's] discretion pursuant to

I.e.

§ 58-31 OA!'

1d at t c. 1.1 (emphft$is

added). Consistent with the lease provision that any renewal will be "as detennined by the [Land
Board):' the 2001 Lease does not state the rental rate that might ~pply to any renewal lease.
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On March 16, 2010, in a 3·2 vote, the Land Boa.rd voted to implement a. 4% lease rate,

effective January I, 2011. See First Branlmer Aff.. Ex. C, p. 36·37. That 4% rate wDutd have
been phased in over 5 ye.ars and would Iuwe been based on the average value of the leased lana
over the prior 10 years. It also involveq a. component of "premi'UlTl rent" upon transfer of the
lease. The rate voted upon at the March (6,20[0 Lamcl Board meeting is generally referred to as
the "4/10/5" rate. Several lawsuits foUoweQ the Board's action: two by the Attorney General and

this matter.
B.

The Attorney General t , Lawlluit&
1.

Idabo Supreme Court Writ of ProhIbition Pr41ceeding Challenging
CQn~tituti~mi!i1y

of Lease Ratc::

The Attorney General's first suit commenced on March 24, 2010. when the Attomey

General filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the Idaho Supreme Court contending tha.t the
lease rate adopted by the Land Board at its March 16, 2010 meeting for the 2011-2021 leases
failed to secure the maximum

~ong

term flllaIlciftl retllrn for the endowment

land~'

beneficiaries

as mandated under Article IX. Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. See Affidavif Qf D. John
Ashby, tiled November 18, 2010 ("Ashby Aff.")1 Ex. A. The LflDQ SoarQ

so~ght

procedural grounds-i.e., that the cxtraordiruuy remedy of prohibition was

unav~Ua.ble

dismissal on
because

(1) the Board was not acting without or in excess of its juriscliotion and (2) a phlin, speedy and
adequate remedy at law existed. Ids Ex. C.
The Payette Lake Cabin Owner's As&aciation,

to which

many if not ~ll Plaintiffs belong,

obtained permission to participate in the Idaho Supreme Court action as an amicus curiae and to
submit a brief in limited support of the Boarq. ld., Ex. D In their brief, the Assooiation did not

argue that its members ha<.1 a contractual right to renew the 2001 Lease at the oJd 2.5% lease rate.
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Instead. it agreed with the Land Board that it& duty was to charge "market rent," Rather. they

argued that the Land Board "has juriadiction to charge market rent." but that, "because the
[March 16, 2010] figure advocated by the Board is above market rent, the Board has acted in

excess of its jurisdiction," ld. at 12, L4. However. the Association further argued that the
Attorney General possessed an adequate remedy at law-relief un4er the Idaho Declaratory
Judgments Act ("DJA"). Idaho Code §§ 10-1201 to ·12]7. Id. at 17-19. The petition was
dismissed on December 1,2010, with fl majority of the Supreme CoUrt holding that the D.TA did
provide a plain. speedy and a4eq\P\te remedy at law without a4dressing the

jurisdiction requirement.

in~excess-of-

See Wasden ex reI. State v. Idaho Stale Bd. of Land Cornmlrs,

2010 Opinion No. 144,2010 WI.. 5186728 (Idaho S. Ct. Dec. 23, 2010) (substitute opinion with

non-substantive amendments to Dec. 1,2010 opinion).
2.

Fourth Judicial District Proceooing Challenging Constitutionality of lciaho
Code § SS..310A

The undedying validity of Idaho Code § S8-31 OA was not before the Supreme ColUt in

the \\-Tit of prohibition proceeding. However, on December 2, 201o-the day following the
Supreme Court's decision-the Attorney General filed an e.ction in the FoUfth Judicial District,
Ada County (Bail. 1., presiding), against the Land Board challenging the statute on the basis tha.t

the absence of 11 public auction requirement violated Article IX, Section 8 and raising two other

claims related to the validity of the "4.. 10-5" lease rate approved at the March 16. 2010 Board
meeting. He simultaneously flIed a motion for preliminary injunction under IRCP 65, which was
heard by the District Court on December 15, 2010. The sole basis for the reque/lted l-elief was
the alleged unconstitutionality of § 58-31 OA by virtue of tbe Jack of public auction.
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The P.yette Lessees filed intervention papers in advance of the preliminary injU1lction
hearing and were granted intervention status at the hearing itself. Neither the Attorney General

nor the Land Board opposed their intervention. but the Attorney General maQe clear that his non·
opposjtion was conditioned on the Lessees' not interfering with aisposition of the litigation

before Judge Bail:
MR. SMJTI-J: Your Honor. our position is as follows: The Attorney Qeneral does
not oppose the intervention motion, with the understan4ing tlial the applicant
intervenors have no objection to proceeding forward with the hearing that W~
have just begun and otherwise proceeding forward with this case before this court;.

Affidavit of Clay It Smith. ftled concurrently herewith ("Smith Aft,"). Ex. A at 14:23·15:4; see

Attorney General-or as I understand it. there's no obj~ction from the Board IUld Department,

and there is a conditional no objection from the Attomey General so long as I do not object to
tbis proceeding going on today. and I do not have sl\ch an objection. and I am prepared to state
our position." Jd at 25:21-26:2. The District Court then orally granted the intervention motion.
ld. at 26:4~6. The Court observed that intervention W~ IIpamcularly" appropriate "in Ught of the

fact that the defense bas stated that their position is that it will not assert" any posiuon with
respect to § 58-310A's constitutionality, ld. at 26:10-12; see id, l:\t 18:14-19 (Defendants'

Counsel: "Counsel [for tho Attorney Oenec"d] .. , bas pointed out that

caDstitution~

been tboroughly briefed, and I take exception to thatJ because we didn't brief it.

issue has

em In fact. we

told the court that we take no position. We followed the law. And we are not the sovereign. It's
not our job to defend the sovereign").
The District Court's inquiry into the At1'omey General's position with respect to the

Payette Lessees \ intervention-and tile AUomey General' Ii articulation of that positionMEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOT10N 1'0 cm·~·SOLIDA TE - 6
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occurred foUowing a colloquy between lhe Court and his counsel concerning the relationship of
the Wasden and Valley County a.ction, Smith Afr., Ex. A at 15:5·17:16, DutifUl

th~

colloquy,

the Court observed in part that "it seems to me the primary focus of this particular should be on
the constitutionality of the

statute~

since thcrels

alre~y

a pending case questioning whether it

was applied properly. assuming that it's constitutioo!.\l, and ... that's not an issue that I would

resolve today." Jd at 16:6-12. TIle Attorney General's counael responded by observing that "the

VlUley County lawsuit obviously does

Qot

challenge 310A" and that the decision in Euclid

Avenue Trust v. Ciry ofBofse, 146 Idaho 306. 193 P.3d 853 (2008), would p['(;:clude consolidation

of the two cases given the st.1.tus of Wasden as a. civil action and the status of this

proceedtn~,

in

the Attorney General's viewl as ajUdicial review proceedini governed. by rRCP 84. Id at 16:19-

17: 16. Consequently, when the Anomer General set out his conditional non-opposition to the
Lessees' intervention. he did so against a backdrop that made absolutely plain his intent to
litigate the merits of the constitutional challenge to § 58-31 OA by the Ada County Pisttict Court.

The Lessees accordingly intervened in tho flction not only with knowleoge of thi~ intent but also

without suggesting that they would seek to remove the Wasden proceeding to smother court,

They nevertheless tiled their motion to consolidate with this Court on the followL.'lg day.
On December 17.2011, Judge Bail issued a p:eliminary injunction prolUbiting the IPL
director, also a defendant, from issuing the template lease that his agency

h~~

been directed to

prepare by the Boatd's March 16.2010 decision. Smith Aff., Ex. S. The preliminary injunction
order. however) went no further and therefore left the Board with discretion to issue other leases
for the cottage sites,

[t

accordingly disclaimed in paragraph 4 of the "Reasons For Issuance"

component of the Order Granting Preliminary Injunction that. inter alia. any intent ~'to affeot the
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Land Board's othetwise lawftd authority related to the management of the cottage site

endowment lands, including but not limited to, the renewal of prior leases set to expjre on
December 31, 2010 Of the execution of new leases as detennined by the Land Boar4.11 Id. at 3.
On December 21, 2010, the Land Board met in regular session, rescinded the March 16,
2010 action, and adopted two motions. The first authoriU!d rDL to renew the existing cottage
site leases for a term of one year at the existing rental rate of 2.5%, The second provided 'that a
simple 4% rental ra.te, without any component of premium rent, would apply to ten-year cottage
site leases beginning in 2012. See Second Brammer Aff., Ex. E. On December 23, 2010, the
parties

to

the Attorney General's action stipulated under IRCP 4l{a)(1)(i) to dismissal of those

claims for relief unrelated to the challenge to § 58·310A'S consdtutionality. Smith Aff., Ex. C.
TIle Attorney General had filed a moUoo for summary jt+dgmenl on December 22, 2010
concerning the statute's va.1idity~~ motion that remains pending before the District Court. /d,

Ex. D. Also pending before Judge Bail is a motion fOf an order sanotioning the defendants for
contempt filed by the Payette Lessees on JanuaIj' 27, 2011 and alleging that the Land Board's

December 2 I, 2010 frrst motion violated the Order Granting Preliminary Injunction. Smith Afl.,

Ex. E.

I

nIt
A.

ARGUMENT

IRep 42(a) StaDdards
Rule 42(a), IRCP. provides that "[w]hen actions involving a cammon question of law or

fact are pending before the court, it may order Ii joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in

1 In light of the Land Board's December 2l, 2010 ac'tiops, Payette Lessees 4ismissed Counts
through VI of the complaint in this matter ptU'Suant to a stipulation filed on JCUluary 20, 2011.
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issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concernins proceeqings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costS or delay." The Idaho
rule is substantively identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(1\.» and. as one commentator has observed
with regard to the federal rule. "[c]onsoUdation under Federal Rule 42(a) can be sought in a

myriad of [sic] substantive contexts'· but that "(a1 full catalogue of these situations would be
extremely difficult and not terribly enligbtaling." Charles Alan Wright

Practice and Procedure § 2384 (3d ed. 2008).

el

al.) 9A Federal

:l

What plainly is essential under Rule 42(a)'s express language. however. are "common
questions of'faet and law." Harrison

Y. T~/or,

It5 Idaho 588, 597, 768 P.2d 1321, 1330 (1989)

(deeming two actions filed in same COtmty as "prime ctmdidates fot consolidationl\ where there
existed "an identity of law and facts between [the plaintiffs), the [defendant1 partners, and the

[defendant]

partne~hlp").

Additional considerations include whether

;'con~olidation

will

expedite matters and will minimize expense upon the public and the parties"-i.e.) "[w]bcn
claims arise out the same accident and one trial is sqfficient to determine all the facts. separate

trials would be a waste of time and expense." Ii. It is also settled that consolldation Is a matter
committed to the district coun's discretion and tbat "the rel~tive merits of conflicting contentions

regarding consolidations of actions for trial can very well be c!etermined by the triaJ judge by an

Rule 42(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides: "Consolic!ation. If actions before the court involve a
common question of law or fact. the court may: (l) join fOl' hearing or trild any or all matters at

2

issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orQers to avoid
unnecessary cost Dr delay,"

MEMORANDUM TN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE., 9

Received

Time

Feb. 17.

1:59P'~

52.5

FEB. 17.2011

NO.001

1:33PM

inspection of the pleadings. I! Branam v. Smith .Frozen Foods of Idaho. Inc., 83 Idaho 502. 508.
365 P.2d 958, 961 (1961).

Applieation otRute 41(a) Standards to Payette Lessees' Motion

B.

1. Absence of Common Issues of F~ct and Law
At the time that the Payette Lessees med tlle consolidation motion. the Land Baara had

not taken its December 21,2010 actions, and various claims were pending in bQtb tlle Wasden
and the Valley County suits that were dismissed in Light of those actions.

The Wasden

proceeding was narrowed to the first claim for relief challenging the constitutionality of Idaho
Code § 58-310A, while this prooeeding has been whittled down to the first two counts-which
the Lessees most recently have characterize4 as Hbreaoh of contract claims" and which, U[rJather
than challenging the administrative process leading to the Defenclants' decisions on December
21~

... are instead concerned with the effect those decisiOn:! have on Defendants' contracts with

Lessees," Payette Lessees' Memo. in 0pp'n to Defa. I Cross-Motion for Pa!til\l Summary J. Re:
Contract Claims ("Payette Lessees' Opp'n Memo,") at 7,

The only bztgis for seeking

consolidation, therefore, is the Lessees' assertion that the Attorney GeoeraP s constitutional

chaUenge in the Wasden suit i'implies that the existing leases are l,mconstitutional. including the
renewal tenns which are the subject of Lessees' breach of contract claims." Memo. in Support
of PIs. Motion to ConsoHdate at 10.
f

The Payette Lessees' concern about the possible effect of § SR-310A's invalidation on
current cottage site leasing pr&etices is understanQahle but, for Rule 42(a), beside the point. That

concern is appropriately and, in Land Board's view. exclusively addressed through intervention
in the Wasden suit where the statute's validity is being contested. Resohnion of that c.!lSe turns
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exclusively on the scope of Article IX, Section 8 and its puhlic auction requirement-which the
Lessees understood and accepted upon intervention. See Wfng

Y.

Amalgamated Sugar Co.• 106

Idaho 905.908.684 P.2d 307, 310 (Ct. App. 1984) C'[a]n intervenor takes a case as he omls it"),
This action, on the other hand, may belp define the precise scope of the Lessees' contract-based
rights but,

however detennincd, will have no subs1antive effect on the Walden proceeding. Tbe

outcome of the laUer proceeding also will have no effect on the resolution of this suit because,
regaxdJess of § 58-310A's constitutionality, the "breach of contract" issl.Ies pending before this
Court by virtue of the pending cross-motions for summary judgment will require resolution.]
There are, in sum, no common issues of fact because this action turns on how the 2001 Lease,
and partioularly paragraph C.1.4.b. should be read. Rhetorical assertions alan "implie[dJ" lease
"unconstitutional[ityJ" canno1, and do Dol, supply the commonality mandated under Rule 42(a).
Z. FaUure to Expedite Case Resolution

The principal effect of the PayeUe Lessees' consolidation motion has been to delay

resolution of the summary judgment motion that has been pending before the Ada County
District Court for almost two months. The two cases l as

discus~eQ

immediately above, share no

3 So, for example, even should the Leasees nat prevail on their "breach of oontract" claims here.
their interest in the validity of § 58-310A remiUns keen beoause it serv~s in practical effort to
grant them a preferential right to renew through protection against conflict auctions. See Idaho
Code § 58-3l0A(l)(e) (legislative finding U[t]hat in the case of single family, reoreational
cottage site and homesite leases, the conflict application and auction procedure have caused
considerable consternation iUld dismay to the existing lessee I1t tlle prospect of Josing a long"time
lease"), The fact that the Lessees' interest in the constitutionality of 9 58~31 OA is affected at
most to a de minimis degree by the outcome of this case merely underscotes the absence of a
common issue of fact or law; i.e., win or lose. they have the same essential concern about the
statute being declared invalid.
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issues whose detennination will bear substantively or remeqially on one another. The Land
Board has not asserted the unconstitutionality of Idaho Code § 58·310A as a defense in this
matter, while the Wasden suit is wholly unconcerned with the rights that may, or may not, be
provided in the 2001 Lease. This Court accordingly would be required to undertake a legal
inquiry wholly independent of the 'ibreach of contract"

iss~s

to answer the question posed by

the Attorney General's challenge to § 58·310A. It is an inquiry that the Ada County Dlstrict
Court already has begun in detail. See Smith Aff.. Ex. A at 3:25-4:3 ("[n]ow, 1 have read. and I
have lost count of how many times. the Supreme Court's decision in the matter of the petition for
the issuance of ~ writ of prohibition. and its discl+Ssion"); id. at 3l :3·8 C'[w]ell. I have lU:tually
spent considerable time with the file in this matter and have ref:l.d quite a few times the briefs
submitted by the parties, and I have read a great number of times Justice Horton's decision in the
writ of prohibition"); ido at 31 :23~32: 1 ("And I also read all of the Idaho watershed proj ccts

cases. And b~ed on my review. the clear authority under Idaho Jaw) the State is entitled to the
injunction it requests under 65E").

The oddity of the Payette Lessees' consolidation motion, as well as its dila.tory effect. is
reflected further in the fact that. before this Court can a44ress the consolidation motion. it must
~

resolution of the cross-motions for

summ~ judgment. TI1e

Court. in other words, wiU

have no need to consider whether consolidation should occur once it decides the

cras~-motions

because, irrespective of which set of parties prevails on the latter, the case wi!l be at

~

end.

However, if the Coqrt were to decide the consolidation motion first. it would be burdening itself
with duplication of the time and effort previously e)Cpended by the A.da County District Court to

decide an issue wholly foreign to the analysis required to resolve the abreach of contraot" issues.
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This oddity takes 00 a quite substantive cht\Tllcter wheo the effect of the StJpreme Court's
decision in Euclid Al'snue Trust is considered.

That case teaches that a judicial review

proceeding subject to IRC? 84 and ordinary civil actions may not be consolidated. As the C01.llt
explained:
'Ihe separation of civil actions and administrative appeals is supported by
good policy Wlderpinnings. After all, one proceeding is appellate in Mture Mel.
the other is an original action. They are processed clifferently by our courts,
Discovery is rarely available in a judicial review proceeding. The review is to be

conducted on the record, absent speoific authorization. , , . The standElrds for
detennining an alltcome are specified by statute .. , , whereas tlUs is not the case
with actions seeking declaratory or mone~ry relief. The confusion re~uJting from
a conglomerated proceeding i~ apparent here. While Euclid primlU'ily styled this
as a proceeding seeking judicial review. the matter was determineq upon tlu'ee
orders granting summ.~' judgment, hardly what one Y";'OLlJd exp!ct in a review on
the record. Thus, we are constrained to hold that actions seeking civil damages or
declaratory relief may not be combined with petitions for j1.ldicial review under

IDAPA.

146 Idaho at 309, 193 P,3d at 853 (citations omitted). This Court is no less 'Iconstrained" to
determine, prior to reachinK the

consoLidatiOl~

UlQU.on. whether Payette Lesseea' "breach of

contract" claims are simply a disguised attack on an agency action subject to the judicial review
requirements in IAPA and Rule 84. This is a significant issue-and one to wh'ch the Lessees
devote substantial attention in their memorandum opposing the Land Board's summary judgment

motion. Payette Lessees' Opp'n Memo. at 7-11. It makes no sense to determbJe that issue in
isolation from 1he other issues raised by the cross-motions, In practical effect,

therefore~

Euclid

Avenue Trust dictates the denial of the consolidation motion.
Finally, the delay resulting from this motion in the prompt resolution of the Attorney
General's ch.QUenge to § 58-310A was directly anticipated in his conditional oonsent to the

Payette Lessees' intervention in the Wasden litigation. It is perhaps unclear from the Lessees'
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counsel statement at the December 15, 2010 preliminary in)unction hearing whether they were
acceding to the condition of not delaying ·'proceeding forward with this case before this comf'
(Smith Aff.• Ex. A at 15:3-4 (emphasis supplied».

bu~

the purpose of the Attorney General's

statement could not have more plain. The consolidation motion was inconsistent with both the

language ancl the spirit of that statement.

This inconsistency weighs heavily against

consolidation.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Land Board respectfQ],1y requests that the motion to
consolidtlte be denied.

DATED this

U clay of February 2011.
RAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & IiAWLEY LLP

~~
~aNO.J026
D. John Ashby, 2SS No. 7228

Attorneys for Defendants Idaho Board of Land
Commissioners and George Bacon
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copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 'fa PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
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1_

Phillip S. Oberrecht

Colleen D. Zahn
HALL, FARLEY. OBERRECHT &
702 WeSlldaha. Suite 700
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P.o. Box 1271

P.A.
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_
Ovornight Mail
__ E-mail
_
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[Attorneys for Plaintiffs]
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FILED

P.M. _ __

F::9 2 2 2011
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clsrk

Charles B. Lempesis, ISBA #2550
CHARLES B. LEMPESIS, CHTD
Attorney at Law
201 West Seventh Avenue
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: (208) 777-8815
Facsimile: (208) 773-1044
idaholawyer@msn.com
Attorney for Priest lake State lessees' Associati
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, Inc.

URTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Case No. CV OC 1023751

Plaintiff

v.
STATE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS,
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands

MOTION TO INTERVENE AS
DEFENDANT

Defendants

ORIGINAL

And
BABCOCK, et al.
Defendants-in-Intervention

And
PRIEST LAKE STATE LESSEES ASSOCIATION,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation

Defendant Intervenor
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BUD BELLES, as President of and for and n behalf of the PRIEST LAKE STATE
LESSEES ASSOCIATION, INC., does hereby move for leave to intervene as a defendant in
this action in order to assert the defenses set fo~h in its proposed answer, a copy of which
is attached hereto, on the grounds and for the reasons as follows:

1.
Proposed Defendant Intervenor P EST LAKE STATE LESSEES ASSOCIATION{
INC. is representative of approximately 350 stat lessees who may be Significantly affected
by the outcome of the Plaintiffs claim for relief.
2.
Defendant Intervenors members ave and will continue to suffer a
interest if Plaintiff's efforts to repeal the
catastrophic devaluation in their leasehold prope
provisions of Idaho Code § 58-310A are granted
3.
Defendant Intervenor's members I ave relied to their detriment on the
statutory provisions of Idaho Code § 58·310A a~ if the Plaintiff/Lessor is permitted to
abrogate or void state law through this or any o~r means, it will result in an
unconstitutional taking of Defendant Intervenor' members' property rights without just

compensation.
4.
No other appearing party can ade uately represent the interests of the
SOCIATION, INC. and the members of the
members of the PRIEST LAKE STATE LESSEES
PRIEST LAKE STATE LESSSEES ASSOCIATION, I C. are entitled to intervene as a matter of
right pursuant to the provisions of IRCP 24(a). i
I

5.
Defendant Intervenor has a defen$e to Plaintiff's claim presenting both
questions of law and of fact which are common 0 the main action.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

-,-11l'"ftf.~f...5

SIS,
orney for Priest Lake
State Lessees AsSOCiation, Inc.

i
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or

SERVICE

da~ ~~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17M
of
2011, I caused to
be served a true and accurate copy of the foregqing by the methOifldicatecl below, and
addressed to each of the following:
I
Via:

-+-

Honorable Lawrence Wasden
Attorney General
Steven L. Olsen, Chief of Civil Litigation
Clay R. Smith, Deputy Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson, Second Floor
P. O. Box 83720
Boise 10 83720

u. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Overnight Delivery
_ _ E-Mail
_ _ Facsimile #208-854-8073

(Attomeys for Plaintiff)
Via:

Merlyn W. Clark, Esquire
D. John Ashby, Esquire
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
877 Main Street, #1000
P. O. Box 1617
Boise 1D 83701-1617

--¥- u.

S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Overnight Deliver
_ _ E-Mail:
mclarck@hawleytroxell.com
jashby@hawleytroxell.com
_ _ Facsimile #208-954-5210

(Attomeys for Defendant)
Phillip S. Oberrecht, Esquire
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton

Via:

P. O. Box 1271

U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Ovemight Deliver
_ _ E-Mail: pso@hallfarley.com
_ _ Facsimile #208-386-9428

y..

Boise 1D 83701
(Attomeys for Payette Cabin Owners)

ENE BEAMER, Assistant to
ES B. LEMPESIS
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICI·j Clerk

Charles B. Lempesis, ISBA #2550
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cspur v

CHARLES B. LEMPESIS, CKTD
Attorney at Law

201 West Seventh Avenue
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: (208) m-8815
Facsimile: (208) 773-1044
idaholawyer@msn.com

Attorney for Priest Lake State Lessees' Association, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his capacity
as the Attorney General of Idaho, ex reI
STATE ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES

Case No. 01 OC 1023751

Plaintiff

v.
STATE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS,
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity
as Director of the Idaho Department of Lands

AFFIDAVIT OF BERT A. BElLES,
LEASEHOlDER AND PRESIDENT
OF PRIEST LAKE STATE LESSEES
ASSOCIATION, INC. IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO INTERVENE

Defendants
And
BABCOCK, et al.

ORIGINAL

Defendants-in-Intervention
And
PRIEST lAKE STATE LESSEES ASSOCIATION,
INC., an Idaho nonprofrt corporation
Defendant Intervenor
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•
STATE OF ARIZONA
COUNTY OF PIMA

)
)ss
)

I, BERT A. BELlES, being first duly sworn, depose and state:
1.
I am the President of the PRIEST LAKE STATE LESSEES ASSOCIATION,
INC., hereinafter referred to as "ASSOCIATION'", a nonprofit corporation organiZed
under the laws of the State of Idaho for the purpose of representing holders of cottage
site leases at Priest Lake granted by Defendant STATE BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS, hereinafter referred to as "lAND BOARD." Additionally, I am the
holder of a cottage site lease at Priest Lake granted by the lAND BOARD. My lease with
the LAND BOARD is administered by Defendant IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LANDS,
hereinafter referred to as "DEPARTMENT." I am familiar with the ASSOCIATION
members and matters invoMng the cottage site leases as they apply to the
ASSOCIATION'S members. I make this Affidavit on my personal knowledge and belief.
2.
My lease has been and continues to be subject to the provisions of Idaho
law duly adopted by the Idaho State Legislature, and more specifically Idaho Code § 58·

310A, et seq.
3.
Plaintiff ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO, hereinafter referred to as
ATTORNEY GENERAL, is a member of the lAND BOARD. In essence, he is a member of
the lessor of these lands. The ATTORNEY GENERAL unilaterally seeks to abrogate state
law which will devalue my leasehold interest and result in a taking of my property in
violation of the ConstItutions of the State of Idaho and the United States.
4.
ATTORNEY GENERAL, the LAND BOARD and Director BACON of the
DEPARTMENT may be able to assert and represent the interests of the lessor of the
lands in question, but they cannot and do not represent the interests of the current
lessees of those lands. In fact, the interests of the lessees conflict with the interests of
the ATTORNEY GENERAL, the LAND BOARD, and Director BACON of the DEPARTMENT.
5.
The interests of Defendants-in-Intervention, BABCOCK, et al (PAYETTE
lAKE STATE lESSEES ASSOCIATION), while generally harmonious, substantially differ
based upon geography and rental rates.
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6.
The lessees have direct pecuniary and personal interests in the lands in
question through the leases they hold and the many improvements they have properly
constructed and maintained on the leasehold premises with the specific approval of the
LAND BOARD and DEPARTMENT. The lessees submitted timely applications for
renewal, and thus have a direct interest in any issues invoMng the renewal of their
leases and the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-310A.
7.
The lessees should be given the right to intervene in this action to protect
their leasehold rights and the extensive investments they have made in those real
properties and improvements.
8.

Further your affiant sayeth not.

DATED this .J..:Z2~y of

5: b'-... Ci:::2l

, 2011.

BERT A. BELLES, Individually and as
President of Priest Lake State Lessees
Association, Inc.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this

11 ~ day of --'-'t:e=-:o'Qr.:...;VAr=...J.1 _ _

---I

2011.

R /iding at: "Tvo,,""

My Commission Expires: ~h., t?",y'
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CERTIACATE OF SERVICE

Cl!t!. of~indicated
2011, I caused to
below,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tI1e
day
be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing, by the me
and addressed to each of the following:
Honorable Lawrence Wasden
Attorney General
Steven L. Olsen, Chief of Civil litigation
Clay R. Smith, Deputy Attorney General

954 W. Jefferson, Second Roor
P. O. Box 83720

Via:
VI U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
~ Overnight Delivery
_ _ E-Mail
_ _ Facsimile #208-854-8073

Boise 10 83720
(Attomeys for Plaintiff)

Merlyn W. Clark, Esquire

Via:

O. John Ashby, Esquire
HAWLEY TROXEU. ENNIS & HAWLEY

l_ _ Overnight
u. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

877 Main Street, # 1000

P. O. Box 1617
Boise 10 83701-1617
(Attomeys for Defendant)

Phillip S. Obemecht, Esquire
Hall, Far1ey, Oberrecht & Blanton
P. O. Box 1271
Boise 10 83701
(Attorneys for Payette cabin Owners)

Deliver

_ _ E-Mail:
mclarck@hawleytrQxell.com
jashby@hawleytroxell.com
_ _ Facsimile #208-954-5210
Via:

-1- u.

S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Overnight Deliver
_ _ E-Mail: pso@hallfarley.cQm
_ _ Facsimile #208-386-9428

CHARLFN~ ~~M~e., ~istant

to

CHARLES B. LEMPESIS
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.-\Hl,;Hll::. N. dANl:)UH ~! vLt:.r
Phillip S. Oberrecht
ISB #1904, pio@hallfarley .ct>tn

Colleen D. Zahn
ISB #620g, cdz.@hallfarl.ey.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &; BLANTON, P.A.

By ..:!

J

I

1(//1 LS :J.

h,-

I

Deput

FEB 2 2 2011
Case No. _ _-,lnst. No._ _Filed
A.M t . J.-ll
PN

702 West Idaho, Suite 700

Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
W:\4\40612.1\PLEADINGS·V N.l.E',{ COI.;NTI\Como.lidtrto- HFOI'!-Reply .doc

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIC1AL DISTRlCT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIlE COUNTY OF VALLEY
GLADYS BABCOCK, as Tm)tee oftb.e BABCOCK
TRUST; et 81.,
Case No. CV 2010-436C
Plaintiffs,

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
CONSOLIDATE

vs.
IDAHO BOARD OF LAND CO:MMISSIONERS~
and GEORGE BACON, in hls official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs (Lessees) submit this Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate.

Contrary to Defendants' assertions, this case and the Ada County case filed by the Idaho
Attorney Gene:rs1 concern common questions of law and fact. For the reasons set forth herein
and in Lessees' prior briefing and the other pleadings on file in these matters, consolidation of
this case and the Ada County case is appropriate and would ensUTC consistency and the efficient

use ofjud.icial resOurces.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Lessees take issue with certain "'facts" stated by the Board of Land Commissioners and
George Bacon (collectively the "Land Board" or '~BOaId") as set forth below.
On page 6 of the Boaxd's Memorandwn in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to
Consolidate ("'Board's Memorandum''), the Board states: " ... the Attorney General made clear
that his non-opposition was conditioned on the Lessees' not interfering with disposition of tbe

litigation before Judge BaiP' (Emphasis added.) This statement misstates the language quoted
to allegedly support it. The discussion at the hearing on the Attorney General's Motion for

Preliminary Injunction never addressed any such issue:
MR. SMITH: Your HODor, our position is as follows: The Attorney General does
not oppose the intervention motion, with the uncief5tanding that the applicant
intervenors have no objection to proceeding forward with the hearing that we
have jU!t begun and otherwise proceeding forward with this case before this court.

Counsel for the Lessees responded by saying:

1

[A]s I understand it, there's no objection from the Board and the Department, and
there is a conditional no objection from the Attorney GenetaI S9 long as I do not
object to this proceeding going QJUOday. ang 1do not have such an Qbjection. and
I am prepared to state our position.

Affidavit of Clay R. Sm1th ("Smith AJf. "), Ex. A at 14:23.15:4; 25:21-26:2 (emphasis
added).

Undersigned counsel for the Lessees then stated the position ofthe Lessees:
The primary reason that the lessees want to be involved in this matter is
that even though the lessees have great faith in the Board, in the Department, and
Out Attorney General as being well-meaning State elected officials who will
certainly act in good. faith, they do not represent the other side of the lease, which
is the lessees, and they do not represent the lessees' interest.
Therefore, they [sic] are critical issues that the lessees wish to bring to the
court's attention. We will not agree with the factual matters that have not been
established. We will contest them, and we will do that throughout.
We will take positions 00 Idaho Code Section 58-310A and on the
constitution. We will present argument to you. on those matters, and so far as our
position today with respect to section 58-310A, we would argue its
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constitutionality .
I'm not prepared to do that. I won't do that at this point in time. But if
this-regardless of what happens in this motion today, there will be further
proceedings, and we will be presentina argument on that.
And so having said that, knowing that we have an adverse position on
many, many factual issues and legal arguments different from both the Board, the
Department, and from the Attorney General, we have no objection to the entry of
the preliminary injunction today. Thank you very much.

Id. at 26:16-27:21,
The Board bas also distorted the facts in this matter by quoting selective portions of that
hearing transcript. leaving the false impression that Lessees agreed to not argue the
constitutionality ofLe. § 58-3 lOA. The Board stated:
The District Court then orally granted the intervention motion. Id at 26:4-6. The
Court observed that intervention was "particulmly'" appropriate "in light of the
fact that the defense has stated tha.t their position is that it will not assert" any
position wi1h respect to § S8-310A's constitutionality. ld at 26:10-12; see Id. at
18:14-19 (Defcndants' Counsel: "Counsel [for the Attorney General] ... has
pointed out that constitutional issue has been thoroughly briefed, and I take
exccption to that, because we didn't bri<!=f it. [1] In fact, we told the court that we
take no position. We followed the law. And we are not the sovereign. It's not
our job to defend the sovereign'').

Board's Memorandum at 6.
What the Board failed to note for this Court is that it was counsel for the Board. not
counsel for the Lessees that took exception to the Attorney General's statement that the
constitutional issue had been fully briefed. And it was the Board's counsel who stated that the
Board was talcing no pOSition at that time.

As a result, Judge Bail had briefing on the constitutional iSsue only from the Attorney
General at the time of the preliminary injunction hearing. Lessees' counsel was only allowed tD
intervene at the bearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, and the Lessees did not oppose
the motion in an effort to maintain the status quo.

Lessees' counsel was clear during the

preliminary injunction hearing that Lessees would be presenting further arguments on the
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constitutionality ofLC. § 58·310A, and that those arguments would be made fully and presented

to the Court at a later date.
Consolidation of the cases was not mentioned, let alone argued at the hearing on the:
preliminary injunction. The Attorney General was fully cognizant of the lawsuit pending in 1b.is

Court, for the Attorney General had been served with the Complaint The Attorney General was
also aware that this case was filed on October 22, 2010, when be filed his case. not in Valley

County, but in Ada County, on December 2, 2010.
The Lessees filed this motion to consolidate the day after they were made parties to the
Attorney General's lawsuit, which was the soonest such motion could be filed.
Yet another factual misrepresentation appears on page 8 of the Board's Memorandum,
wherein the Board refers to the motion for an order sanctioning the Board for contempt. The

Board states the Lessees alleged ", .. that the Land Board's December 21> 2010 first motion
violated the Order Granting Preliminary Irijunction." This quote, however, misconstrues the

motion for contempt. That motion was not based upon the Board's renewal of the current lease
for one

year, but instead the motion was brought because the Board unilaterally raised the rent of

the Lessees without providing the necessary 180 days' prior notice. Judge Bail has stated by
interlineation in the proposed Order submitted by the Attorney General that: "The existing leases
are not addressed by this Order. The Lessees may remain in possession pending further Order on

the existing tenns and conditions." Smith Ajf., Ex. Bat 2 (emphasis added).
Judge Bail further wrote:

''This Order maintafus the status quo pending further

proceedings. It is not intended. to affect any contract rights of any of the lease holders who will
be given an opportunity to address these issues hereafter." [d.

When the Board raised the rent without notice, it affected the contract rights of the
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Lessees by breaching the lease and failed 10 maintain the status quo as ordered by Judge Bail.

ll.
A.

ARGUMENT

Tbsre Are Common Questions of La'! and Fact That Make Tbese
Appropriate for

Cas~s

~onsolidatioD.

The Board, despite its recognition that 1.R.C.P. 42 approves of consolidation of actions
involving common questions of law and fact, fai1s to address or even acknowledge the

overwhelnring number of factual issues common to both cases. Instead, it states the issues of law
in each case vary narrowly in an attempt to show that these cases should not be consolidated.
The reality however, is that these two suits are so closely connected, both factually and legally,
that consolidation is necessary to ensure consistency and the efficient use of judicial resources.

Both cases involve the same parties and the cottage site leases entered into by the Board
and the: Lessees. Although the Wasden case involves the Attorney General in his individual
capacity, while this suit does not, one cannot ignore that the Attorney General is also a member
of the Board, and is thus a defendant in this suit. Both cases concern how the Board renews the

cottage site leases. Specifically, this case is about the contractual renewal obligations the Board
owes to Lessees. In tum, the Wasden smt seeks to prohibit the Boaxd from rene'Ning the leases

in accordance with its contractual obligations.
The Board, in its opposition mcmorandwn, attempts to separate the issue of renewal

under the leases from the issue of whether I.e. § 58-310A constitutionally allows renewal as
provided by the lease agreements. i.e., without a conflict auction. It is inconsistent for the Board
to

say that these issues arc not interrelated, however, when the Board itself relies on I.e. § S8-

310A as a defense to Lessees' contract claims. See Mem. in Supp. o/Defs' Cross-Mot. for

Pmial Summ. J. at 14-15, 18. C"In furtherance of this constitutional mandate, the Legislature

bas instructed the Board to charge 'market rent.' as determined in its discretion. Idaho Code
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§ 58-31 OA. Thus, the Land Board bas no authority to contractually agree to grant the lessees an
automatic right to renew at the existing rental rate - an essential eletnent of their proffered
interpretation of Section K. l.4.h.!')
The Board takes the position that the constitutionality of I.e. § 58-31OA's renewal.

process should be dealt with in isolation; entirely separate from Lessees' contractual renewal
rights. See Board's Memorandum at 11. The Board relies on Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.,
106 Idaho 905, 908, 6&4 P.2d 307, 310 (Ct. App. 1984) to argue consolidation is uncalled for

because "an intervenor takes a case as he finds it." See id Wing, however, is distinguishable
and states nothing concerning the consolidation of two cases under I.R.C.P. 42. 1be court's
decision in Wing spoke to the inability of the intervenor to introduce new claims. not the inability

to consolidate two cases. Id Here. Lessees are seeking a consolidation of interrelated claims
already raised by the parties. which concern common issues ()f law and fact.

The Board's

citation to Wing is inapt.

Finally, the Board claims that a decision concerning the constitutionality of I.e. § 58·
310A wiU have no impact on Lessees' constitutional claims, because they will have the "same

essential concern" about

Le.

§ 58~31 OA regardless of whether they "win or lose" on their

contract claims. Board's Memorandum at 11 0.3. This simplistic argument ignores the fact that
the Board argues in the present case that

I.e.

§ 58·310A essentially mandates there can be DO

preferential right to renew in the Jease contracts. The Board also ignores the reality that the
statute's constitutionality may directly impact Lessees' ability to enforce the preferential right to
renew granted by the 2001 cottage site leases.
The constitutionality of the statute bears directly on Lessees l ability to enforce a renewal
clause or ot.heIwise renew the leases without a conflict auction. It cannot be said that the
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contractual rights and interests of the hundreds of people that have occupied and imprOved the
land at issue for collectively hundreds of years will have ""no substantive effect on the Wasden
proceeding." Id at 11. The questions of fact and law between the two cases arc so closely
intertwined, they should be consolidated to ensure consistency of rulings between the two cases

and to conserve judicial resources.
B.

The Board's EqyjJalzle Argumeut! Agamst CODsolidatWn Are Likewise Without

Merit.
The Board contends that consolidation wOl1ld not be fair in this instance because ''the
Attorney General made clear that his

non~opposition

[to Lessees' intervention in Wasden] was

conditioned on the Lessees not interfering with disposition of the litigation before Judge BaiL"
Board's Memorandum at 6.

As noted above, during the December 15, 2010 prdiminary

injunction hearing in the Ada County case t the Attorney General stated he had no objection to

Lessees' intervention as long as they ~;have no objection. to proceeding forward with the hearing
that we have just begun and otherwise proccecting forward with this case before this court." Id
Couns~l

for Lessees responded by stating "as I understand it . . . there is a conditional no

objection from the Attorney General so long as r do not object to this proceeding ~oing on today.

. .." Id (emphasis added).

At no time during his remarks did the Attorney GeneIal make reference to consolidation.
When counsel for Lessees restated his understanding of the Attorney General's position, he made
no mention of consolidation. If the Attorney General intended his non-opposition to Lessees'
intervention to be conditioned on an agreement to not consolidate the case with Lessees' pending
lawsuit the Attorney Gt:ne:ral knew was

ftloo in Valley County. then the Attorney General should

have stated his reservation clearly. Instead, he gave no indication of any such limitation. There
is no agreement between the parties regarding consolidation and therefore nQ equitable

.
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considerations mitigating against consolidating these cases.

The Board further claims that this motion has delayed "resolution of the summary
judgment motion that has been pending before the Ada County District Court for almost two
months." ld at 11. While Lessees do not claim there has been any '\tonecessary delay" :in these
proceedings, the Board conveniently overlooks the part it has played in any alleged delay of
resolution of Wasden.
The Board has apparently forgotten that on December 30, 2010, it voluntarily vacated a
January 5,2011 hearing it had set on a motion to dismiss all claims in this litigation. On January

13, 2011, the

Bo~d

filed a Cross-Motion for SUllllnary Judgment on Lessees' contract claims,

thereby abandoning its prior motion to dismiss. On January 13, 2011, Lessees and the Board
fi2ed a Stipulation with this Court, seeking to have Lessees' Partial Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendants Summary Judgment Motion and Lessees' Motion

to Consolidate

heard

together, in Ada COWlty on February 24, 2011. Thus, it was the Board who affinnatively acted
to vacate the January 5 hearing, so it could re-file its motion as one for summary judgment and
have it heard on February 24 in Ada County. To now suggest that the motion to consolidate is

the reason these motions are not being heard until February 24 is simply not accurate. Lessees
have cooperated with the Board to get this matter heard as quickly as possible. For the sake of

the Courtts calendar and to promote judicial efficiency, both parties have done everything they
could to brief and ergue this motion in a timely manner.

C.

Euclid Is InapDUeable Bccau$e Lessees' Claims Are Not (.imjted to Judicial Review.

For the reasons set forth in Part A of Lessees' Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims. Lessees' breach

of contract claims are not subject to the APA. See fd at 7-12. Therefore. Euclid is inapplicable
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to this moticm. Were the Courl to grant this motion. the consolidated case would consist of
claims for contra.ctual and declaratory relief, and as such would not run afoul of Euclid.

m.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein and in the prior briefing submitted in support of this
motion, the Board's arguments are without merit. and Lessees l motion to consolidate should be

granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22r1d day of February, 2011.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &

BLANTON, P.A.

:~~;f!Ilif!dColleen D. Zahn - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SQVIg£
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22M day of February, 2011. I caused to be served a true

copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:

Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby
HAWLEY, TROXELL. ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATIORNEY GENERAL
Steven L. Olsen
Chief ofCivit Litigation Division
Clay Smith
Deputy Attorneys General
954 W. Jefferson, 21ld Floor

u.s.
8
o

Maj}~ Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
~ Telecopy 954-5210
~ Electroruc Transmission
mclark@.ha.wlevtroxell.cQm
,ij§hby@hawleytrOxcll.cQm

o

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
d Delivered
emight Mail
elecopy 854-8073

~
o

Electronic Transmission

P.O. Box 83720
Boise, JD 83720

Colleen D. Zabn
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LA.WRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By

I

Deput

FEB 2 3 2011

LAWRENCE 0, WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

CasaNo_._ _ _....,\IlstNo:....--Rled

ST£VEN L. OLsEN, lSB No. 3586

AM

~--

--

Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CLAY R. SMITH, ISB. No. 6385
Deputy Attorneys General

954 W.lefferson, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 83720

Boise. 10 83720r0010
Telephone: (lOS) 334-2400
Fax: (208) 854-8073

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTI:l JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VAlLEY

GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST, et aL,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
IDAHO BOABD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS; and GEORGE BACON,
in his official capacity as Director of the Idaho
Department of Lands,
Defendants.

)
)

~
~
~
)

CllSe ~o. CV 2010-436C

LIMITED ENTRY OF

APPEARANCE

)

l
)

Clay R. Smith, Deputy Attorney General., hereby enters his appearance in this matter on

behalf of La\\Te'IlCe G. Wasden, in his capacity as Attorney General and Plaintiff in Wasden v.
Stale Board of Land

Commissi(m~r$.

No. CV-OC 2010-23751 (Fourth Jud. Dist.. Ada County).

for the limited pwpose of opposing Plaintiffs' motion to consolidate.
///

II/

LIMITED ENTRY OF APPEARANCE - 1
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DATED this 23rd day of February. 2011.
STATE OF IDAHO

OFFICE OF 1HE ATTORNEY G~"ERAL

By

ltl2/
CiAY"tCSMITH
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERnry that on this 2300 day of February, 2011~ r caused to be served a true
and COttect copy of the foregoing by the following method to:

HAWLEYTROXELLENNffi
&HAWLEYLLP
Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby
877 Main Street, Suite 1000

P.O. Box. 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

Phillip S. Oberrecht
Colleen D. Zahn
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &

BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Bo" 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

Du.s.Mail

o Hand Delivery

B
I8l

Certified Mail> Return Receipt Requested

Overnight Mail
Facsimile~ (208) 746-0753
~Email: mcla:rk.@.hawleytrOx.ell.com

oo Hand
U.S. Mail
Delivery

Certiiied Mail, Return Receipt Requested
o~D Facsimile:
Overnight Mail
(208) 395-8585

[8J Email: pso@hallfarley.com.
sxiz@ha.llfarley.com

208-395-8500

CLAy R. SMITH
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.

BY~

DEPUTY

FEB 2 4 2011
Phillip S. Oberrecht

CaseNo'-----.JInslNo

ISB #1904. pso@hallfarley.com

m

FJIed----A.M.J!fu

Colleen D. Zahn

P.M

ISB #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
C IDocument, and S<:'ttlngslmwc'L'l~al Se!ting.,\Temporary Internet Files'OI.Kl9\Slipulalion Regarding

Fact' and Discovcryrcv.doc

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the BABCOCK
TRUST; LAURA L. BARCLAY; BARBARA J. Case No. CV 2010-436C
BARSNESS; THOMAS W. BARTON; JAMES D.
and SHANON N. BIVENS; FRANK R. and
ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES and JEANNENE STIPULATION REGARDING
BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJ·LE TATE and FACTS AND DISCOVERY
HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY RUMPH, as
trustee of the SANDRA BROMAGEN TRUST;
MONTFORD M. BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON
and H. ANTONIOLI; MARTIN L. and JANIS G.
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE FAMILY
1988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNEFJX
of
the
THOMAS,
as
Trustee
CAR~EFIX
TRUST;
WENDELL/BARBARA
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAJvlI
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the
CHARLOTTE
KINNEY
TRUST;
COLIN
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER
IV LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE
COOKE; RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA L.
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and
MARTIN J. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY;
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative of
the ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D. I
DOBBS; BENNETT G. DAY and DONNA DAY I
JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD
MARJORIE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER
DUCHARME
and
TERESA
CHAPMAN

&:
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DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees of the DUCHARME 1
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; ALLEN and,
DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY EDMUNDS; ROBERT I
and BARBARA FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY;
MICHAEL AND PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE
FOLTZ; JOHN W. GENTRY; GERMAIN R.
TARRANT and JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C.
GOUL; RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN
M. HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R.
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; LILA
HARPER; RODNEY HEATER; KENT MICHAEL
HENRIKSEN and JEAl"lNE C. HENRIKSEN, as
Co-Trustees of the HENRIKSEN FAMILY TRUST;
HERVEY;
CRAIG
and
LORl
CHARLES
HlCKMAN; WADE A. & JOAN C. HILLARD;
WILLIAM and BARBARA HIPP; KARL and
MARGARET HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and
JOSEPH J. HON; RlCHARD W. HOYLE; RlCK
JENSEN, as Trustee of the JENSEN FAMILY
TRUST; HAL JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J.
JOSLIN; DANIEL and ANGELINA KAUFMAN;
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARlN KING, as
personal representative for the ESTATE OF,
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE I
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA; SHARON
L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the LEISY
F ~\1IL Y LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and REBECCA
A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEANN LONGSON;
ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN MACK;
RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN MCKNIGHT,
as Trustee of the EDWIN H. & VIVIAN P.
MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST; CINDY KUBENA,
as Trustee of the MILDRED 1. FERGUSON TRUST;
DONNA MOORE; WILLIAM A. and GALE P.
MOTT; STEPHEN and Al'.'N MURDOCH;
EDWARD F. O'GARA, as Trustee of the EDWARD
F. O'GARA 1II FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, I
1982; THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. '
and KlMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY
PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.;
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as Co-Trustees
of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY TRUST; JEANE
E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and KATY L.
REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and PAMELA RIDDLE;
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SUSAN C. ROURKE; DAVID ROUSSEAU; JOHN
D. RULE; EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S5 FAMILY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G. LANCE
and CYNDY SALLADAY; CHARLES and
JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T. SCHULZE;
GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V. SHOEMAKER;
SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH and BARBARA
SMITH, as Co-Trustees of the SMITH F AMIL Y
TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as Trustee of the
STODDARD/CLARK CABIN TRUST; GREGORY
and JULIE SURABIAN; CATHY PETERSON, as
Trustee of THE MCCALL CABIN TRUST;
CHRISTOPHER C. THOMPSON and JULIE E.
THOMPSON; SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S.
TURNER; JOHN L. SIMMONS; SALLE C.
UBERUAGA; STEVEN C. and MAR Y ANN
WALKER; J. LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C.
WALKER and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of
the WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A.
WRENN; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal
Representative of the EST ATE OF KANDACE
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE,
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KA Y KEMP
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H.
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998;
B.
SUZANNE
ZIMMERMAN;
GLORIA
SALLADAY;
GREGG
and
SALLE
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS,

I

I

Plaintiffs,
vs.
IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS;
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
II
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.

.

COME NOW the parties above-named, by and through undersigned counsel of record,

STIPllLATlON REGARDING FACTS AND DISCOVERY - 3

554

•
and stipulate and agree that:

1.

Defendants have no objection to the statement of facts contained in the
memorandum and affidavits supporting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment except for the objections set forth in Defendants' Motion and
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and Disregard Affidavits of
Totten, Hancock, Herndon and Schulze.

2.

Plaintiffs agree that defendants do not have to respond 10 the written discovery
propounded by plaintiffs to defendants until the court has ruled on Plaintiffs'
MotiOnjSUmmary Judgment.

DATED this

j]

day of February, 2011.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, PA.

BY: __~~~~r-~~________~-=___
Phillip S. 0 rrecht '- Of the Firm
Colleen D. ahn - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DATED t h i £ . day of February, 2011.
HA WLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS &
HAWLEY, LLP

. Clark - Of the Firm
D. John Ashby - Oflhe Firm
Attorneys for Defendants
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MARla 8 2011
Case NO _ _- , I os~
.
-z::!: •
dFitev..
_ _ A.M.

:0

P.M

2

3
4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

5

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13

14

15
16
17
18

19

20
21
22
23

24
25
26

GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST; LAURA L. BARCLAY;
BARBARA J. BARSNESS; THOMAS W.
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N.
BIVENS; FRANK R. and ANGELES M.
BORK; JAMES and JEANNENE BOYD;
NANCY BOYD; MAJ-LE TATE and
HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY RUMPH,
as trustee of the SANDRA BROMAGEN
TRUST; GREGG BURINGTON and H.
ANTONIOLl; MARTIN l. and JANIS G.
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE
FAMILY 1988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M.
CARNEFIX THOMAS, as Trustee of the
WENDELl/BARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST;
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and
TAMI CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as
Trustee forthe CHARLOTTE KINNEY
TRUST; COLIN GARDNER, as Trustee of
the COLIN GARDNER IV LIVING TRUST;
RICHARD E. and JOYCE COOKE;
RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA L.
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and
MARTIN J. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON
DALY; FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal
representative of the ESTATE OF ALLYN
DINGEL; JAMES D. DOBBS; BENNETT
G. DAY and DONNA DAY JACOBS, as CoTrustees of the DONALD & MARJORIE
DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER
DUCHARME and TERESA CHAPMAN
DUCHARME, as Co-Trustees of the
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING
TRUST; ALLEN and DIXIE DYKMAN;
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2
3
4

5

6
7

B
9
10
11

12

13
14

15

16

17
18

19
20

21
22

23
24
25

WENDY EDMUNDS; ROBERT and
BARBARA FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY;
MICHAEL AND PATRICIA FERY; DAVID
LEE FOLTZ; JOHN W. GENTRY;
GERMAIN R. TARRANT and JANET L.
KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL; RONALD and
STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M. HAGER;
JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R.
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGANECKES CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING
TRUST; LILA HARPER; RODNEY
HEATER; KENT MICHAEL HENRIKSEN
and JEANNE C. HENRIKSEN, as CoTrustees of the HENRIKSEN FAMILY
TRUST; CHARLES HERVEY; CRAIG and
LORI HICKMAN; WADE A. & JOAN C.
HILLARD; WILLIAM and BARBARA HIPP;
KARL and MARGARET HIPPLE; MICHAEL
B. HON and JOSEPH J. HON; RICHARD
W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as Trustee of
the JENSEN FAMILY TRUST; HAL
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J.
JOSLIN; DANIEL and ANGELINA
KAUFMAN; RICHARD and SHAUN KAY;
KARIN KING, as personal representative
for the ESTATE OF CHARLES R. KING,
JR.; STEVE and JEANE LAIRD; JOSE
NICK and JAN LARREA; SHARON L.
MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the LEISY
FAMILY LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and
REBECCA A. LONGS ON; LEE S. and
LEEANN LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER;
MARY LYNN MACK; RUSSELL F.
MCKINLEY; VIVIAN MCKNIGHT, as
Trustee of the EDWIN H. & VIVIAN P.
MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST; CINDY
KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I.
FERGUSON TRUST; DONNA MOORE;
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT;
STEPHEN and ANN MURDOCH;
EDWARD F. O'GARA, as Trustee of the
EDWARD F. O'GARA III FAMILY TRUST
DATED JULY 8,1982; THOMAS &
SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and
KIMBERLY A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY
PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and

26
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2

3
4

5
6

7

8
9
10
11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20
21

22

23
24

KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR
CO.; ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as
Co-Trustees of the ROBERT & JOAN
PISTEY TRUST; JEANE E. RETTER;
ROBERT D. and KATY L. REYNOLDS;
MICHAEL and PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN
C. ROURKE; DAVID ROUSSEAU; JOHN
D. RULE; EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee
of the S-5 FAMILY TRUST; DEBORAH T.
ROSE, as Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE
TRUST; G. LANCE and CYNDY
SALLADAY; CHARLES and JANNIFER
SCHMOEGER; JAMES T. SCHULZE;
GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V.
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF;
KENNETH and BARBARA SMITH, as CoTrustees of the SMITH FAMILY TRUST;
JOHN M. CLARK, as Trustee of the
STODDARD/CLARK CABIN TRUST;
GREGORY and JULIE SURABIAN; CATHY
PETERSON, as Trustee of THE MCCALL
CABIN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C.
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON;
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER;
JOHN L. SIMMONS; SALLE C.
UBERUAGA; STEVEN C. and MARYANN
WALKER; J. LAMONTE WALKER,
STEVEN C. WALKER and JAN M.
LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the WALKER
MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE;
ROSE A. WRENN; JAYSON
ARMSTRONG, as Personal Representative
of the ESTATE OF KANDACE KEMP
ARMSTRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE,
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KAY KEMP
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY
H. ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE
ZIMMER FAMILY TRUST DATED
NOVEMBER 5, 1998; SUZANNE
ZIMMERMAN; GLORIA B. SALLADAY;
GREGG and SALLE MIDDLEKAUFF; and
JANET M. STEVENS,

25

Plaintiffs,
26
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vs.
2

3
4

5

I DAHO BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS; and GEORGE
BACON, in his official capacity as Director
of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.

6

APPEARANCES

7

8

For the Plaintiffs: Phillip Oberrecht and Colleen Zahn of Hall, Farley, Oberrecht &
Clanton, P.A.

9

10
11

For Defendants State Land Board: Merlyn Clark and John Ashby of Hawley, Troxell
Ennis, & Hawley, LLP
For the Attorney General: Clay Smith, Deputy Attorney General

12

13

PROCEEDINGS

14

This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate. After
15

16

hearing oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement.

BACKGROUND

17
18

Plaintiff Lessees

(~Lessees")

filed this lawsuit against the Idaho Board of Land

19

Commissioners ("Land Board") and George Bacon, in his official capacity as Director of

20

the Idaho Department of Lands ("Department of Lands"), for breaching Lessees'

21

existing lease contracts with the Defendants and for committing statutory and

22

constitutional violations. Lessees allege that the Defendants breached the terms of the

23

leases when it unilaterally imposed new leases with new terms on the Lessees, in
24

violation of the renewal provisions of the existing leases.

Lessees also allege that

25
26

Defendants acted in violation of I.C. § 58-310A and Article IX, Section VIII of the Idaho

559
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Constitution, when they imposed a new rent formula.
2

On December 2, 2010, the Idaho Attorney General filed suit against the

3

Defendants in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in

4

Ada County (Case No. CV-OC-2010-23751). The Attorney General seeks to have I.C.

5

§ 58-310A declared unconstitutional and to prevent the Defendants from renewing

6

Lessees' leases unless those renewals are subject to conflict auctions. The Attorney

7
8

General also argues that the Defendants violated Article IX, Section VIII by imposing a
rental formula that charges less than market rate.

9

It is the Lessees' position that both cases involve common questions of fact and
10

law because both cases concern Lessees' lease rights, the application of I.C. § 5811

12
13

310A and Article IX, Section V" of the Idaho Constitution. As such, Lessees have filed
the current Motion seeking to have the two cases consolidated.
LEGAL STANDARD

14

15

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides that:

16

When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, it may order a jOint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated;
and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

17

18
19

I.R.C.P.42(a).
20

"It is generally recognized that if the actions are such as may be consolidated, ..
21

22
23

. the trial court is vested with a discretion to consolidate or refuse to do so, and the
exercise of such discretion wi" not be reviewed except in a case of palpable abuse."

24

Branom v. Smith Frozen Foods of Idaho, Inc., 83 Idaho 502, 508, 365 P.2d 958. 961

25

(1961). In Branom. the Idaho Supreme Court stated that "[w]henever the court is of the

26
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•

opinion that it may expedite its business and further the interests of the litigants, at the
2

3

same time minimizing the expense upon the public and the litigants alike, the order of
consolidation should be made." Id. at 509,365 P.2d at 961.

1

DISCUSSION

4

5

The Court has reviewed the record in this case, as well as the Ada County case,

6

and has determined that common questions of fact and law exist in the two lawsuits on

7
8

both Lessees' contract claims and their constitutional/statutory claims.

In this case,

Lessees contend that the Defendants have breached the terms of their lease contracts

9

by unilaterally imposing a new lease on Lessees, which contains new terms. In the Ada
10

County case, the Attorney General argues that I. C. § 58-310A, authorizing the
11
12

Defendants to enter into cottage site leases without engaging in the conflict auction

13

process, is unconstitutional.

14

existing leases are unconstitutional, including the renewal terms which are the subject

15

of Lessees' breach of contract claims in this case. As such, the decision in one case

16

will impact the relief requested in the other.

17
18

In making this argument, the Attorney implies that the

Furthermore, the Lessees argue in this case that the Defendants' current
proposed rent formula violates the lease agreements, as well as statutory and

19

constitutional authority, because it requires rent payments that will be so high that they
20

will not promote stable leases at market rent, which will not provide maximum long-term
21

22

financial returns to the State.

23

24
25

1 The Court has authority to consolidate the Ada County case with a Valley County case pursuant to
I,R.C.P, 42(a) because these cases are "pending before the Court," It is not an abuse of discretion for a
district court to consolidate actions that were filed in two separate counties. See Jones v, Jones, 117
Idaho 621, 623-24, 790 P.2d 914, 916-17 (1990),

26
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•
The Attorney General argues in the Ada County case that the leases should be
2

subject to conflict auctions and that the Defendants' new, unilaterally imposed rent

3

formula and its phase-in period result in rent payments below market value, which fails

4

to obtain maximum long-term financial returns to the State.

5

These arguments both concern interpretations of I.C. § 58-310A and Article IX,

6

Section VIII. Furthermore, the relevant facts surrounding the terms of the leases at

7

8

issue in both cases are so intertwined that having two separate trials in these cases
would be inefficient and could result in inconsistent outcomes for the parties involved.

9

Based upon the common issues of fact and law in these cases, the Court will find that
10

consolidation of these two cases will further the interests of the litigants. while at the
11

12
13

same time minimizing the expense upon the public and the litigants. Therefore, the
Court grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate
CONCLUSION

14

15

The Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate. All future papers shall

16

be filed under case number CV-2010-436-C, which was the first case filed. All further

17

18

action with regard to the consolidated cases shall be heard by Judge McLaughlin on the
Valley County docket.

19

The Court will set this matter for future scheduling of motions and other
20

proceedings on March 18, 2011 at 1:00 pm at the Ada County Courthouse.
21
22

DATED this

(

/J

day of March 2011.

r

23

24

MIC AEL McLAUGHLIN
DISTRICT JUDGE

25

26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2
3

I hereby certify that on the - b a y of March 2011, I mailed (served) a true

4

and correct copy of the within instrument to:

5

6

VALLEY COUNTY COURT
VIA EMAIL

7

Phillip S. Oberrecht

8

10

702 W Idaho,Ste 700
PO Box 1271
Boise, 10 83701
Fax: (208) 395-8585

11

Merlyn W. Clark

HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & BLANTON, PA

9

12

13

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 W Main St, Ste 1000

PO Box 1617
Boise, 1083701-1617
Fax: (208) 954-5210

14

Clay R. Smith
15
16
17
18
19

IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
954 W Jefferson, 2nd Fir

PO Box 83720
Boise, 10 83720-0010
Fax: (208) 854-8073
ARCHIE N. BANBURY

Clerk of the District Court

20
21

By: ____~~J..,.C.".J..4-_¥_1~--
Deputy Clerk

22
23

24
25

26
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HALLFARLEY

GtJ0021004

Phillip S. Oberrecht
ISB #1904. pso@ha1Jfllrley.com

Colleen D. Zahn
[SB #6208, cdz@hallfarJey .cem

HALL} FARLEY. OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box J211

Boise, tdaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
W;\4\4-682.1 \PLEADINGS· VAl..LEY COUNTY\MSJ-Conlraet Claims-HF09-NOH.doc

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
GLADYS BABCOCK. as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST. et at.,

Plaintiffs.,
vs.

IDAHO BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS; and GEORGE BACON, in
his official capacity as Director of the Idaho
Department of Lands,

I Caso No. CV 2DID-436C
(Consolidated with Ada County
Case No. Cv-oc 2010-23751)

NOTICE OF HEARING ON
PLAINTIFFS· MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS

Defendants.
HON. LAWRENCE O. WASDEN, in his
capacity as Attorney General of Idaho, ex rei.

STATE ENDOWMENT LAND
BENEFIClARIES,

Ada COWlty
Case No. CV-OC 2010-23751

Plaintiff,

vs.
STATE BOARD OF LAND

COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE BACON, in
his official capacity as Director of the Idaho
Department of Lands.

Defendants.
NOTICE OF HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SL"'MMARY
JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS· 1

564

03/21/2011 10:08 FAX 208395858,

HALLFARLEY

~003/a04

•

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys

Df record, Hall. Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., will bring on for hearing their MOTION
FOR PARTlAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT CLAlMS before the aboveentitled Court sitting in Ada County on May 3, 2011, at 2:00 p.m., at the Ada County
Courthouse, before the Honorable Michael McLa.ughlin.

~/Sr

DATED this ~ day of March, 2011.

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

By::.-".1:::lA~~~~~-===~:t--
Phillip S.
Colleen D.
- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC...E

6y

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of March, 2011, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
/
Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby
HAWLEY, TROXELL • .ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP

877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
P. O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701·1617

I}(" U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
0 Hand Delivered
0 Overnight Mail
0 Telecapy
0 Electronic Transmission

Fax No. 9S4-5210

mclark@haw]eytroxcll.com
j ashby@hawleytroxeU.com

LAWRENCEG.WASDEN
ATIORNEY GENERAL
Steven L. Olsen
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
Clay Smith
Deputy Attorneys General
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor
POBox 83720
Boise, 1083720-0010

~.
Hand Delivered

Mail, Postage Prepaid

§
o

Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Transmission

NOTICE OF HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT CLAIMS - 3
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Har 21 2011 3:00PM

HP

SERJET

20e

FA~

110 ......

p.3

0lar1es B. LempeSis, IS8A #2550
CHARLES B. LEMPESIS, 0iTD
Attorney at laW
201 Wst Seventh Avenue
Post Falls, Idaho 8385oi1\
Telephone: (208) 177-8815
FaCSImile: (208)

Case No

~instNO._,

_

.M_~.M
'"

m-l044

Idaho/awver@mSlLCOlIJ
Attorney for PRIEST lAKE STATE lESSEES' ASSOCIATION, INC.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF VAU..EY
BABCOCK, et a!.
Plaintiffs
case No. 01 2010-436C

v.

COnsoUdated wtth Ada County

Case No. OJ OC 1023751
IDAHO BOARD OF lANO COMMISSIONERS;
and GEORGE BACON, In his ofI'k:lal c:apacJty
as Director of the Idaho Oepartrnent of Lands
Defendants
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDeN, In his capacity
as the Attorney General of Idaho, ex tel
STATE ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFIClAFUfS

ORDER FOR tNTERVENllON BY
PRIEST lAJ<E STATE LESSeES

Consolklatled Plaintiff

ASSOCIATION, INC.

v.
STATE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS,
and GEORGE BACON, In his offtdal capacity
as Director of the Idaho Department of Lands
COnsolidated Defendants

And
PRIEST tAKE STATE I ESSEES ASSOCIATION,
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation
Consolkfated Defendant

Intervenor
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BASED UPON the Motion flied by PRIEST LAKE srATE LESSEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
and the Stipulation of the partieS In open CCot, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that PRIEST LAKE
STATE LESSEES ASSOCIATION, [NC., on behalf of its members who are holders of
approxmately 350 cottage site teases with the STATE BOARD Of LAND

COMMISSION~

staall Intervene In the above consdidated matters as Consolidated Defendant
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CHAJSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By AIC NELSON
O[,Pl'TY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his capacity
as Attorney General ofIdaho, ex rei. STATE
ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC 20lO-23751

ORDER CHANGING VENUE TO
VALLEY COUNTY

VS.

STATE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS,
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.
Having considered and granted PJajntiffs' Motion to ConsoJidate this case with Valley
County Case No. CV 2010·436-C, and good cause appearing therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER that venue of this action is
hereby changed from Ada County, Fourth Judicial District, State of ldano, to ValJey County,
Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho. All future papers shall be filed under Valley County
Case No. CV-2010-436-C.

DA TED this ;2 2-day of March, 2011.
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1Aichael R. McLaughlin
District ludge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the.2.i day of March, 2011. I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:

LA WRENCE G. WASDEN
ATIORNEY GENERAL
Steven L. Olsen
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
Clay Smith
Deputy Attomeys General
954 W. Jefferson, 2 nd Floor
POBox 83720
Boise, ID 83720

Phillip S. Oberrecht

HALL, FARLEY. OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

oo
o

o

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy 854-8073
Electronic Transmission

~. Mail, Postage Prepaid

o
oo
o

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy 395-8585
Electronic Transmission

Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby
HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
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Phillip S. Oberrecht
ISB # 19 04. pso@haUfarley.com

ColleenD. Zahn
ISB #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com

C8seNo,-_ _Inst.NoI..._ __

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585

ROO

~M

______~~M
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST, et al.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 2010-436C
(Consolidated with Ada County
Case 1\"0. CV-OC 2010-23751)

vs.

IDAHO BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS; and GEORGE BACON, in
his official capacity as Director of the Idaho
Department of Lands,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS'IINTERVEN'ORS'
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT RE:
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
I.C. § 58·310A

HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN. in his
capacity as Attorney General of Idaho, ex ret.
STATE ENDOWMENT LAND
BENEFICIARIES,
Plaintiff,
VS.

STA TE BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE BACON, in
his official capacity as Director of the Idaho
Department of Lands,

Defendants.
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and
GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST, et al.
Defendants-in- Intervention,
and
PRIEST LAKE STATE LESSEES

ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation,
Defendants-in·lntervention.

Plaintiffs and Defendants-in-Intervention, Babcock, et ai. (hereinafter "Lessees"), hereby
submit this Memorandum in Opposition to the Attorney General's Motion for Summary
Judgment Regarding the Constitutionality ofI.C. § 58-31OA. For the reasons set forth herein,
the Attorney General's motion should be denied.

Lessees' Opposition Memorandum is

supported by the Affidavit of Phillip S. Oberrecht submitted herewith, and the other pleadings
and papers on file in this matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Courts are constrained to construe statutes in a constitutional manner if at all possible,
and § 58-310A can be easily construed in such a fashlon. Leases are not disposals subject to the
public auction requirement of Article IX. Section 8, of the Idaho Constitution. Additionally,
§ 58-3 lOA's requirement to generate market rent throughout the duration of the lease term, and
its assurance that Lessees will not be deprived of their leaseholds as long as they continue to pay
market rent, encourages Lessees to continue leasing and improving the leaseholds.

This

continued tenancy and improvement to the property maximizes the long-term financial returns to
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the beneficiaries of state, consistent with the constitutional requirements contained in Article

rx,

Section 8, of Idaho's Constitution.

[[the Attorney General's argument was accepted, this system of stable leases would be
destroyed.

In its place would be a system where the Land Board still sets the rents for

leaseholds, but wit~out the requirement to charge market rent. Risk would be introduced into the
market by conflict auctions, thereby decreasing the long-term financial returns to the
beneficiaries. The «problem" which the Attorney General points to in the current system-the
inability of the Land Board to detennine market rent-would not be solved by invalidating § 58310A, but instead result in a market Whereby Lessees are actually forced to pay more than
market rent in order to maintain to their leaseholds. The Attorney General's motion is without
merit and should be denied.
HISTORICAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Article lX, Section 7, of the Idaho Constitution provides the governor, superintendant of
public instruction, secretary of state, attorney general and state controller shall constitute the
Land Board. The same provision charges the Land Board with direction, control and disposition
of the public lands of the state, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. Id. Const.

art. IX, § 7. Article IX, Section 8, of the Constitution concerns the disposition of public lands:

It shall be the duty of the state board of land commissioners to provide for the
location, protection, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, or which may
hereafter be granted to or acquired by the state by or from the general
government, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such
manner as will secure the maximum long-term financial return to the institution to
which granted or to the state if not s-wcificaHx gTanted~ provided, that no state
lands shall be sold for less than the appraised price, No law shall ever be passed
by the legislature granting any privileges to persons who may have settled upon
any such public lands, subsequent to the survey thereof by the genera1
government, by which the amount to be derived by the sale, or other disposition
of such lands, shall be diminished, directly or indirectly, The legislature shall, at
the earliest practicable period, provide by law that the general grants of land made
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by congress to the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and
held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the
resps:ctive object for which said grants of land were made, and the legislature
shall provide for the sale of said lands from time to time and for the sale of timber
on all state 1ands and for the faithful application of the proceeds thereof in
accordance with the tenus of said grants; provided, that not to exceed One bundred
sections of state lands shall be sold in anyone year, and to be sold in subdi....isions
of not to exceed three hundred twenty acres of land to anyone individual,
company or corporation. The legislature shaU have power to authorize the state
board of land commissioners to exchange granted or acquired lands of the state on
an equal value basis for other lands under agreement with the United States, local
units of government, corporations, companies, individuals, or combinations
thereof.

!d., art. IX, § 8 (emphasis added).
Following Idaho's admission, the Idaho Legislature adopted a statute that provided when
two or more persons apply to lease lhe same state lands, the Commissioner of the Department of
Lands shall auction off the lease to the applicant who will pay the highest annual rental therefor.

See East Side Blaine County Live Stock Ass 'n v. Slate Board of Land Comm 'rs, 34 Idaho 807,

809,198 P. 760,762 (1921), citing C.S. § 2910. Tbis statute still exists today as § 58-310, albeit
with some amendments. In 1990, the Idaho Legislature adopted § 58-310A, which exempted
cottage site leases from the conflict auction provisions of § 58-310 and imposed on the Land
Board the requirement to generate market rent throughout the duration of the lease term.
On January 1,2001, the Land Board entered into IO-year cottage site leases with Lessees.

See Affidavit of W. Anthony Park in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt ("'Park Aff."),

'11

1, 18 and Exh. N. The leases provided

fOT

rent at the rate of 2.5% of the current fee simple

value of the leased premises as determined by the Valley County Assessor. See Park Aff., Exh. N
at D.l.l and D.1.S.b. The Land Board reserved the right to increase or decrease the rent paid
effective January 1 of any calendar year in accordance with the 2.5% rental rate formula and
with 180 days' advance notice of any increase in rental. See id. at 0.1.4. The leases further
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provided that upon sale of a leasehold, Lessees would pay the Land Board 10% of any leasehold
value! realized from the sale. See id at E.1.3.b.This ]0% figure was referred to in the lease as
"premium rent." Id
In February 2010. a Cottage Site Subcommittee, comprised of Secretary of State Ysursa
and Superintendant of Public Instruction LWla, presented its recommendations to the Land Board
conceming the rental rate to be utilized for the upcoming 2011 cottage site leases. See Affidavit
of Phillip S. Oberrecht in Support of Plaintiffs'lIntervenors' Opposition to Attorney General's
Motion for Swnmary Judgment Re: Constitutionality of LC. § 58-310A ("Oberrecht Aff."),

Exhs. A, B. The Subcommittee recommended an annual lease rate of 4% of the appraised value
of the leasehold, which appraised value would be averaged over a 1O~year period. ld.

The

increase from 2.5% to 4% would be phased in over a five-year period. Id. The Subcommittee
also recommended that premium rent be increased from 10% of the leasehold value to 50% of
the leasehold value, wlrich increase would also be phased in over a five-year period. Id.
The Subcommittee's recommendations were based on a study commissioned by
Secretary Ysursa in January 2008 from the University of Idaho Policy Analysis Group. See
Affidavit of Steven Strack ("Strack Aff."), Exh. C. The study concluded that identifying market
rent for the leases was challenging due to the unusual characteristics of the market for such
leases and that there were arguments for both higher and lower rental rates. See id, p. 2. The
Policy Analysis Group concluded there was Wllikely to be a simple "correct" answer concerning
market rent, and offered suggestions for possible market rents ranging between 3.5% and 18.3%.

See id., pp. 2,22-23.
The Attorney General did not believe the Subcommittee's recommendations accurately

1 Leasehold value is determined by subtracting the value of approved lessee-owned improvements from the total sale
price. See Park Aff., Exh. Nat E.l.3.l:>.
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reflected market rent and retained an economist to analyze the Subcommittee's recommendations
and testify at the February 2010 meeting. See Oberrecht Aff., Exh. Gat 72:2058-2061, 72:2075-

73:2092. The economist testified that the Land Board's goal should be to increase rents to the
point the leasehold value disappears, which would require a rental rate of 6% instead of the 4%

recommended by the Subcommittee and that the entire increase be made effective the first year
of the 2011 lease. See id. at 75:2160-77:2223.
At the conclusion of public testimony, Secretary Ysursa made a motion to adopt the
Subcommittee's recommendations. See id. at 109:3121-3140. The Attorney General opposed the
motion on the basis that he believed his economist's recommendations were correct. See id. at

118:3390-3403, 121:3467-3481. No contention was raised during the February 2010 meeting
that § 58-310A was unconstitutional, nor was any suggestion or motion made to subject the 2011
leases to conflict auctions. See id The Land Board voted to defer a decision on the rental rate
and premium rent increase for one month. See id., Exh. A, p. 5.
At the Land Board's March 2010 meeting, the Subcommittee presented essentially the
same recommendations for rental rate, and recommended premium rent be calculated as 10% of
gross leasehold value or 50% of net leasehold value, whlchever is greater. See id., Exh. D, p. 5.
The Land Board adopted the recommendations, with the Attorney General voting in opposition
to the motion. See id. Again, no mention was made concerning the constitutionality of § 58-31 OA

or conflict auctions of cottage site Leases.
Eight days after the Land Board's March 2010 meeting, the Attorney General filed a
Verified Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Prohibition in the Idaho Supreme Court against his
fellow Land Board Members and the Director ofthe Idaho Department of Lands. See id.,

Exh. E.

The Attorney General sought a Writ prohibiting the Land Board and the Department from
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implementing the recently approved rental rates because the rents were too low and therefore
failed to achieve market rent. See id, 135. The Attorney General alleged the Land Board should
have set rates at the 6% figure advocated by his economist. See id., ,,27.34-35. The Petition
was fully briefed and argued, and the Idaho Supreme Court issued Opinion on December 1,

2010.z The Supreme Court dismissed the Attorney General's Writ because it concluded a. plain,
speedy and adequate remedy was available in the [onn of an action for declaratory and injunctive

relief. See id. p. 11.
One day after the Supreme Court issued its Opinion, the Attorney General filed a
Complaint against his fellow Land Board Members and the Director of the Department of Lands
in Ada County District Court. See Complaint (Case No. CV OC 1023751).

The Attorney

General alleged for the first time that § 58-310A was unconstitutional because it permitted
issuance of cottage site leases without resorting to conflict auctions, which he contended were
required for state land leases under Article IX, Section 8, of the Idaho Constitution. See id.,

,,27-30 The Attorney General also sought a preliminary injunction preventing the Land Board
and the Department from implementing the lease rates approved at the Land Board's March 2010
meeting, and raised an alternative claim that the rental rate set by the Land Board violated § 58310A because it did not generate market rent throughout the duration of the lease term. See id. at

That same day, the Attorney General also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
which was heard and granted by Judge Bail on December 15, 2010. The Court issued a written
Order for Preliminary Injunction on December 17, 201 0, which prohibited the Director of the
Department of Lands from implementing the leases approved at the Land Board's March 2010

2 This

Opinion was subsequently withdrawn and reissued with minor revisions on December 23, 2010. See

OberrechtAff, Exh.l.
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meeting, and ordered the existing Lessees would remain in possession under the existing lease

terms and conditions.
The Land Board met four days later, on December 21, 2010. See Oberrecht Ail., Exh. G.
The Land Board approved offering existing Lessees a

one~year

lease on the existing lease tenns

and conditions, to commence January 1, 2011. See id., p. 5. The Land Board also approved
notifying leaseholders that the 2012 lease would be offered at a rental rate of 4% with no
premium rent. See id. pp. 5-6. The Attorney General voted in favor of both motions. See id.
Two days after this meeting, the Attorney General filed the present motion for summary
judgment, seeking a declaration that § 58-310A is unconstitutional because it does not require
cottage site leases to be awarded subject to conflict auction procedures.

LEGAL STANDARDS
Noticeably absent from the Attorney General's briefing is any mention of the significant
burdens placed on one who challenges the constitutionality of a state statute. See Brief in Support
3

of Motion for Preliminary Injunction ("Prelim. Injunction Brief'), pp. 10-11. For a facial
constitutional challenge to succeed, the party must demonstrate the law is unconstitutional in all

of its applications. See Loehsa Falls, L.L.c. v. State, 147 Idaho 232,207 P.3d 963, 972 (2009). In
other words, "the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
[law] would be valid." Id The burden of showing unconstitutionality is upon the party asserting

it, and invalidity must be clearly shown. See Moon v. State Bd. of Land Comm 'rs, III Idaho 389,
392, 724 P.2d 125, 128 (1986). In Moon, the Idaho Supreme Court set forth the general rules
applicabJe to constitutional challenges of state statutes:

The Attorney General's Motion for Summary Judgment incorporates the brief submitted in support of his Motion
for Prelimjnary lnjunction as the brief in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment. See Motion for Summary
Judgment and Incorporation of Supporting Brief, p. 2,

3
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A legislative act is presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubt as to its
constitutionality must be resolved in favor of validity. Where a statute is open to
two constructions, one of which will render it unconstitutional and the other
constitutional, the rule of construction must be adopted which -will uphold it. In
the proper application of the foregoing rules, it becomes the duty of the courts to
uphold the constitutionality of legislative enactments if such can be accomplished
by reasonable construction. It is fundamental that the judicial power to declare
legislative action invalid upon constitutional grounds is to be exercised only in
clear cases. The constitutional invalidity must be manifest, and if it rests upon
disputed questions of fact, the invalidating facts must be proved.

Id. Further, legislative history does not render unconstitutional a statute that meets constitutional
standards on its face. See Slate ". Casey, J25 Idaho 856, 858, 876 P.2d 138, 141 (1994). The
Attorney General cannot meet these signiflcant burdens., and his motion should therefore be
denied.

ANALYSIS
1.

Idaho Code Section 58-310A is constitutional on its face.

A.

The term disposal does not include leases.

Article IX, Section 8, only requires "disposals" of state lands to be made at public
auction. The same rules apply to the construction of constitutional provisions as applied to the
construction

of statutes. See Higer v. Hansen, 67 Idaho 45, 52, 170 P .2d 411, 415 (1946).

Whenever the language of a constitutional provision is plain, simple, direct and unambiguous, it
does not require coostruction-it construes itself. ld. The framers of our Constitution must be
understood to have employed words in their natural sense. and to have intended what they have
said. Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 138, 804 P.2d 308, 311 (1990). Where terms of a
constitutional provision are not entirely free from doubt, they must be interpreted as nearly as
possible in consonance with the objects and purposes in contemplation at the time of their
adoption. Higer, 67 Idaho at 53, 170 P.2d at 415. Accordingly, it has been held, in aid of the
interpretation of such terms, that the court may consider conditions existing prior to and at the
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time of the adoption of the provision under consideration, the debates in a constitutional
convention, and the printed arguments for and against the provision submitted to the people at
the polls. fd.
The word "disposal" is defined as "sale, pledge, giving away, use, consumption or any
other disposition of a thing." Black's

Law Dictionary 471 (6111 ed. 1990). Webster's Dictionary

defines dispose as "to transfer to the control of another, to get rid of, to deal with conclusively."
With regard to real property, a disposal would thus involve the transfer of one's entire interest in
property, otherwise known as a fee simple interest. See C & G. Inc., 135 Idaho 763. 768,25 PJd

76, 81 (2001) (holding where there is no language in a deed limiting the estate conveyed or
restricting the purpose of the grant, it will be seen as conveying fee simple title). By contrast, a
lease only conveys a leasehold interest in return for a promise to pay rent periodically. See
Krassell v. Koester, 99 Idaho 124, ]25, 578 P.2d 240, 241 (1978). A leasehold interest is
comprised of contract rights and a. limited ownership interest in the real property. See Id. The
pJain meaning of the word "disposal" does not encompass partia1 conveyances of real property
such as leases. As such, the cottage site leases are not subject to the public auction provision of

Article IX, Section 8.
The Idaho Supreme Court has similarly interpreted the term disposal. The Court held an
Idaho statute allowing the State to exchange school endo'WIllent lands without resorting to a
public auction was constitutional, because the exchange did not constitute an unqualified
surrender or giving away of state lands and therefore did not qualify as a disposal under the
Constitution. See Rogers v. Hawley, 19 Idaho 751, 754, 115 P. 687, 690 (1911). The following

year, the Court concluded statutes permitting the Land Board to convey a right-of-way over state
lands to a private party for irrigation purposes was constitutional, thereby implying the
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conveyance of a right-of-way was not a disposal within the meaning of Article IX, Section 8.

Tobey v. Bridgewood. 22 Idaho 566,583, 127 P. 178, 183 (1912). Several years later, the Court
confirmed Article IX, Section 8, only applies where the state parts with a fee interest:
By holding that said provisions of section 8 are applicable when the state parts
with the fee, and not where it grants an easement, the sections of the Constitution
in regard to the sale of school lands and of eminent domain can be made effective
and hannonious.

Idaho-Iowa Lateral & Reservoir Co.• Ltd. v. Fisher, 27 Idaho 695, 705, lSI P. 998, 1002
(1915).
The Court later held the Land Board had the power to initiate offers to lease, thus
implying leases were n01 disposals subject to public auction. See Allen v. Smylie, 92 Idaho 846,
851-852, 452 P.2d 343, 348-49 (1969). The Court held the power to grant or reject a lease is a

discretionary power of the Land Board, and that it could not identify any legislative acts that

would prohibit the Land Board from initiating and conveying an offer to lease to a private party,
See id. at 850-52,347-49. In analyzing the language of Article IX, Section 8, the Court made no
mention of the public auction language, but concluded the power to initiate lease offers flowed
from the Board's obligation to lease property in such a manncr as will secure the maximmn
amount therefor. 4 See id. at 852, 452 P.2d at 349.
This constitutional construction is borne out by the debates of the framers during the
constitutional convention. During the convention, there was vigorous debate over whether state

lands should even be subject to sale or lease. See Dennis C. Colson, Idaho's Constitution: The

Tie That Binds, 110-113 (2003). The parties eventually reacbed a compromise:
Aaron Parker's absolute prohibition on sale was ultimately defeated, but his

motion had its affect. The debate produced a compromise policy. Section 8 of the
4 In 1982. Article IX, Section 8, was amended to replace "in such a manner as will secure the maximum possible
amount therefore" language with "in such manner as will secure the maximum long-term financial return. House

Joint Res. 18, 1982 Leg.
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article as finally passed authorized disposal, but with conditions. The amount sold
could not exceed twenty-five sections in anyone year, it could not be sold for less
than $10 per acre, it was to be sold at public auction, and it was to be sold in
subdivisions not to exceed one hundred sixty acres to anyone individual,
company or corporation.

Id. at 113. Professor Colson's text on Idaho's constitutional conventions has been utilized by the
Supreme Court to aid in the interpretation of other constitutional provisions, and is therefore
considered a reliable source for detennining the intent of the framers ofIdaho's Constitution. See

Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 136 Idaho 560, 561, 38 P.3d 598, 605 (2001). The framers' intent that
disposal only apply to sales of state lands was fuIther evidenced by the actions of Idaho's early

state legislatures, which as previously mentioned, passed a law that only required conflict
auctions when two or more individuals applied to lease the same land. There is no limiting
language in Article IX, Section 8, that states auctions must only be held when two

Of

more

people seek to obtain the same state property. If the framers had truly intended that all leases of
state lands be subject to conflict auctions, they would have promptly passed a law requiring
auctions for all leases.
Even today, there are multiple categories of school land leases that are not subject to
conflict auctions, thereby indicating the Land Board, Department of Lands and Idaho Legislature
do not believe leases constitute disposals subject to public auction. Idaho law specifically
exempts commercial land leases from conflict auctions. I.C. § 58-307(11). The Land Board is

authorized to unilaterally set rental rates for

state~owned submerged and formerly submerged

lands, and no provision exists for conflict auctions in the event two or more individuals apply to
lease the same area. See I.C. § 47-714; see also IDAPA 20.03.17.03, -035. Existing Lessees of
mineral right leases are afforded a preferential right under certain circumstances that exempts
them from conflict auctions for a

two~year

period. See I.C. § 47-704. During this year's
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legislative session, a law was passed amending the statutory framework for geothermal leases to
provide that leases may be awarded pursuant to a variety options, only one of which involves

competitive bidding. See H.B. 53 (2011), amending

I.e. § 47-1605.

And the Land Board is

authorized to lease any portion of the old penitentiary site to private persons, firms or
corporations for a term not to exceed fifty years, with no mention of being subject to a conflict
auction. See

I.e. § 58-337. The lack of a public auction mandate dlrecting that any of these state

leases be subject to conflict auctions further confirms that leases are not considered a disposal
under Article IX, Section 8.
Significantly, the Attorney General likewise concluded the disposal language in Article
IX, Section 8, did not encompass cottage site leases in a 1990 Legal Guideline issued to
legislator concerning then-proposed § 58-3] OA. See Oberrecht Aff., Exh. H. Interestingly
enough, the legal opinion is authored by Deputy Attorney General Steven Strack, whQ submitted

an Affidavit in support of the present motion. Although Deputy Strack attached to his Affidavit
a copy of a 2009 legal opinion he co-authored finding § 58-310A unconstitutional, he failed to

attach a copy of the 1990 opinion he authored advising the chairman of the House Agricultural
Affairs Committee that § 58-310A was constitutional.

Deputy Strack's analysis relied on many of the same Idaho Supreme Court cases cited

above for the conclusion that the Idaho Supreme Court has concluded the public auction
provision applies only where fee simple title is conveyed. See id, pp. 4-5. Notably, Deputy
Strack analyzed the issue in tenns of whether § 58-31OA could possibly be interpreted in a
constitutional fashion. and expressly advised that legisJative acts are presumed constitutional
unless clearly not susceptible to a valid constitutional interpretation. See id., pp. 6. Deputy
Strack concluded it was possible to lnterpret Article IX, Section 8, as vesting in the Land Board
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the discretion to lease state lands through methods other than public auction, and therefore § 58310A would likely survive constitutional scrutiny. !d.
Neither the Attorney General's subsequent 2009 Advisory Opinion, nor the Idaho

Watershed cases alter this conclusion. In stark contrast to his 1990 legal opinion, Deputy
Strack's 2009 Opinion is a piece of advocacy that does not even attempt to create the appearance
of an unbiased interpretation of § 58-310A. He instead pulls out all the stops in an attempt to
persuade the reader the statute is unconstitutional. See Strack Aff., Exh. B. Gone is the
recognition that statutes are presumed constitutional, and the acknowledgement that the law only
requires a constitutional interpretation be possible in order to uphold a statute.
In its place is a repackaging of the 1990 opinion, with the addition of the Idaho

Watershed cases.

The cases and several appraisal and policy reports are the only new

information that was not available at the time Deputy Strack wrote the 1990 opinion. Comparing
the wo opinions is a bit like traveling tluough the Looking Glass. The cases and the
constitutional convention proceedings cited in support of the 1990 conclusion that § 58-310A
was constitutional were turned on their head and alleged to support the 2009 conclusion that the
same statute is unconstitutionaL Un surprisingly enough, this ISO-degree change in position is
not bome out by the case law, constitutional convention proceedings or legislative history
following Idaho's admission to the union.
Deputy Strack's 2009 interpretation of lhese materials is unsupported for the reasons
cited previously herein. His contention that the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings in Rogers,

Tobey, and Idaho-Iowa Lateral somehow indicate leases are disposals and subject to public
auction are without merit As set forth above, the Idaho Supreme Court repeatedly confmned in
those cases that the tenn "disposal" as used in Article IX, Section S, was intended to apply only
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to fee simple transfers, not other limited conveyances such as leases. For the same reasons, the
constitutional convention proceedings and legislative enactments following Idaho's admission
simi1arly indicate leases were not intended to fall within the public auction requirement.
The Idaho Watershed cases hold no different. Deputy Strack's 2009 Advisory Opinion,
as well as the Attorney General's argument in support of the present motion, rely heavily on
what are referred to as "IWP f', "IWP IF', and "/WP IIr. See Prelim. Inj. Memo., p. 5. In the
interest of consistency, Lessees will refer to these three cases by the same names. The Attorney
General relies on IWP I, IWP III, and East Side Blaine County Live Stock

ASS'11

for the same

reason and in support of the same premise--that the Idaho Supreme Court's mere mention of
Article IX, Section 8, in opinions holding the Land Board was either obligated to or constrained
from taking action pursuant to a state statute somehow equates to a holding that the Land Board
was also constitutionally compelled or restrained. A closer reading of these three decisions
reveals the Attorney General has improperly construed the decisions.
Idaho Watershed J was decided in 1996, and concerned whether the Land Board was
permitted under I.e. § 58-310B to award a grazing auction to an applicant who did not bid at the

conflict auction. See Idaho Watersheds Project, Inc. v. State Bd. of Land Comm'rs ("IWP r'),
128 Idaho 761, 766,918 P.2d 1206, 1211 (1996). The Court held that while the Land Board had

broad discretion to determine what constituted the maximum longptenn financial return for
schools, it did not have the legal ability to reject the sole bid placed lIt a conflict auction and
grant the lease to someone who appeared but did not bid. See id. at 765-766,918 P.2d at 12101211.

The Attorney General ignores the vast majority of the decision and instead fixates on a
concluding sentence that follows a lengthy paragraph analyzing whether § 58-310 authorized the
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actions of the Land Board: "The Board does not have the discretion to grant a lease to an
applicant who does not place a bid at an auction, based upon Idaho's constitutional and statutory
mandate that the Board conduct an auction." See Prelim, Inj. Memo., p. 5. The reference to

Idaho's Constitution is not part of the Court's holding and completely unnecessary to its
decision, which relies almost entirely on the provisions of §§ 58-310 and 58-31 OB, which
provide for conflict auctions regarding grazing leases. At no point does the Court hold cottage
site leases are subject to auction or that the Board's actions were unlawful because it was
required to conduct an auction but did not. The holding has no constitutional roots, but is instead
based on the lack of any legal authority to support the act of holding a statutorily required
auction, but then refusing to award the lease to the only bidder at the auction. See id
The Attorney General relies on East Side for similar reasons. See Prelim. lnj. Memo.,
p. 10. In East Side, a state statu1e provided if two or more individuals applied to lease the same
grazing land, a conflict auction would be held and the lease would be offered to the highest
bidder. East Side Blaine County Live Stock Ass'n, 34 Idaho 807, 813-14, 198 P. 760. 761 (1921).
The Land Board, however, awarded the grazing lease to a company without holding an auction.

ld.
The Attorney General relies on a general statement in East Side, to the effect that Idaho's
Constitution and statutes required the Land Board to offer the lease to the highest bidder. As with

IWP 1, the statutorily created auction requirement distinguishes this case from § 58-310A. The
Court's analysis repeatedly refers to the statutory basis for the auction requirement, making the
Constitutional references surplusage and not a basis for the Court's holding. For the reasons set
forth herein, cottage site leases are not disposals subject to public auction.
In lWP IIf, the Supreme Court held § 58-310B'5 express direction to the Land Board to
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consider the interests of the state in general in addition to the interests of the beneficiaries, was in
violation of Article IX, Section 8's directive to maximize long-term financial returns to the
beneficiaries. Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Bd. of Land Comm 'rs ("IWP II!"). 133 Idaho

64, 67.982 P.2d 367,370 (1999). The Attorney General relies on IWP III for the premise that the
Land Board cannot take action for the benefit of anyone other than the beneficiaries. See Prelim,

Inj. Memo., p. 6. Lessees do not dispute that Article IX, Section 8, directs the Land Board to
hold lands for the benefit of and to maximize the long-ternl returns for beneficiaries.

As

explained in more detail below, the exemption of cottage site leases from conflict auctions is not
only consistent with this constitutional language, but also increases returns to the beneficiaries by
reducing the risks to the state. Idaho Code Section 58-31OA is therefore consistent with the
holding of IWP Ill.
It is important to note the significant differences between §§ 58-310A and 58-310B.

Idaho Code Section 58-310B was not only adopted at a different time than § 58-310A, but
concerned grazing leases instead of cottage site leases, and required grazing leases to be subject
to conflict auctions, rather than exempting them. Further, § 58-31 OB directed the Land Board to
consider specified criteria before awarding a grazing lease, including directing the Land Board to

make decisions that benefitted the state in general. Although § 58-310A states in its findings
section that conflict auctions have caused considerab1e consternation to cottage site Lessees, at
no point does the statute direct the Land Board to consider interests other than those of the
beneficiaries or to the detriment of beneficiaries.
Finally, in IWP II, the Court invalidated a voter-approved ballot measure because it
impermissibly combined separate and incongruous amendments, in violation of another
provision in the Idaho Constitution. See Idaho Watersheds Project v. Marvel r"JWP 11"), 133
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Idaho 55, 59, 982 P.2d 358, 362 (1999). One of the amendments sought to change the word
"disposal" to "sale." The Attorney General contends the fact such a ballot measure was proposed
evidences that people generally understood the word "disposal" to include leases. See Prelim.lnj.
Memo., pp. 5-6. Appendix 1 to IWP II indicates otherwise.
The Appendix includes Legislative Council's Statements of Meaning and Purpose of
Proposed Amendments. These statements were drafted by the State Legislative Council, which is
made up of elected senators and representatives.

In the Statements Against the Proposed

Amendments, Idaho's own elected officials conceded that the word "disposal" has historically
been interpreted to mean a sale. ld. at 64, 982 P.2d at 367. In the Statements For the Proposed
Amendments, Legislative Council stated that while a lease is sometimes promoted as being
wi.thin the tenn "disposal," a lease is not a pennanent decision and should be distinguished from
a sale. fd. at 63, 982 P.2d at 366.

These interpretations by Idaho's own legislators further

support the conclusion that the word "disposaJ" is commonly understood 10 mean conveyances
offee title, rather than leasehold interests. The Attorney General's arguments are without merit,
and his motion should be denied.
B.

A barmonious construction of Article IX, Section 8. furtber compels
tbe conclusion tbat leases are not disposals subject to public auction.

There are two potentially competing provisions in Article IX, Section 8, relating to
cottage site teases. The flrst is the requirement that state lands be rented "in such a manner as

will secure the maximum long-term financial return to the institution to which granted." The
second is the directive that state lands be "carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to
disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for which said grants of
land were made." These two clauses both require acting in the best interest of the beneficiaries,
but may conflict to the extent disposal at public auction does not secure the maximum long-term
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fInancial return to beneficiaries.
Provisions of the Constitution, insofar as they relate to the same subject matter, must be
construed together. Idaho Press Club v. State Legislature of the State, 142 Idaho 640, 644, 132
PJd 397> 401 (2006). Further, it is a princip~e of constitutional interpretation that provisions
apparently in conflict must be reconciled, if at aU possible. Idaho Power Co. v. State, By and

Through Dep't a/Water Resources, 104 Idaho 570, 573,661 P.2d 736, 740 (1983). Only where
an irreconcilable conflict eldsts will the court resort to methods of statutory or constitutional
interpretation which would have one provision prevail over another. See Id.
In this instance. the statute's exemption of cottage site leases from the conflict auction
provisions and charging market rent ensures leases generate maximum long-term returns
throughout the duration of the lease as required by Article lX, Section 8. The State's own report
commissioned from the University of Idaho concedes that out of the various options available to

maximize long-tenn returns, auctions involve the most financial risk to the State. See Strack Aff.,
Exh. C, p. 21.
By exempting Lessees from the conflict auction requirement, Lessees are encouraged to
develop and maintain their leaseholds. This development and maintenance produces increased
revenues for 1.he beneficiaries. 1n other words, by interpreting the disposal language of Article
IX, Section 8 J as applying only to fee simple interests. the Land Board is able to ensure leases
generate maximum long-term financial returns. A contrary interpretation ties the hands of the

Land Board, in direct contravention of the holding in Allen v. Smylie that the Land Board's
obligation to ensure maximum returns gives it broad discretion in leasing, including the ability to
initiate offers to lease through avenues other than public auction. It makes no sense to say the

Land Board's ability to ensure maximum long-tcnn returns will actually be improved by
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restricting the options it has in managing state lands. If the Attorney General believes public
auctions are the only means to maximize long-tenn financial returns, then it is his burden to
establish facts supporting his position. See Moon, 111 Idaho at 392, 724 P.2d at 128. However,

for the reasons set forth herein, he cannot meet this burden.
As stated previously, it is both possible and logical to interpret § 58-310A in a
constitutional manner. The plain meaning of the word "disposal," as well as the Idaho Supreme
Court's decisions and the constitutional and legislative history following Idaho's admission to
the union, indicate leases were never intended to be treated as disposals under Artic1e IX, Section
8. The Attorney General has reached a similar conclusion in the past, although he now disavows
that analysis. The Idaho Watershed cases did not hold cottage site leases were required to be
submitted to public auction. nor did they conclude that § 58-31 OA was unconstitutional. Further,
a harmonious reading of the public auction and maximizing long-term returns language of
Article IX, Section 8, compels the conclusion that leases are not disposals subject to public
auction. The Attorney General's motion should be denied.
2.

Invalidation of § 58-310A will not resolve the Attorney General's concerns.

A closer examination of the Attorney General's argument reveals the crux of his
argument is actually that the Land Board has not been charging market rent as required by § 58310A. Although the Attorney General contends on page 2 of his memorandum that this case i§.
not about the Land Board's actions, a plain reading of his briefing reveals otherwise:

By ignoring the Constitution's unequivocal direction, the 1990 Act interfered with
at least one purpose of the public auction requirement: to use the give-and-take of
the free market as a mechanism for securing maximum long-term financial return
for the endowment land beneficiaries. Prelim. Inj. Memo., p. 2 (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court invalidated Idaho Code § 58-31 DB because it impermissibly
directed the Land Board to consider interests other than the endowment land
beneficiaries in making leasing determinations; so, too, § 58-310A reflects the
Legislature IS detennination to ameliorate existing lessees' "consternation and
dismay" by removing the market force mechanism implicit in a public auction and
substituting the Land Boardls market rent assessment. Id at 6 fnA (italics in
original, underlining added).
In so doing, the Act ran directly counter to the explicit language of Article IX,
Section 8, and imposed on the Board a duty-i. e.. to make "market rent"
assessments--that the Constitution's drafters committed to public auction
processes in the first instance. Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added).
The Attorney General repeatedly emphasizes § S8-310A is unconstitutional because the
Land Board is either unable or unwilling to determine what constitutes market rent when it

comes to cottage site leases. Although he has presented absolutely no evidence on this issue and
therefore failed to meet his burden, his argument both expressly and implicitly urges that only
conflict auctions can determine market rent and thus maximize the long-term fmandal return to
beneficiaries. While Lessees do not agree the Land Board previously set market rent too low, the
remedy the Attorney General seeks-the declaration of § 58-310A as unconstitutional-will not
resolve his concerns.
In the event § 58-310A is declared unconstitutional, cottage site leases applications will
be subject to conflict auctions under I.C. § 58-310. That statute provides:
When two (2) or more persons apply to lease the same land. the director of the
Department of Lands, or his agent, shall, at a stated time, and at such place as he
may designate. auction off and lease the land to the applicant who will pay the
highest premium bid therefore, the annual rent to be established by the state board
of land commissioners.

I.e.

§ 58-310(1) (emphasis added). Thus, regardless of whether § 58-31OA survives

constitutional scrutiny, the Land Board wil1 still be setting cottage site rental rates. Declaring

§ 58-31 OA unconstitutional therefore does absolutely nothing to resolve the Attorney General's
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stated goal of ensuring lease rates are set at market rate. Rather. if he has his way, he ",111
eviscerate the market rate for cottage site leases, because the requirement only appears in § 583 IOA. It is uncJear, to say the least, how the Attorney General believes market rent will be
achieved under these circumstances.
Given the Attorney General is presumed to know the content of the statutes he is charged
with enforcing, one has to question what this argument is really about. One possible explanation
is found in the premium rent concept. Idaho Code Section 58-310 anticipates applicants will pay
a premium, above and beyond the rent set by the Land Board, to obtain the leased premises. In
February 2010, the Attorney General's own economic expert testified before the Land Board
concerning the relationship between market rent and leasehold values:
If the Land Board is charging a rent below what it's worth, there will be a share of
the leasehold value in excess of that rent because I think, just like the grazer
thinks, I'm getting a good deal from the Land Board. If the Land Board is
charging market rents, then stop wonying about leasehold value attributable to the
land that you control - it ain't there. There is no such thing. If you're charging
market rents, the only way there's leasehold value is if the purchaser of the
property believes that the improvements are worth more than the appraised value.
Pure and simple.
Therefore, in my professional opinion, the first and foremost goal of this Board
should be to get rents up to market rent so that the leasehold discussion

disappears.
See Oberrecht Aff., Exh. C at 75:2152-2161. If the Attorney General's stated purpose is

achieved, and the Land Board is suddenly capable of charging market rent, there should be no
premium rent. Forcing bidders to pay a. premium to obtain a lease would vio1ate the very market
principles espoused by the Attorney General and his economist. However, this appears to be the
logical endpoint if the Attorney General's argument is accepted.
Such action will not ensure market rent is achieved, but instead create an additional
revenue stream for the State. The creation of additional revenue streams is not a basis to declare
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a statute unconstitutional. The Attorney General's motion should be therefore be denied.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth previously herein, § 58-31OA is capable of a constitutional
interpretation. The Attorney General has failed to overcome the very significant hurdles required
to show a statute is unconstitutional, and his motion should be denied.
DATED this 19th day of April, 2011.
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